Towards Quasi-Vegetarianism

Journal of Moral Philosophy, 2009

This paper defends a qualified version of moral vegetarianism. It defends a weak thesis and, more tentatively, a strong thesis, both from a very broad basis that assumes neither that animals have rights nor that they are entitled to equal consideration. The essay's only assumption about moral status, an assumption defended in the analysis of the wrongness of cruelty to animals, is that sentient animals have at least some moral status. One need not be a strong champion of animal protection, then, to embrace moral vegetarianism. One need only assume some reasonable view of animals' moral status.

In Konstantinos Boudouris (Ed.) Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy. Athens: Greek Philosophical Society, 2018

There is a teeth-biting debate between vegetarianism and non-vegetarianism on human obligations towards animals. Vegetarianism appeals for equal and ethical treatment for animals whereas non-vegetarianism simply denies any such treatments considering that animals do not have a sense of morality. Non-vegetarianism seems to be ignoring some obligatory duties towards animals and undermines ethical arguments for animal rights. It does not provide sound reason for why humans should deliberately kill animals, painlessly or with least harm, for their own sake. It also overlooks the world economic situation of global hunger in which the use of the total food resources and distribution in terms of nutrition would be much more equitable if everyone was a vegetarian. This paper argues against non-vegetarianism and defends vegetarianism by making a claim that we do have moral obligations of certain kinds towards animals same as we have moral obligations towards us in terms of natural right to survival.

Grazer Philosophische Studien, 2013

Winners of the rst prize of the 2012 essay competition for students sponsored by the Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie (GAP) in cooperation with the Grazer Philosophische Studien* Summary e purpose of this article, which takes the form of a dialogue between a vegetarian and a meat eater, is twofold. On the one hand, we argue for a general characterisation of moral value in terms of well-being and su ering. On the other hand, on the basis of this characterisation, we argue that, in most cases, the moral value attached to the choice of eating meat is negative; in particular, we defend this claim against a number of objections concerning the nature of animal su ering, its moral value, and the moral responsibility of meat eaters. "When we lift our forks, we hang our hats somewhere" (Foer, 2009, 132) " e question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they su er?" (Bentham, 1789, chapter XVII) * e question of the 2012 competition was: "Are we allowed to eat animals?" From the 53 submissions that conformed to the rules of the competition, the jury selected three, one each for the rst, second, and third prize. e authors of the prizewinning essays were permitted to slightly revise and expand their submission for publication. uncorrected proof nicht korrigierte Fahne 258 In what follows, Mechoui, a meat eater, and Kardamon, a vegetarian, discuss the question of eating animals from a moral point of view. Mechoui: ese cheeseburgers are really delicious; are you sure you do not want one? Kardamon: I am sure they taste good; but I am also quite sure that eating animals is morally problematic, to say the least. Mechoui: And apparently you even think that it is bad. How would you defend this position? Kardamon: We could start from the generally accepted idea that su ering is bad (i.e. has a negative moral value) and that well-being is good (i.e. has a positive moral value). On that basis, we could characterise a good behaviour as one which improves the state of someone (towards more well-being or less su ering), and a bad behaviour as one that worsens the state of someone (towards less well-being or more su ering). Mechoui: You are talking about individuals su ering, but some of the individuals that are relevant to our moral question are animals (more precisely, non-human animals). It is not obvious that animals su er in the same way as humans, or even that they su er at all (see e.g. Descartes 1637, part V; Nagel 1974; Wittgenstein 1953, 174). Kardamon: Animal su ering is indeed a controversial issue. Let us rst consider the claim that animals do not su er at all. It seems that a necessary and su cient condition for being able to su er is to be a sentient being, and that a necessary and su cient condition for being a sentient being is to be equipped with a sufciently developed nervous system. us, since at least some animals meet this condition, at least some animals can su er. Mechoui: What you are saying suggests not only that at least certain animals can su er, but also that other individuals, like plants, cannot su er. Kardamon: Exactly. And this is why, for instance, it is not incoherent to choose not to eat animals on ethical grounds, while still eating vegetables. Let us now consider the claim that animals can su er, but not in the same way as we do. People who endorse this position seem to suggest that there is

2015

In this paper I'm going to illustrate and discuss first the Peter Singer's utilitarian approach to the defense of a vegetarian diet. Then I'm going to show some objections to the above-mentioned argument, particularly objections raised by virtue ethicists. Finally I'm trying to build a better argument based on the capabilities approach in Martha Nussbaum's version.

Between the Species, 2008

Between the Species: An Online Journal for the Study of Philosophy and Animals, 1995

2018

Human eating habits are widely distinguished between Vegetarianism and Non-Vegetarianism, where former presumes themselves to be holding no moral risk toward nature and animals as they do not eat animal meats. However, if we examine it closely and thoroughly, every eating habits hold some or other moral risk. My paper is an attempt to unfold different arguments made in support and against the moral concern of Vegetarianism. Although it is impalpable to answer ‘What is morally good to eat?’, our discourse helps to bring forth different arguments to understand the moral concern of our eating habits.