Moral Reasons: A Defence of Internalism

Principia, 2019

In this paper I will analyze John McDowell's broad account of practical rationality and moral reasons, which he displays mainly in his articles "Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?" (1978) and "Might There Be External Reasons?" (1995). My main aim is to argue that from a philosophical perspective, no less than from an empirical one, McDowell's account of practical rationality is not a realistic one. From a philosophical point of view, I will argue that his intellectualist account is not convincing; and if we consider his virtue-ethical ideal of practical rationality in light of the model of human cognition, we also realize that moral behavior is not immune to cognitive biases and does not always flow from robust traits of character like virtues. At the same time, this puts at stake his strong thesis of moral autonomy-the idea that with the 'onset of reason' moral beings are no longer determined by 'first nature' features.

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 72 (2006) no. 3

Addresses the question of whether moral reasons stem from existing desires of the agent, from the nature of practical rationality or from outside the agent herself.

1964

In this essay we will be looking at whether we have reasons to act morally, and at the related question of whether we can have amoral reasons for forming moral intentions. The first question is also known as Hume's 'is–ought'problem: The problem of how to get from 'is', the state of affairs, to discussing 'ought', what morally speaking should be done, in a way that can be seen as argumentatively sound. 1 If we speak to non-philosophers, the 'is–ought'problem hardly seems to be an issue.

1998

Moral Internalism is the claim that it is a priori that moral beliefs are reasons for action. At least three conceptions of 'reason' may be disambiguated: psychological, epistemological, and purely ethical. The first two conceptions of Internalism are false on conceptual, and indeed empirical, grounds. On a purely ethical conception of 'reasons', the claim is true but is an Externalist claim. Positive arguments for Internalism -from phenomenology, connection and oddness -are found wanting. Three possible responses to the stock Externalist objections are uncovered and overturned. In so doing a close relation between Internalism and Behaviourism is revealed, and some stock anti-behaviouristic arguments are co-opted for Externalism. The likely dependence of Internalism on an Atomistic Associationism is uncovered and criticised. Internalism is seen as being ultimately a type of Ethical Determinism. Finally, a sketch of an Anti-Associative Externalism is given whereby the notion of self determination of action is put forward as an account of moral motivation fit to resist both the internalist and the belief-desire psychology premises of the stock non-cognitivist argument.

Some writers in metaethics have maintained that moral motivation is intrinsic to the semantic content of an apparently propositional reasons statement. This paper unpacks and responds to this claim by showing that all mainstream metaethical views are committed to the non-identity of the properties that underlie actual motivation with the properties of the semantic contents of moral judgments. First, the paper reconstructs accounts on which the semantic contents of moral judgments are supposed to be intrinsically motivating. Then, it objects to such accounts by showing that the semantic contents of reasons statements, according to any metaethical view of what these consist in, are not of the right kind to belong to the proper objects of motivational states. An important implication of this argument is the falsity of a strong version of the motivational internalism thesis, according to which there is a necessary connection between agents’ recognition of reasons statements and their possession of corresponding motivation because motivational state contents are intrinsic to the semantic contents of reasons statements.

2006

Cognitive internalism is the view that moral judgments are both cognitive and motivating. Philosophers have found cognitive internalism to be attractive in part because it seems to offer support for the idea that moral reasons are categorical, that is, independent of agents' desires. In this paper, I argue that it offers no such support.

An ancient but central divide in moral philosophy concerns the nature of opinions about what is morally wrong or what our moral duties are. Some philosophers argue that moral motivation is internal to moral opinions: that moral opinions consist of motivational states such as desires or emotions. This has often been seen as a threat to the possibility of rational argument and justification in morals. Other philosophers argue that moral motivation is external to moral opinion: moral opinions should be seen as beliefs about moral reality, beliefs which may or may not motivate depending on whether the person holding them cares about moral matters.

2018

The first part of this introductory chapter introduces and discusses four core theses of moral rationalism: (i) the psychological thesis that reason is the source of moral judgment, (ii) the metaphysical thesis that moral requirements are constituted by the deliverances of practical reason, (iii) the epistemological thesis that moral requirements are knowable a priori, and (iv) the normative thesis that moral requirements entail valid reasons for action. We sketch different ¬– stronger and weaker – versions of each thesis, and tentatively examine whether specific versions of the different theses can be recombined into attractive rationalist packages, in which the various strands are mutually supporting. The chapter’s second part provides an overview of the contributions included in this volume.

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion

I show that the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent, and essentially omnimalevolent being is impossible given only two metaethical assumptions (viz., moral rationalism and reasons internalism). I then argue (pace Stephen Law) that such an impossibility undercuts Law's (2010) evil god challenge.

Philosophia, 2007

In his fetishist argument, Michael Smith raises an important question: What is the content of the motivational states that constitute moral motivation? Although the argument has been widely discussed, this question has not received the attention it deserves. In the present paper, I use Smith's argument as a point of departure for a discussion of how advocates of externalism as regards moral judgements can account for moral motivation. More precisely, I explore various explanations of moral motivation that externalists can employ to answer the question Smith poses.