To Salvage Neurath

This chapter argues for the centrality of Neurath's syntacticism to his physicalism, encyclopedism, and the unity of science program. I defend the intelligibility of Neurath's opposition to semantics and underline the role syntacticism plays in his anti-metaphysical empiricism. I argue that Neurath was correct to fear that the semantic turn would spell the end of logical empiricism. Many of the most influential metaphysical arguments of the 20 th century turn on premises that would be undermined by a Neurathian rejection of semantics.

General Semantics Bulletin, 2004

2009

This is a beautiful book. It traces the history of philosophical work on vagueness, evaluates the main contemporary treatments of the subject, and advances the view that vagueness is ignorance, supporting this position by a detailed account of the notion of inexactness in knowledge.

Analysis, 1996

According to the epistemic conception of vagueness defended in Williamson 1994, what we use vague terms to say is true or false, but in borderline cases we cannot know which. Our grasp of what we say does not open its truth-value to our view. Crispin Wright 1995 offers a lively critique of this conception. A reply may help to clarify the issues.' The first point to note is that epistemicism is not a denial that our terms are vague; it is a theory about what their acknowledged vagueness consists in. Me all recognize examples of vagueness when we encounter them in borderline cases; we can then go on to construct alternative hypotheses as to the underlying nature of the phenomenon. Wright acknowledges this point, for he credits epistemicism with '[tlhe merit [. . .] of bringing out that the ordinary idea of genuine semantic indeterminacy is not itself a datum, but a proto-theory of data' (134, Wright's emphasis). Unfortunately, some of his criticisms neglect the point. For example, he takes the epistemicist to hold that 'when I intend that you should stand roughly here, [...I the demarcation of the range of cases in which you would comply from that in which you would not is already perfectly precise' (155, Wright's emphasis; other such remarks occur on 153 and 155). Precision is the absence of vagueness. On the epistemic view, 'Stand roughly here' is a vague request, not a precise one, but its vagueness is an epistemic matter. Our understanding of it is such that we cannot know where we cease to comply with it. Even the metaphor of vague concepts as blurred shadows (133) can be interpreted epistemically. Fortunately, Wright's main arguments do not depend on this misstatement; they must now be addressed. Part of the case for epistemicism is an explanation of our inability to know whether vague terms apply in borderline cases (Williamson 1994: 21647). It uses independently motivated principles about knowledge. Suppose that x judges truly that P. If x could too easily have judged falsely by the same method, then x has judged truly only by luck, and x does not know that P.2 Contrapositively, if x does know that P, then x could not too * I will ignore Wright's criticisms of Roy Sorensen's arguments for epistemicism, to which Sorensen replies in his 1995.

2015

We argue that a number of difficulties facing expressivist solutions to the Frege- Geach problem are paralleled by almost exactly analogous problems facing realist semantic theories. We argue that a prominent realist solution to the problem of explaining logical inconsistency can be adopted by expressivists. By doing so, the expressivist brings her account of logical consequence more in line with philosophical orthodoxy, while simultaneously purchasing herself the right to appeal to a wider class of attitudinal conflicts in her semantic theorizing than is allowed, for instance, by Mark Schroeder in his recent work. Finally, it emerges that a standard objection to expressivist theories is based on a misinterpretation of the Frege-Geach problem. We explain this misinterpretation and show how expressivists can easily skirt the objection it motivates.

Argumentation and Advocacy, 1984

Ethics, 2015

We argue that several difficulties facing expressivist solutions to the Frege-Geach problem are paralleled by almost exactly analogous problems facing realist semantic theories. We show that by adopting a variation on a prominent realist solution, the expressivist brings her account of logical consequence closer to philosophical orthodoxy. Our discussion also demonstrates that a standard objection to expressivism is based on a misinterpretation of the Frege-Geach problem and that the expressivist can appeal to a wide range of attitudinal conflicts in her semantic theorizing-far wider than Mark Schroeder, for example, allows in his recent work. Odi et amo. quare id faciam, fortasse requiris? nescio, sed fieri sentio et excrucior. 1 ðCatullus 85Þ * Order of names is alphabetical. Both authors contributed equally. Thanks to Jamin

Meta-representation, self-organization and art. …, 2008

By the law of non-contradiction, a statement and its negation cannot be true simultaneously. Ever since its introduction in Aristotle's Metaphysics more than two thousand years ago, it has been commonplace to assume that rationality is incompatible with the maintenance of ...

2015

I propose a new theory of vagueness centered around the epistemology and normativity of vagueness. The theory is a version of epistemicism—the view that vagueness is a fundamentally epistemic phenomenon—that improves upon existing epistemicist accounts by accommodating both the alleged tolerance and open texture of vague predicates, while foregoing excessive metaphysical commitments. I offer a novel solution to the infamous Sorites paradox, one that outrivals alternative contextualist theories in their ability to explain the phenomenology of vagueness as well as its deontic consequences.Philosoph