Body Without a Self, Self Without Body

Anthropology & Philosophy, 2015

Several authors have recently defended the idea that there is a “pre-reflective self-consciousness”, or “pre-reflective self”, which is regarded as a very precocious psychic function that grounds every conscious act. In particular, Prebble, Addis & Tippett (2013) argue that this kind of self-consciousness is a fundamental prerequisite for episodic memory and is very similar to the Jamesian notion of I, or subjective self (as opposed to Me, or objective self). In this paper we will argue that the identification of the Jamesian notion of I with pre-reflective self-consciousness is a misunderstanding of James’ account and that self-consciousness is, properly said, the result of a gradual process of objectification, which requires conscious (but not self-conscious) activities of representation. Indeed, the subjective self (or self-consciousness), far from being the grounding source of every conscious mental activity, is the result of a complex neurocognitive and psycho-social construction, where the understanding of other minds both ontogenetically precedes and grounds the understanding of our own minds.

Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture, 2020

The paper discusses the unique relationship that exists between the ego and one's own body. There are two fundamental possibilities to grasp it-using the verb "to be" or "to have," which results in two known formulas: "to be the body" or "to have the body." However, after careful examination, it turns out that they are one-sided and entangle us in numerous aporias. A more complete picture of the relationships with one's own body is made possible by a phenomenological description, which is a first-person and direct approach. The body, given in numerous experiences, turns out to be paradoxical and ambiguous. This is also my relation with it-it is feeling myself and others, getting to know myself and the world; an internal and at the same time external bond, at most my own experience along with the need to transcend the body. Finally, we consider whether the category of "relationship" resp. "relation" matches the experience of one's own body. Perhaps a better solution is to give up this term and describe the body as a character of human being.

2011

In the present paper we address the issue of the role of the body in shaping our basic self-awareness. It is generally taken for granted that basic bodily self-awareness has primarily to do with proprioception. Here we challenge this assumption by arguing from both a phenomenological and a neurophysiological point of view that our body is primarily given to us as a manifold of action possibilities that cannot be reduced to any form of proprioceptive awareness. By discussing the notion of affordance and the spatiality of the body we show that both have to be construed in terms of the varying range of our power for action. Finally, we posit that the motor roots of our bodily self-awareness shed new light on both the common ground for and the distinguishing criterium between self and other. The properties of the mirror mechanism indicate that the same action possibilities constituting our bodily self also allow us to make sense of other bodily selves inasmuch as their action possibilities can be mapped onto our own ones. Our proposal may pave the way towards a general deconstruction of the different layers at the core of our full-fledged sense of self and others.

As Descartes noted, a proper account of the nature of the being that one is, begins with a basic self always present in first-person experience, a self that one cannot cogently doubt being. This paper seeks to uncover the nature of this self, first within consciousness and thinking, then within the lived or first-person felt body. After noting the inadequacy of Merleau-Ponty’s commonly referenced reflections, it undertakes a phenomenological investigation of the lived body that finds the basic self to reside in one’s espoused feelings and striving, both of which are bodily in nature. It then examines the relationship of the lived body to the visual body and to the body studied by science, noting their strong topological and dynamic congruence. Finally, it considers two aspects of the lived body not directly available experientially in third-person observation, its apparent agency and free will. It concludes that on the available evidence neither is rightly deemed illusory.

Phenomenology and Mind, 2014

This article aims at providing a faithful description of the first-person perspective phenomenon. after clarifying what makes a description faithful, it will argue that Perry's and Baker's theories alone do not offer such description. nevertheless, they offer some interesting insights which, along with the phenomenological attitude, contribute to the formulation of a faithful description. This is why this article focuses on these two specific authors from a phenomenological perspective. toWARDs A FAItHFUL DesCRIPtIon oF tHe FIRst-PeRson PeRsPeCtIve PHenoMenon: eMBoDIMent In A BoDy tHAt HAPPens to Be MIne 1 this phenomenon is phenomenologically conceived as the subjective and personal side of every intentional structure. 2 see also borges 1964. 3 cf. also sartre 1943, Part iii, chapter i (especially § 4). toWARDs A FAItHFUL DesCRIPtIon oF tHe FIRst-PeRson PeRsPeCtIve PHenoMenon: eMBoDIMent In A BoDy tHAt HAPPens to Be MIne bianca bellini università vita-salute san raffaele

In an important sense this note is not about self. It does not make any claim that self does exist or it does not exist. This note questions the the very notion of self. The notion, this note argues, is misconceived and fails to make sense beyond the discursive boundary with in which it finds a problematic use. It fails to cross the boundary to talk about that is not a mere construction of the discourse. I have used in this note a few terms that are neologisms and a few others for which I have departed from conventional use. There are certain words I needed to rediscover for the presentation. In a discursive context for example deliberators arrive at a position by rational argumentation. The words agreement an consensus tell a different story. Gratis, the Latin root of 'agree', actually means to please. And 'consensus' derived from sentire meaning in Latin feeling. Originally therefore agreement and consensus are non-rational and very inter subjective in nature. The rational procedure of the discursive level hardly gets out of the vicious circle it's own ideas create. And cannot match with the agreement and consensus of the inter subjective level. Key words: Subjective plane-introspection-extra-spective-intersubjective plane-extra-spective plane-extraspectively intersubjective-introspectively intersubjective-discursive level-phenomenation-transcendental unity of apperception-selfsame ess of continuous consciousness-reflexive consciousness-lived bodies-three orders of being-sense of horizon of existence-auto-ontological-ex-ontological-facing-field-bio-embodied Consciousness-interface-instrumentation of sign system-cogito complex-spontaneous reflexivity-auto-thetic-linguistic fabrication One: spontaneous reflexivity Thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries dared not use the word self as reassuringly as many of their counterparts do today. They stuck to the words 'the I' or 'ego' for referring to something which many of them thought to have an

In current trends in cognitive sciences, the discussion on body crosses the classical divide between the body and the self in terms of nature and function. Embodiment theories have helped to bring in the importance of the role of subjective experiences to understand cognition, and place the process of knowing in a cultural and social context. This article is a critique of the growing trend in cognitive sciences, particularly in affective neurosciences, and approaches, to reduce the experiential self to a nonentity. It is shown that though the apparent goal is to highlight the inner qualitative nature of experience, what is happening in the background is a role reversal. The outer body becomes the inner self. The inner self becomes the outer body. The nature and functions of the self are founded on the body by theorizing embodiment as an alternate to neural reductionism. This article argues that one of the negative consequences of embodiment theories is that age-old concepts of freewill, character and moral choices become flimsy and fleeting in the process of embodying cognition. The age-old wisdom of philosophy and empiricism of sciences tells us that the body is outside and the self is inside. The distinction between the outer and the inner are not ambiguous conceptually. Further, while the life and physical sciences are to understand the object which is outside, the psychological sciences and philosophy are to understand the inner self. In other words, we have an outer body and an inner self that require different methods and approaches for their analysis. Baconian and Cartesian dualism supports such a stance. In postmodern and feminist philosophies, such wisdom is questioned, and the very notions of body are extended to be connected with the interiority of the self. The renewed notion of body is to give a specific phenomenological importance and place the body as the centre of experience. The body concepts from phenomenological and feminist traditions mostly enrich the concept of inner self than removing it.

Philosophical Papers

Characterizing the first-and third-person perspectives is essential to the study of consciousness, yet we lack a rigorous definition of or criteria for these two perspectives. Our intuitive understanding of how personal pronouns help to specify the perspectives gives rise to mutually exclusive notions of the first-person perspective. This contradiction thwarts our progress in studying consciousness. We can resolve the current ambiguity of the first-person perspective by introducing a new distinction between the first-person and third-person perspectives, based on two modes of consciousness: reflective and non-reflective. The purpose of this paper is to explain this new proposal, to elucidate the grounds for it, and to briefly suggest benefits from its use. Many scholars of consciousness have drawn attention to the essential differences between knowing ourselves and knowing the world around us, which respectively-it is thought-correspond to first-person and third-person points of view or perspectives. Two important issues relate to these points of view. The first concerns the very distinction between them: to date there are few, if any, elaborated criteria for the delineation of the two perspectives. The second is the connection or relationship between them. These two issues are intertwined: as long as the distinction between the two perspectives lacks a clear definition, the problem of the connection between them cannot be solved. Clarifying this connection would illuminate such problems of consciousness as the 'explanatory gap' and the mind-body problem. Formulating these problems correctly depends crucially on distinguishing between first-and third-person phenomena in an adequate way, and their solution must involve a theory about the relationship between the two.

This paper outlines the results of a phenomenological investigation into the nature of the self. It is a conceptual model of the composition and functional structure which is, I hope, true for all human selves. Phenomenology is biasless reflective examination of experience, in this case experience of the self. Thus, the model of the self presented is a model of the self as experienced by itself. To do phenomenology, each person must examine his or her own experience. Thus, this essay is devoted to outlining the results of my own examination of my experience of myself. By reporting these results in a language publicly available to all, I make it possible for others to compare the findings of their own reflective examination of themselves with my results, thereby making possible consensual validation or disconfirmation of assertions regarding the nature of the self. The investigation proceeds from the transcendental Self (what Husserl calls the transcendental Ego) taken as that-which-is-conscious to the empirical self, that synthetic unity of diverse elements available as objects of consciousness which each of us is, to the transcendental Self taken as agent, as that-which-acts. The transcendental Self is inherently incapable of becoming an object of consciousness, for it is that which is itself conscious. Strictly speaking we should not use a noun phrase, but should rather speak of experiencing and acting as functions of the self to which no particular experiencable objects or types of objects correspond. The empirical self is the self as available in experience to conscious examination; it is that complex of affairs of which I am or can become conscious which has or can rationally acquire the sense “me” or “mine.” It is composed of thinking and thoughts, perceptions, bodily sensations, emotions, moods, the self-concept, and deliberate and habitual action viewed from the point of view of that person whose action it is. Though composed of many elements, the self is a unity in that it is located in a single place, is embodied, and its elements are functionally related to each other and to the whole in a teleological drive toward survival, health and happiness. The self is intrinsically related to its world, to other selves, and to itself. By virtue of its relation to itself, the self is free to choose courses of action and to perform them. It is free to determine for itself ethical maxims by which to guide its actions fruitfully. Determination of such ethical maxims is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.

The Review of Contemporary Scientific and Academic Studies, 2023

Determining the Self by a single notion is difficult. Yet, there are undoubtedly some details that define who I am. Nothing, in my view, is more intimately known to and specific to an individual than Consciousness, which forms the "I". It makes sense that there must be a self for the I Consciousness to exist. We need to treat consciousness seriously if we are to understand the authenticity of the Self. When an organism has conscious experience, it indicates that it has some sense of what it's like to be that creature. Without changing the underlying structure, one could appear or act like a certain creature, but their conscious experience would be entirely distinct from that of that particular creature. In this essay, I strive to find the "Self," but I am unwilling to eliminate or even reduce the body-rather, I want to affirm its significance in defining the self. How self-consciousness could be objectively understood without a specific perspective is unquestionably an open question. Understanding a person's point of view-that is, how he or she feels or sees the world-is the only way to truly comprehend that person. In the specified sphere of an endured world, this uniqueness starts with the body. Our bodies are the aspect that unifies us, contributing to what has been alluded to as a sense of ownership.