Expression and Knowledge of Other Persons, Aletheia 2 (1981)

Philosophical Studies, 2007

Abstract This essay offers a constructive criticism of Part I of Davis’ Meaning, Expression and Thought. After a brief exposition, in Sect. 2, of the main points of the theory that will concern us, I raise a challenge in Sect. 3 for the characterization of expression that is so central to his program. I argue first of all that a sincere expression of a thought, feeling, or mood shows it. Yet attention to this fact reveals that it does not go without saying how it is possible to show such things as thoughts, feelings or moods; we need an account of how this is possible, and I offer a partial such account in Sect. 4. Second, much of the attraction of Davis’ program depends on its ability to explain how linguistic meaning can be arrived at without covertly presupposing linguistic conventions. This in turn depends, in Davis’ hands, upon the claim that it is possible to express any of a wide range of ideas in the absence of conventions. I argue in Sect. 5 that the account of showing at which we will by then have arrived makes clear that Davis needs, and lacks, an explanation of how it is possible to do this.

Proceedings of the European Society for Aesthetics, vol.3, 2011

Classic expression theory identified the emotional content of works of art with the feelings of their creators or recipients. This content thus appeared to be external to the work itself. Consequently, formalism declared it to be irrelevant to a work's value. A solution to this dilemma-one which the Polish aesthetician Henryk Elzenberg was among the first to propose-was suggested by the idea that physical, sensual objects can themselves possess emotional qualities. Thanks to Bouwsma and Beardsley, this conceptof expressiveness as a quality-became common in Anglo-American aesthetics from the fifties onwards. At the same time, these authors demanded that the term "expression" be expunged from the language of aesthetics.

2018

Given the importance it plays in various “meta-phenomenological” questions,1 it is easy to take expression for granted as a phenomenological dictum. However, doing so not only harms the rigor of the phenomenological explorations employing (or in some cases implicitly built upon) the concept of expression, but it also loses sight of the fact that expression is itself a phenomenon2 that is able to be explicated by way of phenomenological analysis. In this paper, rather than talking about the role of expression in phenomenology, I would like to undertake a phenomenology of expression. That is, here I hope to describe, as clearly and distinctly as possible, the main components of expression. I will begin with an eidetic examination of the essential characteristics of expression (Section I), before moving on to a brief sketch of a genetic account of our acquisition of expressive abilities and their role in connecting us to the broader, common lifeworld (Section II).

Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 2006

In this paper I discuss how expressive behavior relates to personality and psychopathology, integrating recent findins from my laboratory and the insights of Charles Darwin on this topic. In the first part of the paper I challenge the view, in part espoused by Darwin, that humans are equipped to convey only a limited number of emotions with nonverbal behavior. Our lab has documented displays for several emotions, including embarrassment, love, desire, compassion, gratitude, and awe, to name just a few states that previously were thought not to possess a distinct display. I then present an argument for how individual differences in emotion, although fleeting, shape the social environment. This argument focuses on the functions of nonverbal display: to provide information to others, to evoke responses, and to serve as incentives of preceding or ensuing social behavior. This reasoning sets the stage for the study of the relationships between personality, psychopathology, and expressive behavior, to which I turn in the final part of the paper. Here I show that basic personality traits (e.g., extraversion, agreeableness) and psychological disorders (e.g., externalizing disorder in children, autism) have expressive signatures that shape social interactions and environments in profound ways that might perpetuate and transmit the trait or disorder.

Researchers on emotion and expression commonly distinguish expressive from representational acts and artifacts without further elucidating that distinction. I here take steps toward such an elucidation by, first (Section 1) characterizing self-expression as behavior in which one designedly shows an aspect of one’s psychological state. The states we express may be cognitive, affective or experiential. The showing at issue requires making knowledge available. The design may be a result of natural selection, artificial selection, cultural evolution, or individual intention where this latter is construed widely enough to include acquired automaticity. Expression per se is then defined in terms of self-expression and expressiveness. I then argue that expressed emotions may in some instances be perceived (Section 2), after which I consider (Section 3) implications for this position in light of recent challenges to a view of emotions as natural kinds. I then (4) defend a view of speech acts as institutions whose role is to extend the scope of those states we can express beyond those we make perceptible, and broaden this perspective (5) to slurs in the course of advocating an expressivist perspective thereon. I then (6) propose that metaphors are often used to aid speakers in expressing affective states by showing others how they feel. Speech acts, slurs and metaphors are all representational, and yet each wields substantial expressive powers.

Southern Journal of Philosophy , 2017

How do we become aware of the properties or states that are expressed by gestures, utterances and facial expressions? This paper argues that expression raises peculiar problems, distinct from those of property perception in general. It argues against some current accounts of awareness of expressed states, before proposing an account which appeals to the notion of empathy. Finally, it situates the proposed account within current discussions of expression in the philosophy of music.

This article provides a sketch of the theoretical framework of German Expression Psychology (GEP) and discusses the forms and functions of bodily and verbal types of communication that express inner states. Starting with a brief historical overview, we discuss general concepts of the German Expression Psychology framework, in particular with respect to the definition of expression, the relationship between expression and its subject, and the perception of expression. Within each of these areas special attention is given to the face, body and voice as indicators of inner states. Following this general overview of German Expression Psychology, we focus on the contribution of three selected authors, namely, Philipp Lersch, Paul Leyhausen and Egon Brunswik, who have been particularly influential in the field of German Expression Psychology. For Lersch, we consider the co-existential relationship between affect and expression, the detailed anatomical description of expressions, as well as the analysis of dynamic aspects of expressions. Leyhausen added an ethological perspective on expressions and perceptions. Here, we focus on the developmental aspects of expression and impression formation, and differentiate between phylogenetic and ontogenetic aspects of expression. Brunswik's Lens Model allows a separation between distal indicators on the part of the sender and proximal percepts on the part of the observer. Here, we discuss how such a model can be used to describe and analyze nonverbal communication on both the encoding and decoding side. Deriving from the presentation of all three authors, we outline the general relevance of German Expression Psychology for current research, specifically with respect to the definition and function of expressions and perceptions, and existing approaches to the study of verbal and nonverbal behavior.

Frontiers in psychology, 2017

In the present essay, we aim to develop an expressivist reading of the phenomenon of first-person authority and the adverbial meaning of unconsciousness. In the first part, Wittgenstein's grammatical remarks on the asymmetry between the first -and third-persons in psychological self-ascriptions are developed as an alternative to detectivist explanations according to which first-person authority is to be regarded as a matter of epistemic accomplishment. In the second part, this expressivist account will be used to propose a non-epistemic analysis of the meaning of unconsciousness and to offer a critical discussion of both Freud's and Lacan's respective readings of the unconscious. Regarding the latter, we will reject the idea that the concept of the unconscious (i) necessitates the introduction of a (Cartesian) "subject of the unconscious" and (ii) could be deduced from the paradoxes of first-personal reference.

2013

The paper claims in favour of a theory of artistic expression as expression, contesting other approaches to artistic expression as expressiveness. In particular it analyses Lopes “impersonal theory” of pictorial expression, trying to show the insufficiency of an approach that avoid the connection between expression and the self. First it argues for the necessity that a concept of the expressed emotion is involved, and not merely indicated, in the perception of the expressive content of a picture. It also criticizes Lopes’ notion of expression-look as independent of an expressive perception. In the same way it maintains the necessity to distinguish between the depicted expression of a figure or scene and the picture expressiveness, to which the figure may contribute. It suggests that expressiveness of the picture is attributable to the artist’s activity. Finally it challenges Robinson’s attempt to maintain expression and expressiveness separated, and holds that expressiveness is to b...