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This paper analyzes Iran's foreign policy through a defensive realist lens, contrasting it with offensive realism. It explores the influence of internal and external factors on Iran's nuclear program and security strategy, emphasizing the historical context of threats from the U.S. and regional dynamics. The findings suggest that a defensive realist perspective better explains Iran's behavior in the international arena, particularly in response to perceived threats and the lack of trust in the international community.
Understanding and Explaining the Iranian Nuclear ‘Crisis’ Theoretical Approaches, 2020
This chapter focuses on the security challenges and perceptions that Iran was facing during the early 2000s. Being isolated by the international community, and with a weakened rival Iraq to its West, Iran did not appear to have an immediate security concern, which from a security perspective would neces- sitate a clandestine nuclear program. In fact, in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Iran cooperated with the United States in Afghanistan in bring- ing down the Taliban regime. The ‘axis of evil’ speech escalated the hostility between Iran and the United States. Iran’s Eastern neighbor Afghanistan and Western neighbor Iraq were both occupied by the United States who were referring to Iran as a part of an axis of evil. Given this geostrategic setting, this chapter explores whether or not Iran’s nuclear program was put in effect with possible security concerns. The chapter advances two Realist hypotheses—one defensive, the other offensive. From a defensive Realist perspective, the regional and structural conditions in Iran’s region increase its threat perception and, therefore, Tehran understands that it must increase its military capabilities. The con- tention surrounding Iran’s nuclear program is not solely due to Tehran itself and the defensive Realist hypothesis only partially explains the escalation of Iran’s nuclear program into a ‘crisis’. From an offensive Realist perspective, the United States as the sole regional hegemon in the international system wants to prevent the rise of another regional hegemon in the international system by offshore balanc- ing, which means allying with regional states to curb the rise of a potential hegemon in the Middle East. Interestingly, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 caused a dramatic change in the balance of power in the Middle East. The region was suddenly transformed from a tripolarity (Iraq–Iran–Saudi Arabia) to an evolving bipolar regional order with the elimination of Iraq as a stakeholder. Iran was not only relieved of a historic rival that fought a bitter war in the 1980s, but also now had an opportunity to ll in the “power vacuum” and use its in uence among the Shiite population of Iraq to expand its in uence. Given this regional bipolarity, the offensive Realist perspective we advance argues that the United States is allying with anti-Iranian factions and states within the region to prevent Iranian hegemony. An Iranian nuclear capability would dramatically increase Tehran’s position in the strategic situ- ation. Consequently, the United States is using its military, economic, and diplomatic capabilities to offshore balance and prevent a possible nuclear Iran that would change the balance of power in the region.
The foreign policy of The Islamic Republic of Iran (hereinafter referred to as Iran) can be explained most convincingly by realist theory. Although other theories may have seemed to offer insight into Iran’s foreign policy decisions and behavior following the Islamic Revolution in 1979, they are inferior in their contemporary explanatory power. This paper contends Iranian state behavior since 1979 has moved from one guided primarily by Islamic revolutionary zeal that, over time, has yielded to the power realities with which most modern states must contend. Specifically, Iran’s choices and consequent actions thirty-three years hence reveal realist proclivities, while simultaneously maintaining the rhetoric of Islamic revolutionary appeal for domestic (and transnational) consumption. Further, where threatening public pronouncements raise the specter of an irrational regime seeking nuclear weapons, it is far from certain to be so. At the core, such inflammatory rhetoric is more apt to be the product of efforts toward domestic power consolidation coupled with a public relations campaign, which seeks support in the form of ideological consonance abroad. The net result seems to be an effort directed at state survival and power maximization in the face of a self-perceived security deficit.
This paper will assess the alleged relevance of the realist thinking in International Relations by answering the question whether Realism still dominates the theory and practice of International Relations. Examination of some core theoretical assumptions of Realism and assessment of the continuing significance of the realist thinking during the Cold War period and after will be undertaken with regard to both theory and practice. To answer the key research question whether Realism is still dominant, arguments against and in favour of the claim will be presented. Based on evidence, the line of argument establishes that although the realist depiction of International Relations, with its stress upon the distribution of power, provides an important departure and continuous insight, not to mention the ‘timeless wisdom’ into the understanding of the behaviour of states, it is not in itself definitive as Realism has some noticeable weaknesses. This paper begins from the premise that although Realism alone is insufficient for understanding of contemporary international relations, its insights remain necessary to that enterprise. The method adopted is Toulmin model of argument, which serves as a basis for structure and organization. The big idea is an elucidation on ‘an enlightened Realism’, which confirms the continuing validity of Realist principles throughout history. It is explained through a juxtaposition between statecraft by Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski. Despite arguments questioning the relevance of the classical paradigm Realism is nowhere near becoming irrelevant in the practice of some states. Whereas the discipline has witnessed an astounding flourishing of numerous post-classical theories of International Relations. Despite emergence of such new theories, it is reasonable to suggest that Realism has not become obsolete. Undeniably, Realism produces numerous prolific critics, perhaps deservedly, because in its power political mode, it provides instrumental interpretation of the international system. Some would argue even, immoral examination of international politics, as opposed to a normative one, unlocked by the study of alternative International Relations theories, such as the English School, Constructivism, Feminism, Green theories or Global Environmentalism. It will be argued, however, that scholars of international politics cannot totally discard the Realist paradigm since security, rather than economic development, still remains the most important concern for many states in the developing world (although emancipation concerns are coming to the fore as well). Realism’s applicability and ability to explain the current international politics remains unparalleled. Although the world is changing (45% of the world is democratic), in certain fundamentals, it has not changed as much as many contemporary International Relations theorists believe. To a large extent, it remains characterised by anarchy, and its attendant logic of self-help and struggle for survival. The world is still decentralised, the key political actors are states which are competitive. This confirms Realist analyses of power politics with states compelled by their anarchic environment to act in a ‘functionally undifferentiated’ manner while using capability advantages to gain more influence over outcomes based on power accumulation, as timeless. In other words, Realism as one of not many theoretical paradigms remains relevant despite the passing of history, in other words, it aspires to explain events even beyond history as it is the longest tradition of thinking about international political reality. Thus, Realism remains essential to understanding states’ choices and actions. Consequently, despite the emergence of postpositivist approaches, it would be incorrect, some would argue even naïve, to state that Realism is not dominant. However pessimistically it may sound, based on data and evidence of states' practice Realism persists. Realism is far from being an exhaustive theory though, neither has it existed without evident limitations, nor has it remained universally applicable to all times and epochs (despite claims for it being beyond history, i.e. being relevant in all epochs), but its savage, simplistic variant is still evident in the world. Whether in brutal acts of war, acts of avenge, revanchism, competition and breaking of human rights, Realism is still unrivalled when it comes to the conduct of states in the non-democratic world. However, Realism's influence is not monolithic when it comes to theory. Realism persists in acts of states only when weak leaders sacrificing integrity and objectivity decide to allow so, for example, by not disarming an aggressor in time, or by turning a blind eye to unlawful military interventions, or by not being guided by ethics. Hard military power counts for more in the context of international politics than it does in democratic domestic politics. In international relations, conquest, or pure coercion, is not leadership, but mere dictation. In other words, 'offensive' Realism exists, as long as, weak leaders who are on top of states follow the realist precepts and its attendant logic of competition, rivalry, carnal revenge and retort to war. In so doing though dictators put whole societies as well as liberal order in danger. In contrast, strong leaders help groups create and achieve shared goals. Successful transformational leadership is about change. When strong leaders allow for the possibility of transformation of the structure towards security community, then the realist logic no longer holds true and is not accurate. Realism and neo-realism are unable to explain structural change in world order. In line with the evidence, although Realism is not definitive (i.e. even weak leaders have alternatives and societies have democracy to choose strong leaders), it is alive and well, and it looks like it is not likely to disappear anytime soon from both theory and practice of International Relations. Primitive, savage and brutal elements are unfortunately still visible in 21st century civilized world. What can IR scholars do to make Realism less dominant in both IR theory and practice of states? The relationship between theory and practice is that of mutual, dual causality. If Realism persists on top echelons of power, it persists also in the practice of states. To change this, scholars have to initiate a theoretical innovation among the top most powerful statesmen. Realism persists unless IR scholars are actively engaged in innovative refinement and eclectic creation of new theories which could then be, in turn, readily applied by strong, transformational leaders, i.e. leaders who believe in change and bring about real, multiple social change. In principle, good theories lead to good policies since policy problems inspire theoretical innovation. Theories inform policy although policy makers pay relatively little attention to the vast theoretical literature in International Relations. If this trend could be reversed, if more scholars would become more interested in doing policy-relevant work and if more policy makers started to listen to IR scholars, then this would enable more effective bridging of the gap between theory and policy. If it is accepted that the point of IR theory is to enable a convergence in which political theory meets practice. Then, such an analytic activity could be, thereby leading to a smoother and swifter transfer of new, well crafted, fine-tuned, and more innovative theories strengthening 'transmission belt' from theory to policy. This would be followed by implementation of effective, successful policies to enable peaceful change though within the system, in actual reality, leading to the innovative and technological transformation of the whole system. Perhaps, even civilizing the International Society in the way that some of the English School scholars have long time ago envisaged. Creative, original ideas exist, but they are rarely applied by policy makers and statesmen who often discard eco-movements, feminist, postmodernist, pospositivist theories. Thus, if scholars and academics produce useful knowledge, as for example with the theory of 'an enlightened Realism', such constructive ideas could be implemented into the practice of statecraft. When successful, research for policy’s sake could perform an enlightenment function of social sciences (this metaphor illustrates the role of a theory in understanding the world of IR - we can only shed light on what is known, and even then, we cannot be 100% certain about the activity of theorising, for what is unknown remains in the darkness) making the discipline more diverse and the world a better place. Reminding at the same time that each of the theories whether classical or post-classical, reveal only part of truth about contemporary international political reality, and thus, from this standpoint, none is sufficiently satisfactory.
International journal of innovative research and development, 2020
The application of theories in the study of International Relations is the surest epistemic strategy one could deploy to master the flexibilities and complexities of international system, structures and interactions-from intercitizenry level to that of national governments. This is more so because as much as the indispensability of empirical knowledge in theorisation thrives, the empirical knowledge could not be epistemologically comprehended, unless when premised on propositions, hypothesis and theories on the already known or established pattern of human conditions (Yandaki, 2015: 11-12). Indeed, the fluidity and flexibility of knowledge as it endlessly flows from the fountain of human intellect makes schools of thoughts and streams of interpretations to be numerous. This is not unconnected to the fact that people are usually the conscious or unconscious spokespersons of their society, as it profoundly influenced them (Carr, 1984; 55). As such, it is understandable why scholars belonging to different schools of thought, often write on the same phenomenon, differently. Impliedly, therefore, theories, regardless of the academic usefulness of their abstractness must possess empirical roots and correspondence (Yandaki, 2015: 14); so too, the theories in International Relations, the dominant among which are Realism, Liberalism and Marxism. These are considered to be the dominant because 'whatever comes later is simply built on them' (Arabu, 2016: 43). These schools of thought or theories are a construct of an array of scholarly dispositions by different thinkers, both classical and contemporary, on the nature and essence of human behaviour and interactions as they affect International Relations. The prime goal has been to have a cognitive mastery over the patterns of human relations in order to explain the laws of international interactions or recurrent national behaviour and orchestrate a safer and more prosperous world. Thus, being a plethora of enormous and complex events, issues and relationships, International Relations could be best understood and analysed through the instrumentality of theories, which help......observer to think critically, logically, and coherently by sorting these phenomena (i.e. the complex events, issues and relationships) into manageable categories so that the appropriate units and level of analysis can be chosen and, where possible, significant connections and patterns of behaviour identified (Burchill and Linklater, 2005: 16). Trying to assemble, narrow and explain the complexities of the nature of human beings as they interrelate, representing their respective groups at an international level, for instance, the liberalists stressed on the use of liberal approaches in international interactions. Furnished with a firm optimism on human nature, they believe that international law and morality, rather than power (à la the realists), are the key influences on International Relations; and with the presence of International Organisations such as United Nations (UN), cooperation, peace and prosperity could be achieved to form a comity of nations. The Marxists on the other side solely view International Relations from the perspective of economy, class struggle and the control of productive forces. They conclude that the hierarchical nature of the international system, which favours some nations at the expense of others, was a result of imperialism (Mingst, 1999: 66-70 & 79-83).
Iran’s foreign policy is consistent and is fundamentally realist with a revolutionist vision while the means are rationalist is the central argument of this dissertation. I make use of the English Schools three traditions of realism, rationalism and revolutionism in analyzing the speeches of Iranian statesmen to identify the ways in which the dynamics of the three traditions have evolved since 1997 and what it means for interpreting the developments of Iran’s foreign policy ventures. I utilize both quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis in examining the speeches of the supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, the presidents since 1997. The quantitative method employs a customized software generating figures that represent the recurrence of realist, rationalist and revolutionist terminologies in all the documents downloaded from the official websites of the Iranian statesmen as well as the United Nations and select news agencies and affiliates. The quantitative phase of the analysis, meanwhile, carefully examined selected statements of the supreme leader and the presidents uncovering the foreign policy argumentations and justifications, which were studied alongside foreign policy actions and classified under the three traditions. The findings suggest that Iran’s foreign policy is the same as in the other states of international society – it is consistent and dynamic. It is simultaneously realist, rationalist and revolutionist with each tradition serving a specific purpose, which cannot be disentangled from the other two.
The main purpose of the study is to analyze the role of Ideology and pragmatism in Iranian foreign policy. Main thesis is whether one factor surpasses the other while making the choices and decisions or both impacts equally influence the course of action in global political arena. The focus remains on the Iran's foreign policy towards the western world in general and America in particular. It also focuses the role of cultural disparity and why constructive breakthrough has not been achieved previously. Moreover, the cordial relationship with United States has been held in abeyance due to ideological clash and policy priorities between the two states. Iran remained focused more on ideology rather giving attention to US strategic concerns in the region since the end of cold war. Diplomatic behaviors of the states are results of the historical animosities and cordialities among the states. Moreover, Iranian policy priority has been anti-hegemonic and anti-imperialistic designs of the big powers in the post-cold war era. They kept their ideology alive and remained fixed on their strategic interests and ideology. Moreover, the scenario in the post 9/11 has been changing and global environment continue to be tougher for underdeveloped and the developing countries. Iran has been suffering due to unlimited economic and political bans because it is not bowing before the global superpower. However, things started changing and a shift came up in the policy of Iran with the emergence of new rapprochement in shape of a historical deal with United States. It seems the Iranian policy has tilted more on the side of pragmatism.
The Washington Quarterly, 2017
2000
Realism and International Relations provides students with a critical yet sympathetic survey of political realism in international theory. Using six paradigmatic theories - Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, the Prisoners' Dilemma, Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes - the book examines realist accounts of human nature and state motivation, international anarchy, system structure and the balance of power, international institutions, and morality in foreign policy. Donnelly argues that common realist propositions not only fail to stand up to scrutiny but are rejected by many leading realists as well. He argues that rather than a general theory of international relations, realism is best seen as a philosophical orientation or research program that emphasizes - in an insightful yet one-sided way - the constraints imposed by individual and national egoism and international anarchy. Containing chapter-by-chapter guides to further reading and discussion questions for students, this book ...
Epiphany Journal of Transdisciplinary Studies, 2014
This paper examines the complexity of the Iranian foreign policy through the case of Iranian nuclear program and analyzes foreign policy orientations of the last three Iranian presidents, Mohammad Khatami, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hassan Rouhani in dealing with the international community in pursuing its nuclear program. This assessment would not be complete without reference to the Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei who is the most powerful political authority. This paper also examines Iranian foreign policy expectations with various theories of international relations as to identify the most dominant or the most consistent policy orientation. Its aim is also to strengthen realist and power-based explanations that have dominated the discourse on the Middle Eastern in general and Iranian foreign policy in particular. In this context, a number of questions will be addressed here. To what extent was Iranian negotiation with the international community over its nuclear program consistent throughout these three presidencies? What has changed, if anything, from Iranian foreign policy perspective and why? Can Iranian foreign policy behavior on this specific topic and in this specific time be explained through any international relations theory? The methods employed in answering these questions are largely structured around ethnographic research methodology and my personal diplomatic experience. In addition, a chronological account and comparative approaches will be used to analyze foreign policy discourse and the assessment of key decision makers. Keywords: Iranian Foreign Policy; Nuclear Program; Realism; Power and Middle East.
Deciphering Revisionism: Is Iranian Foreign Policy in the Middle East Offensive or Defensive?, 2018
This research focuses on Iranian foreign policy. More specifically, it aims to discover whether Iranian foreign policy in the Middle East is offensive or defensive. Offensive foreign policy means that Iran would seek to dominate countries like Iraq and Yemen without the threat of U.S. intervention. Defensive foreign policy means that Iran is seeking to dominate countries like Iraq and Yemen because it fears that if these countries were to succumb to U.S. influence, the Iranian regime would be threatened. This research includes a literature review in the topics of international relations (IR) realism, constructivism, the history of the Middle East, the history of Iran, Middle Eastern geopolitics, Iranian foreign policy, and U.S. foreign policy. The research hypothesizes that Iranian foreign policy is offensive, seeking to dominate countries like Iraq and Yemen without the threat of U.S. intervention. Interviews were conducted with oral questionnaires distributed during the interviews. These interviews and questionnaires were given to experts on Iranian foreign policy, found at think tanks and universities like the Arab Institute for Security Studies, the Middle East Institute, and the University of Jordan. Because of Iranian foreign policy’s hypothesized offensiveness, U.S. policy toward the Middle East should invest in the Iraqi, Syrian, Lebanese, and Yemeni economies to gain leverage over these countries and regions. If these places continue to be places from which Iran will support terrorists, the U.S. should sanction the countries in which these terrorists congregate and offer U.S. personnel to combat these terrorists. Terrorists include members of Hezbollah, Iranian-backed Shia militias, al-Qaeda, Islamic Jihad, and Hamas. This study contributes qualitative perspectives from experts on Iranian foreign policy, Middle Eastern geopolitics, and U.S. foreign policy.
Galaxy: International Multidisciplinary Research Journal, 2023
Hans J. Morgenthau's "Politics Among Nations" is a seminal work in the field of international relations that lays out his political realism theory. Morgenthau argues that the international system is characterized by a constant struggle for power and influence among states, and that the pursuit of power and self-interest is the primary driving force behind state behavior. He also stresses the importance of diplomacy in advancing national interests and maintaining the balance of power, as well as the concept of the "national interest" as the primary guiding principle of foreign policy. The statesman also plays a crucial role in Morgenthau's political realism, as he must understand the complexities of the international system and make decisions in the face of uncertainty and ambiguity. In conclusion, Morgenthau's political realism provides a nuanced understanding of international relations and the behaviour of states in the pursuit of power, selfinterest, and national interest.
European Journal of International Relations, 2004
The present article argues that the discipline of international relations is bound to repeat its rounds of debates about realism as long as the underlying dynamic intrinsic to the realist tradition is not understood. Whereas present debates tend to criticize contemporary realists for going astray (an unhappy conjuncture, as it were), this article claims that there exists a systematic theoretical problem with the way realist theorizing has developed within international relations, and consisting of two fundamental dilemmas. The first or ‘identity dilemma’, the choice between distinctiveness and determinacy, results from the characteristics of the central concept ‘power’ — realists either keep a distinct and single micro–macro link through concepts of power/influence which provides indeterminate explanations or they improve their explanations, but must do so by relaxing their assumptions, thereby losing distinctiveness. The second or ‘conservative dilemma’, the choice between tradition and justification, results from the fact that realism is a form of practical knowledge, which needs some form of justification other than the recourse to mere tradition. Hence, realists either update the practical knowledge of a shared diplomatic culture while losing scientific credibility or, reaching for logical persuasiveness, cast their maxims in a scientific mould which distorts the realist tradition. Realism in international relations is fated to return to these dilemmas until it abandons its own identity as derived from the ‘first debate’ between realism and idealism. By doing so, however, it would be free to join a series of metatheoretical and theoretical research avenues which it has so far left to other schools of thought.
All Azimuth, 2019
As one of the most significant actors of the region, Iran’s interactions with great powers (as well as regional powers and non-state actors) have come under scrutiny. This article adopts an historical account and suggests a framework to study Iran’s foreign policy. The framework is contextually built with a multilevel approach to specify the independent and intervening variables of Iran’s foreign policy through the light of neoclassical realist theory. In this context, it is argued that the independent variables of Iran’s foreign policy are geopolitics, threat perceptions and balance of power politics. These systemic variables are filtered through nationalism, theological and revolutionary ideology and policy making mechanisms.
2022
Objective The study aims to shed light on similarities and differences between realism and Islam in terms of their epistemology, methodology, and relevant concepts such as human nature, state in the anarchic international system, and power. Methodology This study utilizes a qualitative research approach. Data are mainly taken from relevant literature and books. The analysis is conducted by comparing realism and Islam on the related epistemological and methodological constructs. Research Finding This research argues that Islam and realism fundamentally differ on epistemological and methodological aspects. Realism is posited in line with the positivistic approach that rejects value as part of scientific inquiry. However, it has been argued by Muslim scholars that they are not value-free. Islam, on the contrary, accepts value as an essential part of knowledge and science taken from revelation sources (the Qur'an and Sunnah) and gives equal importance to rationality as a complementary method to comprehend the revelation and vice versa. Application The study shows some relevance between realism and Islam. The study is useful for general readers and researchers who are interested in Islamization of social science in general and international relations in particular. The result demonstrates a clearer understanding of their similarities and differences.
Asian Politics & Policy, 2012
remains a powerful guide to understanding Chinese strategic behavior in the twentieth century" (p. 208), an unbroken strategic culture should not be taken for granted when the book discusses the issue of how China behaves when its power rises in an age of U.S. unipolarity. Given these concerns, cultural studies should not be dismissed as an irrational logic. History can provide important insights, but it is far from infallible in terms of its guidance for the present and the future. Nonetheless, structural realism may maintain a degree of validity for the purpose of explaining the impact of the international system on Chinese foreign policy. An evolutionary transformation from "hard realpolitik" to the so-called "soft idealpolitik" has somehow informed the Chinese leaders' recent political discourse on "harmonious world" and "peaceful development." However, while China may seek to promote such Confucian values as a "kingly way" (wangdao) as feasible alternatives to the power politics of U.S. hegemony (badao) abroad, it cannot expect such approaches to be endorsed by others when China itself is not willing to demonstrate its own adherence to these principles. The book would have also benefited from a discussion of the current debate on Chinese ancient thoughts of IR, 1 the universality of Chinese ancient thoughts and philosophies, and the areas of a possible convergence between Western and Chinese approaches to IR theory. In this sense, the book's discussion of China's "smart balancing" against U.S. dominance (p. 197) would have also been more inclusive had the author also considered the role of strategic culture. Despite these limitations, Harmony and War: Confucian Culture and Chinese Power Politics is a must-read for those who are interested in Chinese power politics and strategic culture. The book's realist approach is a timely addition to the literature given the current abundance of scholarship focusing on ideational factors in relation to Chinese foreign policy studies. Note 1 In this context, the current academic literature has focused on the ideational power deriving from Chinese traditional culture. For an example, see Yan Xuetong (2011).
Over the years, the Islamic Republic has experienced enormous fluctuations in foreign policy objectives, which revolve around the notion that there are competing interests between those of the Islamic clergy and those of the nation in general (Salehzadeh, 2013: 1). In the early years of the revolution, the leadership of Iran under the influence of Khomeini Ayatollah sought for ideological reasons and advantages, to pursue isolationism and to reduce the power of the military. However, these ideological prisms were soon challenged by national interest proponents, and at times, the latter have triumphed over ideological clerics in foreign policy formulation (Kruse, 1994: 10). The triumph of pragmatic leaders in foreign policy formulation offered a compelling example for structural realists that cannot be ignored by state theories in discussing the determinants of Iranian foreign policy. Therefore, whilst acknowledging structural realist arguments, this paper argues that internal attributes, including history, environmental factors and domestic politics all play a decisive role in shaping the behavior of Iran towards other countries.
This article seeks to explain why Iranian foreign policy toward the western countries in general and The United States in particular even under the systemic pressures has remained relatively unchanged. To this end, the present article identifies the determinant factors affect Iranian foreign policy. Since the 1979 Islamic revolution, Iranian foreign and security policy has been dominated by a new set of revolutionary values and discourses. The author believes that the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran mostly is driven by its revolutionary values and ideological perspectives than the logic of nation states. To understand Iranian foreign behavior, one should try to understand the basic characteristics of the country's normative and discursive structures. Hence, this article argues that due to the role of normative factors in constructing Iranian foreign policy, the Holistic constructivist approach is considered the most applicable theory for explaining the country's foreign policy.
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