How are Moral and Ego Development Related

Human Development, 2015

The notion that self-identity and morality are deeply implicated has long-standing roots in both ethical theory and psychology. In ethical theory it is evident in Harry Frankfurt's [1971] account of what it means to be a person: A person (as opposed to a wanton) is someone who cares about morality. A person cares about the desirability of one's desires (second-order desires) and then wishes to will them all the way to action (second-order volitions). Similarly, Charles Taylor [1989] argued that identity is defined by reference to things that have significance for us. It is the result of strong evaluation about what is worthy or unworthy, and these discriminations are made against a horizon of significance that frames and constitutes who we are as persons. He writes, "My identity is defined by the commitments and identifications which provide the frame or horizon within which I can try to determine from case to case what is good or valuable, or what ought to be done or what I endorse or oppose" [Taylor, 1989, p. 27]. The affinity of selfhood and morality is a theme in several psychological traditions as well. Erikson [1968, p. 39] argued, for example, that an ethical capacity is the "true criterion of identity," but he also noted that "identity and fidelity are necessary for ethical strength" [Erikson, 1964, p. 126]. This suggests that moral identity is the clear goal of both moral and identity development and that in the moral person the two developmental tracks are ideally conjoined. Similarly, Damon and Hart [1982] showed that, within each domain of the "Me Self" (physical, active, social, psychological), the highest level of self-understanding implicates a moral point of view. This suggests that the moral self is the clear outcome of self-development [Lapsley, 2005]. Indeed, recent research has shown that morality is considered indispensable to selfhood; it is the moral self that is essential to our identity, more than personality traits,

PsycEXTRA Dataset, 2000

The purposes of this study were to conceptualize moral identity as moral ideal self, to develop a measure of this construct, to test for age and gender differences, to examine links between moral ideal self and adolescent outcomes, and to assess purpose and social responsibility as mediators of the relations between moral ideal self and outcomes. Data came from a local school sample (Data Set 1: N ϭ 510 adolescents; 10-18 years of age) and a national online sample (Data Set 2: N ϭ 383 adolescents; 15-18 years of age) of adolescents and their parents. All outcome measures were parent-report (Data Set 1: altruism, moral personality, aggression, and cheating; Data Set 2: environmentalism, school engagement, internalizing, and externalizing), whereas other variables were adolescent-report. The 20-item Moral Ideal Self Scale showed good reliability, factor structure, and validity. Structural equation models demonstrated that, even after accounting for moral identity internalization, in Data Set 1 moral ideal self positively predicted altruism and moral personality and negatively predicted aggression, whereas in Data Set 2 moral ideal self positively predicted environmentalism and negatively predicted internalizing and externalizing symptoms. Further, purpose and social responsibility mediated most relations between moral ideal self and the outcomes in Data Set 2. Moral ideal self was unrelated to age but differentially predicted some outcomes across age. Girls had higher levels of moral ideal self than boys, although moral identity did not differentially predict outcomes between genders. Thus, moral ideal self is a salient element of moral identity and may play a role in morally relevant adolescent outcomes.

Applied Psychological Measurement, 1978

The present paper addresses three issues sur rounding Rest's Defining Issues Test, an objective test of moral development based on Kohlberg's six- stage theory of moral development. Those issues are (1) the stability of test scores over time; (2) correla tion of scores with Kohlberg's interview measure of moral development; and (3) the insensitivity of its scoring procedure, which ignores responses to all items keyed to lower stages. In two age heterogene ous samples, total score test-retest reliabilities were generally in the high .70's or low .80's, regardless of which of several scoring schemes was used. In another age heterogeneous sample, the correlation with scores on Kohlberg's test was .70; but in two age homogeneous samples, the correlations were about .35 and .20. These validity coefficients sug gest that (1) the common variance shared by Rest's and Kohlberg's tests in age heterogeneous samples can be attributed to the fact that scores on bo...

Current directions in psychological science, 2010

Most of us have at one point speculated about why one individual grew up to be honest and fair while another became wicked and untrustworthy. In the current review, we present the case that new directions in the empirical study of moral personality development are needed. We set the stage for this future work by presenting six propositions that should serve as the foundation for future research in the field. We conclude by providing an example of how using a more integrative and inclusive framework for studying personality can readily incorporate these propositions.

Moral cognition and decision making, Vol. 50 of the Psychology of Learning and Motivation series , 2009

We review how the construct of the moral self has arisen within moral development theory and discuss the search for integrative linkages with other domains of psychology, including personality. Next, we describe moral personality and then programs and approaches to developing moral identity in children. Moral schema development and moral information processing research is outlined, including mapping expert-novice differences. Finally, we conclude with two emerging integrative theories, one on educational intervention for moral skill development and the other a neurobiological model of moral functioning which draws on evolutionary themes in the development of a moral brain.

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2016

At first glance, one of the most obvious places to look for moral progress is in individuals, in particular in moral development from childhood to adulthood. In fact, that moral progress is possible is a foundational assumption of moral education. Beyond the general agreement that moral progress is not only possible but even a common feature of human development things become blurry, however. For what do we mean by 'progress'? And what constitutes moral progress? Does the idea of individual moral progress presuppose a predetermined end or goal of moral education and development, or not? In this article we analyze the concept of moral progress to shed light on the psychology of moral development and vice versa; these analyses are found to be mutually supportive. We suggest that: moral progress should be conceived of as development that is evaluated positively on the basis of relatively stable moral criteria that are the fruit and the subject of an ongoing conversation; moral progress does not imply the idea of an end-state; individual moral progress is best conceived of as the development of various components of moral functioning and their robust integration in a person's identity; both children and adults can progress morally-even though we would probably not speak in terms of progress in the case of children-but adults' moral progress is both more hard-won and to a greater extent a personal project rather than a collective effort.

European Journal of Developmental Psychology, 2013

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sublicensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology, 2005

By maintaining that moral functioning depends upon four components (sensitivity, judgment, motivation, and character), the Neo-Kohlbergian account of moral functioning allows for uneven moral development within individuals. However, I argue that the four-component model does not go far enough. I offer a more accurate account of moral functioning and uneven moral development. My proposal retains the account of sensitivity, divides the judgment component into a theorizing component and a reasoning component, and eliminates the motivation and character components.

Sam Houston State University , 2018

Extant literature has reported conflicting findings regarding moral preferences while ego depleted. Some suggested that when self-regulatory resources are exhausted, people are more preferential toward conservatism (Eidelman, Crandall, Goodman, & Blanchar, 2012) or moral foundations related to conservatism (Van Berkel, Crandall, Eidelman, & Blanchar, 2015). Others suggested that a more left-leaning moral preference is natural when participants are ego depleted (Wright & Baril, 2011). To elucidate these contradictory findings, the present study compared depleted and non depleted participant’s scores on Moral Foundation Vignettes (MFVs; Clifford, Iyengar, Cabeza, & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2015). Additionally, researchers have struggled to find a computerized depletion task with a strong effect size. The present study attempted to offer a solution to this problem in the form of an e-crossing procedure based on Haggar and colleagues’ (2016) replication report yet modified according to Baumeister and Vohs’ (2016) recommendation to include an initial, habit-forming phase. Both the sequential task paradigm and performance over time showed no evidence of an ego depletion effect. Surprisingly, moral judgements were uncorrelated with political orientation. Reliable depletion tasks must be developed before correlates with moral judgement can be studied.

Recent theorizing in moral psychology extends rationalist models by calling attention to social and cultural influences . Six studies using adolescents, university students, and adults measured the associations among the self-importance of moral identity, moral cognitions, and behavior. The psychometric properties of the measure were assessed through an examination of the underlying factor structure (Study 1) and convergent, nomological, and discriminant validity analyses (Studies 2 and 3). The predictive validity of the instrument was assessed by examinations of the relationships among the self-importance of moral identity, various psychological outcomes, and behavior (Studies 4, 5, and 6). The results are discussed in terms of models of moral behavior, social identity measurement, and the need to consider moral self-conceptions in explaining moral conduct.

Journal of Personality, 2013

This study was conceived to assess the agreement between self-and other reports of egoistic (E) and moralistic (M) self-enhancement (SE). A self-report scale assessing E-SE and M-SE was filled out by 304 participants (mean age = 39.11, SD = 10.12, 54% female). The scale, with items worded in third person, was also completed by 304 informants (one for each target participant). Data were subjected to a correlated-traits correlated-methods model. Confirmatory factor analysis yielded two distinct factors for both self-and other ratings of E-SE and M-SE.A significant correlation across raters was observed for each factor. Proportion of trait variance was .58 for E-SE and .35 for M-SE. Proportion of method variance was .24 and .41, respectively. E-SE and M-SE were substantially correlated within each data source. However, the two measures became orthogonal after method variance was partialed out. Measures of E-SE and M-SE include both trait and artifactual components of variance, which are likely to reflect individual differences in the style of self-presentation and response bias (i.e., tendencies to exaggerate agentic and communal qualities).The trait components of E-SE and M-SE represent two unrelated tendencies that can be captured and distinguished not only through self-judgments, but also by an external observer.

Developmental Psychology, 2014

This article introduces a special section on moral development. We claim that the field is now undergoing a resurgence of theoretical and methodological innovation after the eclipse of paradigmatic moral stage theory. Although research on prosocial development, moral emotions, and social domain theory has sustained interest in moral development, recent additional trends have contributed to its resurgence. This includes research in neuroscience, sociobiology, and social psychology; broad interest in moral-character education and virtues; and the appearance of recent handbooks and special journal issues. We review 3 broad possible future themes (early development, self and personality, and culture) of moral development research and introduce a set of new contributions in this special section as examples.

Developmental Psychology, 2014

The purposes of this study were to conceptualize moral identity as moral ideal self, to develop a measure of this construct, to test for age and gender differences, to examine links between moral ideal self and adolescent outcomes, and to assess purpose and social responsibility as mediators of the relations between moral ideal self and outcomes. Data came from a local school sample (Data Set 1: N ϭ 510 adolescents; 10 -18 years of age) and a national online sample (Data Set 2: N ϭ 383 adolescents; 15-18 years of age) of adolescents and their parents. All outcome measures were parent-report (Data Set 1: altruism, moral personality, aggression, and cheating; Data Set 2: environmentalism, school engagement, internalizing, and externalizing), whereas other variables were adolescent-report. The 20-item Moral Ideal Self Scale showed good reliability, factor structure, and validity. Structural equation models demonstrated that, even after accounting for moral identity internalization, in Data Set 1 moral ideal self positively predicted altruism and moral personality and negatively predicted aggression, whereas in Data Set 2 moral ideal self positively predicted environmentalism and negatively predicted internalizing and externalizing symptoms. Further, purpose and social responsibility mediated most relations between moral ideal self and the outcomes in Data Set 2. Moral ideal self was unrelated to age but differentially predicted some outcomes across age. Girls had higher levels of moral ideal self than boys, although moral identity did not differentially predict outcomes between genders. Thus, moral ideal self is a salient element of moral identity and may play a role in morally relevant adolescent outcomes.