The ontology of beliefs from a cognitive perspective

Theoria, 2008

I limit the discussion here to linguistically and conceptually competent cognizers. * I am indebted to Lynne Baker for the suggestion and stimulation to write this paper. 'Cf. my [9], Section VII; my [ l l ] and my [I21 4Cf. also Harman, 461, ch. 4, Section 11. 9-Theoria 31986 '*For more on the relation of a belief to the object it is about, cf. my [9], sections IV-IX. I develop a full-fledged theory of this relation in my 1151. For a condensed version of some of its main ideas, cf. my [14].

Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science, 2020

The empirical study of belief is emerging at a rapid clip, uniting work from all corners of cognitive science. Reliance on belief in understanding and predicting behavior is widespread. Examples can be found, inter alia, in the placebo, attribution theory, theory of mind, and comparative psychological literatures. Research on belief also provides evidence for robust generalizations, including about how we fix, store, and change our beliefs. Evidence supports the existence of a Spinozan system of belief fixation: one that is automatic and independent of belief rejection. Independent research supports the existence of a system of fragmented belief storage: one that relies on large numbers of causally isolated, context-sensitive stores of belief in memory. Finally, empirical and observational data support at least two systems of belief change. One system adheres, mostly, to epistemological norms of updating; the other, the psychological immune system, functions to guard our most centrally held beliefs from potential inconsistency with newly formed beliefs. Refining our understanding of these systems can shed light on pressing real-world issues, such as how fake news, propaganda, and brainwashing exploit our psychology of belief, and how best to construct our modern informational world.

2004

Two of the greatest problems of research on affective factors, and in particular, research on beliefs, is what and how we observe. The first difficulty is due to the lack of a clear terminology; but even once it has been clearly decided what to observe, it is not easy to put this into practice. This report describes from a theoretical point of view the results obtained using a new questionnaire appositely designed to overcome some critical points of beliefs' observation.

2023

Some Remarks on Beliefs and Normativity The aim of this work is to present some recent observations in Cognitive Science about beliefs and the way they are able to originate chains of actions and condition behaviors. It is not my aim to evaluate reliabilist views on beliefs in Philosophical Epistemology, but only to point out that certain scientific observations about the process of belief formation can help us to build an interesting theory. Contemporaneity brings many important challenges to traditional philosophical questions that can potentially broaden our knowledge, hence the importance of considering them in some detail. Some peculiarities of scientific investigation will be presented, some classifications to better understand the phenomenon of study, some difficulties that are imposed on scientific investigation and, finally, some considerations about the normative role of beliefs will be presented.

Frontiers in psychology, 2014

Over the past decades, delusions have become the subject of growing and productive research spanning clinical and cognitive neurosciences. Despite this, the nature of belief, which underpins the construct of delusions, has received little formal investigation. No account of delusions, however, would be complete without a cognitive level analysis of belief per se. One reason for this neglect is the assumption that, unlike more established and accessible modular psychological process (e.g., vision, audition, face-recognition, language-processing, and motor-control systems), beliefs comprise more distributed and therefore less accessible central cognitive processes. In this paper, we suggest some defining characteristics and functions of beliefs. Working back from cognitive accounts of delusions, we consider potential candidate cognitive processes that may be involved in normal belief formation. Finally, we advance a multistage account of the belief process that could provide the basis...

Journal of cognitive neuroscience, 2018

Cognitive neuroscience research has begun to explore the mental processes underlying what a belief and what believing is. Recent evidence suggests that believing involves fundamental brain functions that result in meaningful probabilistic representations, called beliefs. When relatively stable, these beliefs allow for guidance of behavior in individuals and social groups. However, they are also fluid and can be modified by new relevant information, interpersonal contact, social pressure, and situational demands. We present a theoretical model of believing that can account for the formation of both empirically grounded and metaphysical beliefs.

Artificial Intelligence, 1999

We suggest a foundational representation for the notion of belief and belief change process based on the notion of an epistemic state and its associated Scott consequence relation. We study the basic belief change operations in this framework and compare the resulting theory with related approaches.

Nordic Studies in Mathematics Education, 2011

This is an accepted version of a paper published in Nordisk matematikkdidaktikk.

Philosophical Papers, 2009

This paper claims that the standard characterization of the motivational role of belief should be supplemented. Beliefs do not only, jointly with desires, cause and rationalize actions that will satisfy the desires, if the beliefs are true; beliefs are also the practical ground of other cognitive attitudes, like imagining, which means beliefs determine whether and when one acts with those other attitudes as the cognitive inputs into choices and practical reasoning. In addition to arguing for this thesis, I take issue with Velleman's argument that belief and imagining cannot be distinguished on the basis of motivational role.

1997

Almost twenty years ago set forth the hypothesis that some species, notably humans and chimpanzees, have an innate "theory of mind." According to this hypothesis, some animals, and humans, are able to predict and explain the behavior of an individual by attributing to them beliefs, desires and other intentional states. This means that these species would have the so-called "folk psychology" in an internalized form. Folk psychology, as a means for understanding behavior, is generallly accepted in an instrumental form. The problem is whether the attributed intentional states are really present in the mind, or have to be considered as fictional entities. These are the positions, in turn, of Fodor and Dennett. I will try to show that the data marshaled in favor of the theory of mind are better suited for Dennett's view on ontology of intentional states than for Fodor's view. However, as we will see, Dennett's position should be modified from a fictional toward a more realistic view. Let us start from the theory of mind.

Cognitive Science, 2023

The notion of belief appears frequently in cognitive science. Yet it has resisted definition of the sort that could clarify inquiry. How then might a cognitive science of belief proceed? Here we propose a form of pluralism about believing. According to this view, there are importantly different ways to "believe" an idea. These distinct psychological kinds occur within a multi-dimensional property space, with different property clusters within that space constituting distinct varieties of believing. We propose that discovering such property clusters is empirically tractable, and that this approach can help sidestep merely verbal disputes about what constitutes "belief."

Invited lecture, Workshop Changing Minds, ILLC , 2004., 2004

I discuss on which bases we accept or reject a belief and the difference between just storing vs. believing. How this depends on the "source" reliability and the degree of credibility, on the convergence and confirmation among sources; on the importance and plausibility of the information. I discuss how beliefs support goals and in particular the role of beliefs in goal processing. How epistemic rationality impacts on pragmatic rationality; and how mind is in search for "coherence" both for beliefs and intentions.

Belief justification is essential in the justification of knowledge. Beliefs are due to a process involving perception. Perception is a source of knowledge and it is distinct and guides human beliefs and activities in life. The sources of belief include memory, hallucination and perception (sense-data). The justification of belief involves the connection between the results of the situational belief and the justified beliefs benefiting from it. Therefore, situational knowledge gives the justification for a belief and perception is a source of knowledge. However, intentions can influence the nature of perceiving. Introspection which helps in analysing an individual's inner life is also a form of knowledge. Other sources of knowledge include "memory as a storehouse of what we have learned in the past, introspection as a way to know our inner lives, reflection as a way to acquire knowledge of abstract matters, or testimony as a source of knowledge originally acquired by others." This article looks at belief acceptance and the conditions uses in achieving that.