Lessons from Wittgenstein: Elucidating Folk Psychology
Daniel D. Hutto
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Abstract
To the extent that psychologists are concerned to do more than collect raw data for possible interpretation, they cannot avoid interrogating the philosophical assumptions which inform their work. This paper argues that there is a vital need for conceptual clarification of many of the central topics studied by today’s sciences of the mind. Yet, rather than offering a comprehensive survey of these, this paper focuses on one illustrative, high profile case: the way in which our everyday understanding of reasons for action has been wrongly categorized in terms of ‘theory of mind’ abilities. Focusing on this example I show how it is possible to elucidate topics in the philosophy of psychology by relinquishing certain powerful explanatory temptations and by attending more closely to our everyday practices and activities.
Key takeaways
- Wittgenstein maintains that it is the attachment to certain misleading pictures that makes us fundamentally unable to understand important phenomena of interest.
- For, inspired by Wittgenstein, I maintain that the task of philosophy is precisely to remove obstacles to clear thinking on important topics and that this type of activity is of the first importance to psychology, especially in its current state.
- Wittgenstein thought that all philosophy should be therapy.
- To describe folk psychology as ''ToM abilities'' (or cognate terms) entails the implicit adoption of a philosophical picture of this familiar practice.
- Rejecting the idea that there is an automatic implication of cultural relativism, they otherwise endorse the idea, criticized by Astington and Gopnik (1991), that: ''folk psychology is.what Wittgenstein would call a ''form of life,'' a set of social and cultural practices and conventions.
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Review of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology by Malcolm Budd 203p (1989)(review revised 2019)
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A superb effort, but in my view Wittgenstein (i.e., philosophy or the descriptive psychology of higher order thought) is not completely understood by anyone, so we can hardly expect Budd, writing in the mid 80’s, without the modern dual systems of thought view, and no comprehensive logical structure of rationality, to have grasped him completely. Like everyone, he does not get that W’s use of the word ‘grammar’ refers to our innate Evolutionary Psychology and the general framework of Wittgenstein’s and Searle’s work since laid out (e.g., in my recent articles) was unavailable to him. Nevertheless, he does a good job and nicely complements the work by Johnston (Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner) which I have also reviewed. Budd’s summary is a fitting end to the book (p165). “The repudiation of the model of ‘object and designation’ for everyday psychological words—the denial that the picture of the inner process provides a correct representation of the grammar of such words, is not the only reason for Wittgenstein’s hostility to the use of introspection in the philosophy of psychology. But it is its ultimate foundation.” An excellent study, but in my view, like them all, it falls short of a full appreciation of W as I explain here and in my other reviews. Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) ,The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019).
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The myth of mind, and the mistake of psychology
In psychology, it is thought 'natural' to speak of people as possessing within themselves something called their "mind," and to think that minds have their own discoverable, intrinsic principles of operation, which owe nothing either to society or to history for their nature. But the "mind" as such is, I think, a mythic entity. And attention to it diverts our attention away from the detailed social processes involved, not only in negotiating the making of common meanings, but also from those involved in the everyday methods of testing and checking we use in establishing socially intelligible and legitimate common goals. It is its failure to notice the importance of these processes of normative evaluation which is, I think, psychology's mistake. What I want to claim below is: 1) that psychology is not a natural but a moral science; 2) that instead of what might be called a theoretical/explanatory approach, aimed at producing theoretical knowledge, it must use a practical/ descriptive approach, aimed at gaining practical-moral knowledge; 3) that this aim is much more difficult to achieve than might be imagined, as more than simply academic activities are involved; and 4) that although 'social constructionist' studies are required at present, our embodied nature is what is our ultimate problematic.
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