Pragmatism, Phenomenalism, and Truth Talk

Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 1988

his essay offers a rational reconstruction of the career of a certain heroic apT proach to truth-the approach whose leading idea is that the special linguistic roles of truth ascriptions are to be explained in terms of features of the ascribinns of truth, rather than of what is ascrided. The explanatory emphasis placed on the act of calling something true, as opposed to its descriptive content, qualifies theories displaying this sort of strategic commitment as 'pragmatic' theories of truth, by contrast to 'semantic' ones. The starting point is an articulation of a central insight of the classical pragmatist theories of truth espoused in different versions by James and Dewey. Developing this insight in response to various objections yields a sequence of positions ending in contemporary anaphoric semantics: prosentential theories of 'true' and pronominal theories of 'refers'. These theories articulate an antirealist position about truth and reference, of the sort here called 'phenomenalist'. Insofar as theories of this sort offer adequate accounts of the phenomena they address, they assert relatively narrow and clearly defined limits to the explanatory ambitions of theories couched in traditional semantic vocabularies.

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1995

CLCWeb : Comparative Literature and Culture, 2024

Pragmatic theories of truth are usually associated either with C.S. Peirce’s proposal that true beliefs will be accepted “at the end of inquiry” or with William James’ proposal that truth be defined in terms of utility. More broadly, however, pragmatic theories of truth focus on the connection between truth and epistemic practices, notably practices of inquiry and assertion. Depending on the particular pragmatic theory, true statements might be those that are useful to believe, that are the result of inquiry, that have withstood ongoing examination, that meet a standard of warranted assertibility, or that represent norms of assertoric discourse. Like other theories of truth (e.g., coherence and deflationary theories) pragmatic theories of truth are often put forward as an alternative to correspondence theories of truth. Unlike correspondence theories, which tend to see truth as a static relation between a truth-bearer and a truth￾maker, pragmatic theories of truth tend to view truth as a function of the practices people engage in, and the commitments people make, when they solve problems, make assertions, or conduct scientific inquiry. More broadly, pragmatic theories tend to emphasize the significant role the concept of truth plays across a range of disciplines and discourses: not just scientific and fact-stating discourse but also ethical, legal, and political discourse as well.

Análisis. Revista de Investigación Filosófica, 2022

In this paper, I compare the approach to truth characteristic of pragmatism, often identified with warranted assertability, with the prosentential proposal put forward by Robert Brandom. I argue that Brandom´s is a genuine step forward from pragmatism and analytic philosophy, even though his philosophical take includes classic pragmatist features. Furthermore, I show that Dewey and Brandom coincide in their social kind of naturalism, also supported by evolutionary psychology. I conclude that the essential distinction between truth and warranted assertability cannot be exposed without involving an external perspective, the third-person perspective, which is absent in standard pragmatist approaches to truth.

Pragmatism is Americas most notable contribution to philosophy. The pragmatic conception of truth was developed in response to what those in America (most notably William James and Charles Sanders Pierce) saw as European reliance on the scholastic and Kantian schools of thought. Pragmatic conception of truth is that truth happens to an idea, it is not an inherent property of the idea. The possession of a true idea is not an end in of itself, but can be seen as a tool that allows us to function towards our desires and goals. Truth in an idea is how much it “works”, how much we can use it by incorporating it with our previously held truths to accurately predicting our actions to meaningful moments. Truth has a certain “cash-value” in pragmatism. Truths pay, they pay because they lead us towards some way of predicting our next experiences. Copying reality is really not important, who cares if our beliefs copy reality if what we really want is to be able to use our beliefs to guide us to where we want to be through this persisting reality that we seem to be experiencing through our sensory perceptions.

In his influential book Truth, Paul Horwich deploys a philosophical method focused on linguistic usage, that is, on the function(s) the concept of truth serves in actual discourse. In doing so Horwich eschews abstract metaphysics, arguing that metaphysical or ontological conceptions of truth rest on basic misconceptions. From this description, one might reasonably expect Horwich's book to have drawn inspiration from, or even embodied philosophical pragmatism of some kind. Unfortunately Horwich relies upon Russell's tired caricature of pragmatism about truth (''p' is true if and only if it is useful to believe p' (Ibid., p. 34, p. 47)), and as a result underestimates the challenge it poses to Minimalism. This paper develops a pragmatist critique of minimalism that focuses on the seemingly central, plausibly constitutive role played by the concept of truth in the speech-act of assertion. The critique suggests that Horwich's Minimalism does not and cannot accomplish its stated goal of explaining all of the facts involving truth. Indeed, the kind of thorough-going deflationism sought by Horwich and others (including pragmatist sympathizer Bob Brandom) is incompatible with an adequate account of assertion, and perhaps other concepts (like belief, judgement and inquiry) as well.

Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2006

Intercultural Pragmatics

This essay presents an array of arguments demonstrating that truth is necessarily pragmatic. Evaluations of truth derive from human experience, from the individual’s weltanschauung which molds their point of view and ideological perspective. Consequently, within any community, there exist alternative truths. Traditional takes on truth are reviewed. The fuzziness of many truths is examined. The existence within the community of alternative, sometimes contradictory, truths is explicated and shown to be fairly common in practice, even though it can occasionally lead to social dissension. The essay expatiates on the alleged incontrovertibility of logical, mathematical, and scientific truths (supposedly true in all possible worlds) showing that they are necessarily subject to specific conditions which render the assessment pragmatic. In sum, Φ is true resolves into Φ functions as true under specific conditions a 1…n . Certainly, a hegemonic group within the community will often assert a ...

THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 2014

Teorema, 2016

In The nature of truth: An updated approach to the meaning of truth ascriptions (2012), M. J. Frápolli presents a novel approach to the meaning of truth ascriptions, defending that these expressions should play an essential role in our understanding of truth. A crucial part of that account is the detailed taxonomy of the different types of truth ascriptions, as well as the different pragmatic roles truth ascriptions can perform. In this critical notice I will show that the proposed framework has several flaws concerning the two central points: the taxonomy and the pragmatic roles of truth ascriptions.