Moral values and the Taoist sage in the Tao de Ching

Forum Philosophicum, 16 (2), (2011): 99-110

Arthur Danto argues that all Eastern philosophies – except Confucianism – fail to accept necessary conditions on genuine morality: a robust notion of agency and that actions are praiseworthy only if performed voluntarily, in accordance with rules, and from motives based on the moral worth and well-being of others. But Danto’s arguments fail: Neo-Taoism and Mohism satisfy these allegedly necessary constraints and Taoism and Buddhism both posit moral reasons that fall outside the scope of Danto’s allegedly necessary conditions on genuine morality. Thus, our initial reaction, that these Eastern philosophies offer genuine moral reasons for action, is sustained rather than overturned.

The Routledge Companion to Virtue Ethics, 2015

There has been an impressive revival of virtue ethics in the West, as a challenge to ethics of duty and consequentialism that have been dominating modern dis- courses of ethics. Many attempts have thus been made to explore the potential of virtue ethics in Asian traditions, including Hinduism, Buddhism, and, most prominently, Confucianism. However, little attention has been paid to the virtue ethics potential in Chinese Daoism. This chapter on Daoist virtue ethics thus cannot but be experimental. While the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi are the two greatest and yet quite different classics in philosophical Daoism, this chapter will draw on the latter only.

As the ethics of virtue, with a focus on cultivating admirable traits of character instead of commanding adherence to rigid rules, becomes increasingly popular in contemporary moral discourses, scholars have tried to find evidence of virtue ethics in such ancient traditions as Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. This article explores the possibility of a virtue ethics in a tradition that has been largely neglected, Chinese Daoism, by focusing on one of the most important classics in this tradition, the Zhuangzi. Contrary to a common misconception of the Zhuangzi as skeptical, relativistic, and therefore empty of any guide to moral life, it presents a solid normative ethics through various stories, and this normative ethics is a virtue ethics. The most important trait of character in this Daoist virtue ethics is respect for different ways of life—a virtue not discussed in any familiar versions of virtue ethics in the West and yet most valuable to contemporary life in a global and pluralistic society.

2020

This essay is part of my series exploring the validity of the existence of “Classical Daoism” or Daojia 道家, “Dao Specialists.” Prior to examining the various texts on matters pertaining to ethics or morality (forthcoming in Part 5.3), it’s prudent to briefly discuss some relevant Chinese “ethical terms.” This is a work in progress: comments and questions are most welcome, as are notification of any typos or mistakes.

(Unpublished) This paper presents an overview on the matter of virtue from different philosophical angles. It concentrates on three different schools of thought coming from the West and the East and their respective concepts of virtue. These schools of thought and the therewith-associated personalities and works discussed in this paper are Aristotelian virtue ethics, Confucianism and Daoism. Particularly, this paper focuses on the Nicomachean Ethics (NE) by Aristotle, the Analects belonging to Confucianism, and the Dao De Jing coming from Daoism. In the course of elaborating those different approaches, the paper starts with introducing the different personalities and their respective works. In the second section, the paper continues with describing the three different schools of thought and the historical context. The third section explains the concept of virtue of each school, before going into detail about the particular virtues in section four. The paper closes with a summary and conclusion. In the conclusion the paper establishes differences as well as similarities, at least between Aristotelian and Confucian virtue ethics. However, the author general takes a critical stance towards comparisons merely for the sake of finding similarities, as particularly in the case of Aristotelian and Confucian virtue ethics there is a significant difference when it comes to the cultural and historical background of those virtues, which should not be ignored. Besides, even within Chinese philosophy there are already significant differences when it comes to concepts and practice, which becomes apparent when comparing the Confucian approach to virtue ethics with the Daoist conception of virtues.

Norton Introduction to Ethics

A discussion of Daoist challenges to Confucian views of virtue, and the unique forms of virtue we find in Daoist texts. Unabridged version of forthcoming article on early Daoist conceptions of virtue in the Norton Introduction to Ethics.

Dao: a Journal of Comparative Philosophy, 2015

DAI Zhen 戴震criticizes Song-Ming 宋明Neo-Confucianism, especially ZHU Xi’s 朱熹dichotomy between principle (li 理) and desires (yu 欲) and his claim that principle is received from Heaven and completely embodied in the heart/mind, as if Zhu advocates asceticism and ultra-intuitionism. This criticism culminates in the accusation of “using principle as a means of killing or persecuting people.” In this paper, I argue that DAI Zhen misunderstands ZHU Xi’s moral theory and does not do him justice. At some point Dai’s criticism is similar to the utilitarian criticism of deontology. However, more interesting are Dai’s unique ideas, especially his arguments for desires that covertly appeal to the immanent-monist trends of thought in the Ming-Qing 明清period. His own ethical enterprise lies in dismissing Song Confucians’ notion of ethics as revealing principles a priori, and then establishing criteria or procedures that enable common moral deliberation.

Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia, 2019

The paper explores the possibility of finding radical elements of individualistic and libertarian (especially left-libertarian) thought in Taoist philosophy. It demonstrates that philosophical Taoism should be treated in a comprehensive way, with a particular emphasis on ethics. In connection with this, the anti-authoritarian ethico-political dimension of early Taoism is examined, and it is argued that the Taoist philosophers of ancient China had a deep respect for the equal liberty of individuals, who are all unique by nature. As a result, findings suggest that Taoist anarchism in early medieval China evolved as the logical conclusion from ancient Taoist ethico-political thought since radical ideas were embodied in it. The research goal of this paper is to develop a Taoist-libertarian virtue ethics and to show its political relevance. Therefore, it is also intended to show how Taoist libertarianism (avant la lettre) undermines political authority despite being neither consequentialist nor deontological, unlike typical American libertarianism.

Journal of Chinese Philosophy

Onto-Cosmology as Onto-Morality This article is about morality and its foundation. 1 In particular, I will attempt to show that moral life is its own foundation. Confucianism is a good example for an attitude of this type; Neo-Confucianism is a renewal of it in new terminology. We are used to appreciating the Neo-Confucian project as endowing Confucian morality with its "missing link" in the form of a metaphysical foundation. In this article I claim that the so-called "metaphysical" language in Neo-Confucianism is first and foremost an affirmation of Confucian morality, in new terms receptive to the challenge of the time. These terms are metaphysical in nature, and yet very true to Confucian original spirit, as they do not endow Confucianism with an external foundation, but rather with an internal ethical one. I address the question of the significance of metaphysical terms by showing the inner bond of the Great Ultimate (taiji) and humanity (ren), suggesting that moral beings are "organs" in the one ultimate body, which is fundamentally moral. I first deal with humanity depicted as origination (yuan, as related to benti); secondly, in terms of substance (ti) and function (yong); third, as the highest good or the Great Ultimate itself. I conclude with a general remark regarding the power of foundations of this nature in a contemporary context. Generally speaking, in Confucianism, from the cosmological perspective, in the process of creation, both human and "divine" are operative. The relation between the ultimate and the myriad of things can roughly be put such that "things" exist in one organic whole; this whole is the Great Ultimate, and anything included in it is an essential characteristic or aspect of this whole. Accordingly, morality is related to the Great Ultimate as an essential characteristic of the