Kant's Criteria of the A Priori
John Divers1999, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
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Abstract
Kant states that necessity and strict universality are criteria of a priori knowledge. Interpreting this dictum standardly and straightforwardly in respect of necessity, it is inconsistent with there being necessary a posteriori truths or contingent a priori truths (cf Kripke). This straightforward interpretation may convict Kant of understandable error (at worst) in the case of necessity, but it is so uncharitable in the case of strict universality that we ought to seek an alternative. I offer a charitable interpretation of the doctrine that necessity and strict universality are sufficient conditions of a priority, commenting briefly on comparable necessary conditions. (N) Necessity is a sure criterion of a priori knowledge but also with the widely neglected thesis:
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