Legal Traditions?

2014

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPE: A SKETCH OF HISTORY [1999] 11–21 // PHILOSOPHISING ON LAW IN THE TURMOIL OF COMMUNIST TAKEOVER IN HUNGARY (TWO PORTRAITS, INTERWAR AND POSTWAR: JULIUS MOÓR & ISTVÁN LOSONCZY) [2001–2002] 23–39: Julius Moór 23 / István Losonczy 29 // ON THE SURVIVAL OF ILMAR TAMMELO’S LETTER AND MANUSCRIPT ADDRESSED TO PROFESSOR MOÓR [2009] 41–44 // PROFESSIONAL DISTRESS AND SCARCITY: ALEXANDER HORVÁTH AND THE LEGACY OF NATURAL LAW IN HUNGARY [2005] 45–50 // HUNGARIAN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE 20TH CENTURY [2011] 51–72: I. The Pre-war Period [1. Bódog (Felix) Somló (1871–1920) 52] / II. The Inter-war Period [2. Gyula (Julius) Moór (1888–1950) 54 / 3. Barna Horváth (1896–1973) 55 / 4. József Szabó (1909–1992) 57 / 5. István Bibó (1911–1979) 58 / 6. Tibor Vas (1911–1983) 59 / 7. István Losonczy (1918–1980) 60] III. The Post-war Period (Communism) 61 [8. Imre Szabó (1912–1991) 62 / 9. Vilmos Peschka (1929–2006) 63 / 10. Kálmán Kulcsár (1928–2010) 65] IV. Contemporary Trends and Perspectives 66 [11. Csaba Varga (b. 1941) 66 / 12. András Sajó (b. 1949) 69 / 13. Béla Pokol (b. 1950) 70] V. Our Understanding of the Law Today 71 AN IMPOSED LEGACY LOOKING BACK [1999] 75–94: 1. On Ideologies and Marxism in general 75 / 2. Life of an Intellectual in Communism 79 / 3. On Marxism and its Socialist Cultivation in Particular 82 / 4. Legal Philosophising [4.1. Approaches to Law 87 / 4.2. Arriving at a Legal Ontology 91] 5. Conclusion 94 // LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE MARXISM OF SOCIALISM: HUNGARIAN OVERVIEW IN AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE [2003] 95–151: I. Development and Balance of Marxist Philosophising on Law in Hungary [1. Preliminaries (until 1948) 96 / 2. Stalinism (from the Soviet Occupation on) {a) Liquidation of the »Residues« 98 / b) Soviet-type Uniformisation [Gleichschaltung] 99 / c) Denial of the Past, with a Dual Effect 99 / d) »Socialist Legality«, Drawn from the Progressive Past of Western Europe 103 / e) Search for the Germs of Scholarly Evolution 103} 3. Institutionalisation Accompanied by Relaxation (from the 1960s) [a) Epigonism Becoming the Scholarly Ideal 104 / b) Stalinism in a Critical Self-perspective 105 / c) Disciples Diversified Launching their own Trends 107 / d) Comparatism 110 / e) (Re)discovery of the Western Legal Philosophy as a Competitor 112 / f) A Leading Mediatory Role within the »Socialist World Order« 114} 4. Disintegration (in the 1980s) {a) Attempt at Laying New Foundations for Marxism with Epigonism Exhausted 115 / b) Competitive Trends Becoming Exclusive 115 / c) Western Legal Philosophy Acknowledged as a Fellow-traveller within the Socialist Orbit Proper 116 / d) Hungarian Legal Theory Transforming into a National Corpus 118 / e) The Practical Promotion of Some Balance 119} 5. End-game for a Substitute State Religion (in the 1990s) 120] II. Marxist Legal Philosophising in an International Perspective [Ad 1: To the Preliminaries 122 / Ad 2: To Stalinism 124 / Ad 3: To Institutionalisation Accompanied by Relaxation {a) Late Separation from Vishinskiy’s Theory 125 / b) From Ideological Self-closure to an Apparently Scholarly Openness 127 / c) From Political Ideology to Genuine Scholarship 130 / d) International Recognition of Socialist Jurisprudence as an Independent Trend 135 / e) Together with Western Trends 137} Ad 4: To Disintegration {a) Loss of Attraction as Mere Epigonism 139 / b) Exclusivity of Competing Trends 139 / c) Fellowship with »Bourgeois« Trends 140 / d) An own Trend, Internationally Recognised 141 / e) A yet Progressive Role 142} Ad 5: To the Present state 143] III. A Temporary Balance 145 // AUTONOMY AND INSTRUMENTALITY OF LAW IN A SUPERSTRUCTURAL PERSPECTIVE [1986] 151–175: 1. The Strange Fate of Concepts 151 / I. A Relational Category 2. Basis and Superstructure: The Genuine Meaning 154 / 3. Exerting Social Influence as a Conceptual Minimum 156 / 4. Relationships within the Prevailing Totality 158 / 5. Attempts at Interpretation in Hungary 159 / 6. The Lukácsian Stand 162 / 7. Lukács’s Recognitions 168 / 8. Some Criticism 169 / II. The Law’s Understanding 171 / 9. Law Interpreted as Superstructure 171 / 10. Conclusions Drawn for the Law’s Understanding 173 // LEGAL THEORY IN TRANSITION (A PREFACE FROM HUNGARY) [2000] 177–186 // DEVELOPMENT OF THEORETICAL LEGAL THOUGHT IN HUNGARY AT THE TURN OF THE MILLENNIUM [2006] 187–215: 1. International Environment 188 / 2. The Situation in Hungary 190 / 3. Outlook I: The Historical-comparative Study of Legal Cultures and of the Lawyerly Way of Thinking 203 / 4. Outlook II: The Paradigmatic Enigma of the Transition to Rule of Law 207 / 5. Incongruity in Practice 213 / 6. Perspectives 214 TWENTIETH CENTURY CONTEMPORANEITY CHANGE OF PARADIGMS IN LEGAL RECONSTRUCTION: CARL SCHMITT AND THE TEMPTATION TO FINALLY REACH A SYNTHESIS [2002] 219–234: 1. Dangers of Intellectualism 219 / 2. Schmitt in Facts 221 / 3. Schmitt and Kelsen 222 / 4. On Bordering Conditions 226 / 5. With Kelsen in Transubstantiation 230 / 6. Polarisation as the Path of Theoretical Development 232 // KELSENIAN DOCUMENTS IN HUNGARY: CHAPTERS ON CONTACTS, INCLUDING THE GENESIS OF AUTOBIOGRAPHY [2006] 235–243: 1. Preludes 235 / 2. The Search for Moór’s Bequeath 235 / 3. Moór’s Collegiality 238 / 4. Bibó as a Disciple Translating 241 // THE »HART-PHENOMENON« [2002] 245–267: I. The Hart-miracle 246 [1. The Scene of Britain at the Time 247 / 2. The Personal Career 250 / 3. The Opus’ Career 252 / 4. Verbal Sociologism 255 / 5. Growing into the British Pattern 259] II. The Hart-phenomenon 260 [6. Origination of a Strange Orthodoxy 261 / 7. Mastering Periods of the 20th Century 263 / 8. Raising the Issue of Reception in Hungary 365] // LITERATURE? A SUBSTITUTE FOR LEGAL PHILOSOPHY? [2007] 269–287: 1. The Enigma of Law and its Study 269 / 2. “Law and Literature” 271 / 3. Varieties of “Law and Literature” 274 / 4. The German Study of Artistic Representations 280 / 5. Some Literary Reconsiderations 285 / 6. Conclusion 287 APPENDIX: THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING LEGAL PHILOSOPHY IN HUNGARY [2007] 291–320: I. Why and How to Philosophise in Law? 291 / II. The State of Teaching Legal Philosophy 294 / III. The Philosophy of Teaching Legal Philosophy 296 / IV. Programme at the Catholic University of Hungary 300 [1. Graduate Studies 300 {a) Basic Subjects 301 / b) Facultative Seminars 305 / c) Closing Subjects 309 / d) Written Memoranda and the Thesis 312} 2. Postgraduate Studies 313 / 3. Conclusion 317] V. Perspectives 318 Index of Subjects 321 / Index of Normative Materials 328 / Index of Names 329

ENGLISH: The subject-matter of the paper can be placed in the (somewhat neglected though important) subfield of legal philosophy which one may call an ‘evolutionary analysis of legal-philosophical concepts’. It is specifically focused on the concept of convention/conventionality and is aimed at realizing two goals. The first goal is historical and conceptual: that of differentiating various shades of the notion of convention/conventionality (in the legal context) and, consequently, of the claim about the conventional character of law. The second goal is to examine on which (if any) of those meanings the law can plausibly be regarded as a convention. The structure of the analysis rests upon the distinction between the ‘traditional’ discussion over the conventionality of law (tracing back to the controversy between the Sophists and Plato) and the contemporary discussion (inspired by game theory’s insights into the nature of convention). In the paper it is argued, inter alia, that most non-fundamental legal norms are not conventions, and that it is difficult to balance the arguments for and against the thesis that the rule of recognition is a convention, but even if it is a convention, it cannot generate normativity by virtue of its being convention. POLISH: Tematyka tego artykułu wpisuje się w ważny, choć niedoceniany, nurt filozofii prawa, który można nazwać ‘ewolucyjną analizą pojęć prawnych’. Artykuł ten poświęcony jest jednemu z takich pojęć – konwencji/ konwencjonalności, i ma on dwa cele. Pierwszy z nich ma charakter historyczny i pojęciowy – jest nim wyróżnienie i prześledzenie historii rozmaitych odcieni znaczeniowych pojęć konwencji/konwencjonalności oraz rozmaitych sensów tezy o konwencjonalności prawa. Drugi ma charakter bardziej problemowy – jest nim próba rozstrzygnięcia, czy teza o konwencjonalności prawa jest tezą przekonującą. Analiza prowadzona jest w oparciu o rozróżnienie między ‘tradycyjną’ dyskusją wokół konwencjonalności prawa (mającą swoje źródło w sporze Platona z sofistami) i współczesną dyskusją (inspirowaną teoriogrowym ujęciem konwencji). Jej dwa główne wnioski dają się streścić tak: primo, większość norm prawnych nie ma charakteru konwencji; secundo, choć trudno jest zbilansować argumenty na rzecz i przeciw tezie, że fundamentalna reguła prawa, tzw. reguła uznania, jest konwencją, to można przekonująco argumentować, że nawet jeśli jest ona konwencją, nie może ipso facto uzasadnić normatywności prawa.

Rechtswissenschaft in Osteuropa, 2013

Gdansk University Press - Wolters Kluwer, 2016

University studies mean the critical reading of texts, and also reflection. The latter should be stimulated by lectures and tutorials, and by discussion. In an attempt to meet the needs of students, we offer here a handbook for the study of the philosophy of law. An innovative idea underlies this handbook – teaching an aspect of law through questions and answers. It is based on a philosophical approach to the study of law. We have proceeded from a position that the subject of philosophy of law may be dealt with in five sections. These are: (I) methodology; (II) people; (III) approaches; (IV) concepts; and (V) hard cases. The contents of our book reflects this division into parts. At the outset, however, we must mention some reservations. First, this handbook considers problems of contemporary philosophy of law, but it is by no means a handbook of the history of philosophy of law. Second, this handbook has a module-based organization. In the future, it will be possible to change these modules as required. Thus, it is an open-ended offering, which will certainly - and this was part of the project from the start - be subject to further changes, supplements, and modifications in subsequent editions.

Legal Scholarship and the Political: In Search of a New Paradigm, 2020

The possibility of producing apolitical knowledge is, beyond doubt, one of the chiefideas of modernity. It was implemented in various ways, including in the domain of legalscholarship. Legal scholarship found itself in a peculiar situation because of the object of itsstudy – the law. It is assumed that its, at least partial, instrumentality cannot be free fromentanglements, including engagements with the political . Any discussion of an “apoliticalcharacter” obviously presumes an analysis of the concept of the “political,” which is thedefinitional opposite of “apolitical.” We understand the “political” character of science andlegal scholarship as encompassing three different dimensions: (1) the political (das Politische, le politique, polityczność), understood as the fundamental antagonism at the foundation of anyhuman society, present in the deep structure of legal theory/philosophy of law anddoctrinal legal scholarship (a concept developed in contemporary philosophy of politics by, inter alia, , Chantal Mouffe); (2) politics (die Politik, la politique, polityka), understood as a set of practices and institutions which, in conditions of conflict created by the political (in the meaning given above), creates anorder enabling human coexistence; this meaning is the closest to the intuitive meaning of political, derived from the thought of Max Weber; (3) an influence upon creating public policies (die Politike, les politiques, polityki), , understood as a set of principles which need to be adopted in order to pursue a certain aim (e.g. “agricultural policy,” “consumerpolicy” or “defence policy”). This notion is especially underlined in pragmatist legal philosophy.

Acta Juridica Hungarica, 2011

Acta Juridica Hungarica, 2012

From amongst legal theories of Socialisms' Marxism, Hungarian scholarship played a rather balancing role all along. Characterised by dialogue and successful mediation, it strove to take a middle-of-the-road stance within the Socialist orbit. It took the professional requirements of scholarship rather seriously within the bounds of feasibility at varying times. Under restrictive conditions and despite ideological dictates, it fi lled a fermentative role. All in all, it made both (1) the sociological approach and (2) the historico-comparative perspective accepted in the Socialist world by transcending legal positivism and especially "Socialist normativism", on the one hand, and by breaking out from domestic/regional self-seclusion, on the other. Moreover, it (3) introduced the ontological perspective, built upon the epistemological perspective, exclusive till then, and thereby it could attribute ontic signifi cance to the self-explanation and self-representation of different legal cultures, usually treated as having merely an ideological importance; and (4) by developing a law and modernisation theory, it could address Central and Eastern Europe in a responsive way. The overview starting by assessing the legacy in the end of WWII concludes in a parallel characterisation of the state of scholarship and its achievements throughout the countries concerned by the end of the Soviet rule. Through and owing to all this, the Hungarian pattern offered a relatively near-to-optimum alternative, a kind of optimality in its solutions and responses.

Paksy, Máté – Takács, Péter: Continuity and Disconinuity in Hungarian Legal Philosophy. = The Transformation of Hungarian Legal Order 1985–2005. Transition to the Rule of Law and Accession to the European Union. Szerk.: Jakab András – Takács Péter – Allan F. Tatham. The Netherlands, Kluwer Law International, 2007. 655–665. o. ISBN 904-112-6945.

2017