The Narrative Nature of Ethical Discourse

Social Problems, 1980

Verlag Karl Alber, 2024

The idea that all ethical problems can be resolved with only one moral principle - be that Kant's Categorical Imperative or the utilitarian principle of maximising utility - is not only fundamentally misguided, but also incapable of doing justice to the complexity of moral reality. The present book shows the foundations of "ethics as a method" and thereby stems itself substantially against traditional ethical theory. The suggested ethical method allows one to discuss and resolve moral issues in the grey area between the claims of universalism and particularism. Only a moral expert is capable to understand the complex relations of holistic moral reality in an appropriate way and to find a proper solution for every ethical problem. Whereas ethical theories so far have only been approximate evaluations of certain parts of moral reality, the moral expert now appears as a person who takes into view the entirety of moral reality. The complexity of a difficult moral problem can only be appreciated appropriately when we employ a pluralistic ethical method.

This manuscript will be reviewed as part of a postgraduate philosophy course autumn 2024. All comments, critique and corrections until end of the year greatly appreciated.

Igwebuike: An African Journal of Arts and Humanities, 2020

The concept of ethics is often an object of misconception, misinterpretation and mismatching with other terms like morality, value and aesthetics in philosophy especially among undergraduate students of Arts and Humanities. It is evident that a good number of them are sometimes confused when it comes to the definition and meaning of ethics, its differences from the notion of morality and the relationship between the two in moral philosophy. There are those that do not know why there are various ethical theories and justification for them in the society that cherished such ethical theories. Again, there are young learners who desire to know the similarities, differences and relationship between normative and meta-ethics. Therefore, this paper is concerned with the definition and meaning of ethics, the differences between meta-ethics and normative ethics, the differences between ethics and morality, the significance each plays in the understanding of ethics and implications inherent in their relationship with one another. Besides, the paper also gives a general survey of special ethics to young and curious minds with reference to various professions that are growing up in leap and bound of our contemporary society.

Human Studies, 1991

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, 2021

This paper presents a new argument for thinking of traditional ethical theories as methods that can be used in first-order ethics. It begins from outlining how ethical theories, such as consequentialism and contractualism, are flexible frameworks in which different versions of these theories can be formulated to correspond to different first-order ethical views. The paper then argues that, as a result, the traditional ethical theories cannot be evaluated in terms of their truth or correctness. Instead, I will suggest that these theories should be understood as providing different kind of ways of thinking about difficult moral problems. I then recommend a certain form of pragmatic pluralism - it may well be that different moral problems are better approached through different ethical theories.

Oxford Handbook of Anscombe , 2021

This chapter compares the general form and state of moral philosophy during the first half of the twentieth century (§1) to how it stands today (§3). These two overviews serve as the bread of a GEMA-filled sandwich. In §2 I accordingly consider Anscombe's criticisms of 'modern moral philosophy' from Sidgwick to Ross. Anyone in sympathy with the general line of her criticisms, I argue, must concede that the state of moral philosophy was in far better shape in the decades before she wrote her seminal 1958 paper than it has been ever since. Ironically, contemporary moral philosophy has become what it is partly due to Anscombe's own unintended role in influencing (i) the formation of 'virtue theory' as yet another position within normative ethics, and (ii) the fashioning of 'moral psychology' as an altogether distinct-and increasingly empirical-branch of moral philosophy.

2016

The goal of this paper is to suggest that theoretical thinking with respect to metaphysical determinations or indeterminations is not the appropriate realm for attributing moral responsibility. On the contrary, judgments that attribute moral responsibility (S is responsible for...) depend on the possibility that a rational narrative be built. Agents are capable of forging their future actions, as well as of reflecting upon past actions. With this it will also be shown how we assume control of our behavior because we ignore whether actions are the result of causality or chance. It is claimed that contexts determine the degree of causal demand in narratives that attribute moral responsibility. In order to construct this type of narrative one must focus on a specific link in the causal chain of explanations. If context alone is not demanding enough so as to require that theoretical reflections strive for the ultimate foundation of our actions, then the agent may be considered responsib...

Ethical theory and moral practice, 2003

ABSTRACT. In recent times, comments have been made and arguments advanced in support of metaethical positions based on the 'phenomenology' of ethical experience – in other words, the 'feel' that accompanies our ethical experiences. In this paper I cast doubt on ...

What makes right actions right and wrong actions wrong? This draft text surveys some of the more influential attempts to answer this question in the history of Western philosophy.

Journal of Philosophical Theological Research (JPTR), 2019

The paper attempts to give a systematic survey of different strands and intentions of “narrative ethics” both in philosophy and in theology and proposes how to develop narrative ethics in the future. This proposal features three different dimensions of the term “moral vision,”, i.e. morally substantial ideas that are embedded in traditions (Moral Vision 1), the appropriation of these ideas by particular historical cultures or individuals (Moral Vision 2) and moral perception channeled by Moral Vision 2 (Moral Vision 3). Narrative ethics, the paper argues, can describe how (religious) traditions can inspire moral thinking and learning without falling prey to traditionalism. Theological ethics is about forming an ethical culture in which we remind each other of the stories that continue to inspire us and in which we tell each other of our moral world-view and commitments, our strong feelings about the good and the bad which are based in our individual and common lives and not derived from grammatical rules or ultimate principles.

The book is both richly instructive and delightful to read. Voorhoeve has a sophisticated command of his interlocutorsʼ philosophical views, and his questions often hit the nail on the head. He has the talent to ask difficult questions in a welcoming way, setting the stage for his interviewees to explain their positions as clearly as they can. For the reader interested in moral theory this is a true asset, since Voorhoeve managed to assemble quite a few of the figures that have shaped the face of moral philosophy in the past generation to discuss fundamentals of their moral views.

Ethical language as an alternative to phenomenology, 2014

In this paper, I intend to reflect on the meaning of what Emmanuel Levinas called “ethical language” for the consideration of humanity and its role in the contemporary world. The point of departure for my considerations is the phenomenological tradition, in which Levinas is included. However, his philosophy goes far beyond phenomenology, pointing to ethics as the main direction for the contemporary era. In his propositions, such values as responsibility and devotion to the Other may be the basis for thought on what it means to "be responsible" and on how to formulate responsibility in language (which would be "ethical language", "the language of responsibility"). In this perspective, ethical language moves far beyond a communicative function, becoming a certain way of being, a responsible function in society. The paper is divided into three parts. The first one is a presentation of Levinas’ thought against the background of phenomenology and a demonstration of “anti-phenomenological” moments in this philosophy. In the second one, I get closer to what the philosopher understood as "ethical language". In the third part, I indicate an actuality of "ethical language" as responsibility for one's own actions as well as those of others, including the responsibility towards future generations.