Empathisches Verstehen im psychoanalytischen Prozess

2007

Even if it were true that before around 14 months infants are incapable of coding experience in ways that are recoverable in analysis, nonverbal communicative processes of emotional induction or projective identification may play an important role in our work with certain, perhaps even all, of our patients. But it may be an error to assume that such NONverbal processes equate to or dervive from primitive, PREverbal processes and experiences. They may involve subtle and intelligent nondiscursive symbolic forms. Since we are analysts and not researchers in developmental psychology, perhaps we ought to remain within our area of competence, working in depth with the unconscious in the here and now of the analytic relationship, recognizing our speculations about the past as merely that, and leaving the issue of their validity to those who are interested in and capable of conducting scientific research in this field.

Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 1986

The burgeoning field of infant research has burst through the seams of our traditional view of infants. We now know that neonates are far more aware of their environment, more capable of eliciting responses from people, and more differentiated in their responses to caretakers and to a variety of external stimuli than we had ever believed. In part, this new knowledge has been gained through clever, creative experimentation by academic researchers. Experiments have been devised which are simple enough for neonatal responsiveness, yet offer relevant information about the infant's learning, cognitive, and emotional capacities. Joseph Lichtenberg's book, Psychoanalysis and Infant Research, presents this rich body of research. Were he content to offer us this new and absorbing view of the neonate, that alone would make the book interesting and worthwhile. Lichtenberg, however, is more ambitious. He sees important implications of infant research for various aspects of psychoanalytic theory and believes that a careful reading of the infancy data will "lead to reexamination of our theory" (p. 27). Lichtenberg raises many different ideas and generally grapples with them in a careful, thoughtful manner. For example, there is a detailed discussion Requests for reprints should be sent to Doris K. Silverman,

Harvard Review of Psychiatry, 1995

This article provides an update on recent trends in psychoanalytic theory, particularly the theory of technique. It discusses several trends that have coalesced into a major shift in emphasis. Psychoanalysis is moving to embrace a two-person psychology, focused on the relations between patient and analyst. In this new perspective the analyst is no longer seen as an objective observer, even potentially free from unconscious influences. These trends are discussed in terms of their origins in analytic experience, contemporary science, and philosophy. The struggle within psychoanalysis to deal with these new views is examined, and some implications for the practice of psychotherapy are offered. (HARVARD REV PSYCHIATRY 1995;3:65-74.) The study of human subjectivity, of what is literally on a person's mind, has been prone to fractionation in psychiatry. The empirical approach has selectively studied that which is most capable of being defined and quantified. Many clinicians fault this approach for avoiding what is most uniquely human. In contrast to the empirical approach, psychoanalysis has embraced the metaphors a person uses to describe the complexities of emotional experience. This approach runs the risk of reification. At present, contemporary neuroscience has moved beyond behavioral reductionism toward a much richer conceptual framework that allows for the study of subjectivity.'

In the 1950s when I began my training as a psychiatrist and psychoanalyst many concepts of infancy, what I would now call myths, were regarded by many as a positive yield from objective scientific inquiry -or more realistically -the best analysts treating adult patients could do. This method of approach, referred to as a "top down model"from adult to infant began to be replaced by a "bottoms-up" approach in the 70s and 80s

2008

The perspectives of a realistic and fruitful dialogue between the psychoanalytical concept and the neurosciences remain controversial. This problem has been treated also by us (Derevenco, 1994); newer issues justify to revise this topic. Several sharp critics of psychoanalysis keep up a vehement polemic and counter any scientific value of this concept. On the other hand some outstanding scientists think that many of Freud's theoretical constructs could be integrated in the contemporary developments of neurobiology. A champion of this view is Eric Kandel. He considers "that a unified discipline of neurobiology, cognitive psychology, and psychoanalysis would forge a new and deeper understanding of mind". A part of the main components of psychoanalysis can be studied by a neuroscientific methodology. For instance, several investigations aiming to explore the neurobiological basis of cognitive unconsciousness resort to cerebral imagery. The psycho-neuro-endocrinology of sexuality, with its gender differences and infancy peculiarities is in progress; the nowadays investigations of dreams, and memory allow new interpretations. A topic of interest of the connection between psychodynamic and biological factors concerns stress, particularly its mnestic processes, the role of limbic system, the posttraumatic stress disorder, and the therapeutic interventions. Despite the difficulties to achieve a through convergence proposed by Kandel the dialogue between the neurosciences and psychoanalysis is beneficial for both disciplines.

Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 2008

A discussion of Sterns 'The Intersubjective World of the Infant

The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 2012

Psychoanalytic training in the French Societies belonging to the International Psychoanalytic Association does not grant any place to the observation of babies as it exists in certain societies of other countries. Infant observation is even the object of sharp critiques by eminent French theoreticians. The reasons given for condemning infant observation and refusing to give it any place in the training programme lie in theoretical positions concerning the very nature of the Freudian discovery and its interpretation, which is more idealistic than empirical. The author discusses these reasons while drawing attention to the frequent confusion between a reference to empiricism and a reference to the experimental. The fear of a psychologizing deviation of metapsychology and of a denial of psychic reality leads, in the French model, to placing the emphasis on personal analytic experience during the candidate's psychoanalysis, prolonged by supervisions. It excludes any academic teaching of metapsychology or of related disciplines. The confusion between the empiricism of Esther Bick's method and the recourse to experimental procedures in developmental research stands in the way of making a place for infant observation and of recognizing its training value, not so much for the acquisition of new knowledge or the validation of metapsychological models, as for its usefulness in developing a mode of psychoanalytic observation and an increase in the candidates' containing capacities.

Psychoanalysis has had a long gestation, during the course of which it has experienced multiple rebirths, leading some current authors to complain that there has been such a proliferation of theories of psychoanalysis over the past 115 years that the field has become theoretically fragmented and is in disarray (Fonagy & Target, 2003; Rangell, 2006). In this paper, I survey the past and present landscapes of psychoanalytic theorizing and clinical practice to trace the evolution of Freud's original insights and psychoanalytic techniques to current theory and practice. First, I sketch the evolutionary chronology of psychoanalytic theory; second, I discuss the key psychoanalytic techniques derived from clinical practice, with which psychoanalysis is most strongly identified; third, I interrogate whether Freud's original theoretical conceptualizations and clinical practices are still recognizable in current psychoanalytic theory and practice, using four key exemplars – object relations theory, attachment-informed psychotherapy, existential/phenomenological and intensive short-term dynamic psychotherapy; and fourth, I discuss recent unhelpful, disintegrative developments in psychoanalytic scholarship. To this end, I critique the cul-de-sacs into which some psychoanalytic scholars have directed us, and conclude with the hope that the current state of affairs can be remedied. Psychoanalysis is simultaneously a form treatment, a theory, and an " investigative tool " (Lothane, 2006, p. 711). Freud used each of these three facets of psychoanalysis iteratively to progress our understanding of human mental functioning. Among Freud's unique theoretical insights into the human condition was the historically new idea that humans are primarily animals driven by instincts (Freud, 1915a, 1920) who undergo growth via universal developmental (psychosexual) stages that are influenced by family and social life. This was in opposition to the prevailing view of his time that humanity was God's highest creation. Freud (1908) challenged the cherished belief that humankind is rational and primarily governed by reason, replacing it with the disturbing notion that we are in fact driven by unacceptable and hence repressed aggressive and sexual impulses that are constantly at war with the " civilized " self. Freud himself and Freud scholars (Jones, 1953; Strachey, 1955) consider that the Studies on Hysteria (Breuer & Freud, 1893) mark the beginning of psychoanalysis as a theory and a treatment. These early papers place the causes of the symptoms of hysteria firmly in the psychological, not the neurological domain (although such a distinction is no longer sustainable), thus moving thinking about the cause of hysterical and other psychological symptoms from the brain to the mind. This insight underpinned a paradigm shift in thinking about the mental functioning of human beings, for which there was a scant vocabulary and embryonic conceptualizations. The theory that organized early clinical observations gradually unfolded, many precepts of which have entered the psychological lexicon as givens, concepts that are now taken for granted. Three of these bedrock concepts are the existence of the Unconscious, the notion of hidden meaning and the idea of repression.

Philosophy, Psychiatry, Psychology, 2018

For psychoanalysis to qualify as scientific psychology, it needs to generate data that can evidentially support theoretical claims. Its methods, therefore, must at least be capable of correcting for biases produced in the data during the process of generating it; and we must be able to use the data in sound forms of inference and reasoning. Critics of psychoanalysis have claimed that it fails on both counts, and thus whatever warrant its claims have derive from other sources. In this article, I discuss three key objections, and then consider their implications together with recent developments in the generation and testing of psychoanalytic theory. The first and most famous is that of ‘suggestion’; if it sticks, clinical data may be biased in a way that renders all inferences from them unreliable. The second, sometimes confused with the first, questions whether the data are or can be used to provide genuine tests of theoretical hypotheses. The third will require us to consider the question of how psychology can reliably infer motives from behavior. I argue that the clinical method of psychoanalysis is defensible against these objections in relation to the psychodynamic model of mind, but not wider metapsychological and etiological claims. Nevertheless, the claim of psychoanalysis to be a science would be strengthened if awareness of the methodological pitfalls and means to avoid them, and alternative theories and their evidence bases, were more widespread. This may require changes in the education of psychoanalysts.