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1978, International Studies in Philosophy
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3 pages
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The reviewed book "Freedom and Value" explores the nuances of human freedom in relation to moral frameworks, particularly through the lens of Thomistic ethics and John Rawls' theories of justice. It critiques traditional notions of freedom, proposing a more dynamic understanding influenced by contemporary philosophical discourse. The analysis emphasizes the philosophical implications of freedom as a value in itself, regardless of the moral capacities of its applications, thereby highlighting the complexities inherent in debates surrounding free will, moral choices, and the significance of freedom in ethical considerations.
This chapter looks at human freedom in the context of the problem of free will and conceptions of it in existentialist philosophy.
2009
Traditionally, the defense of freedom appeals to moral responsibility: if we are not free, then we have no moral responsibility, but we believe in responsibility, so we must acknowledge that we are free. In this thesis, I show some of the ways that this argument has been attacked, both by showing that we might not be morally responsible and by showing that we might be morally responsible without being free. Then I argue that the defense of freedom needs a broader scope in order to succeed. Arguments from Kant's Critique of Pure Reason are used to show that we must be free in order to acquire knowledge and to progress, individually or as a society. Then Heidegger's ontological notion of freedom is explicated in conjunction with the problem of explaining human creativity, which also seems to depend upon a very broad concept of freedom. The defense of freedom is strengthened by this consideration of other human activities, besides the practice of holding others morally responsible for their acts, the explanation of which seems to require a concept of freedom.
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE NATURE OF HUMAN FREEDOM - by F.W.J. von Schelling (Edited by Edouard d'Araille), 2001
The chapter on 'The Nature of Freedom' from one of the most original essays ever written, exploring freedom from the standpoint of Post-Kantian Idealism. F.W.J. von Schelling's essay is challenging to read but it has been re-edited into chapters and presented in a new way so as to make it more easily read. Edouard d'Araille has also provided the briefest of introductions to the life and work of Friedrich Wilhelm Josef von Schelling. In his 'Prefatory Note' he provides a biographical sketch of the author and discusses his work and influences. It is followed by an extract of Josiah Royce's on Schelling which gives a larger picture of the romantic-idealist philosopher. It is a valuable contribution to the philosophy of freedom, surpassed only by Schopenhauer's 'Essay on the Freedom of Will'. This meticulous edited version of von Schelling's essay includes three portraits (one in colour) and full textual annotations.
Proceedings of the XIII. International Kant Congress , 2021
Kant’s conception of autonomy has been criticised for identifying acting freely with acting morally. As a result, many Kantians have moved away from Kant’s moral conception of autonomy, instead proposing what I will call an “end-set- ting” or “two-way capacity” account of autonomy. I believe that we should resist these revisions and that doing so makes clear why it is only the capacity for moral autonomy that is of unlimited value. What fundamentally distinguishes our free capacity of volition is the fact that we are autonomous. This capacity en- ables us to have a conception of unlimited goodness that gives us the dignity, i. e. the unlimited value, that non-autonomous beings lack.
Theoria, 134 (2013) 1-25.
""Abstract Human freedom resides primarily in exercise of that capacity that humans are singularly better at than any other species on earth: the capacity for judgement. And in particular: that special judgement in relation to Self that we call aspiration. Freedom is not the absence of a field of (other) powers; instead, freedom shows up only against the reticulations of power impinging from without. For freedom worthy of the name must be construed as an exercise of power within an already-present field of power. Thus, liberty and causal necessity are not obverses. ""
Nova et Vetera, English Ed., 2019
Samuel Johnson once observed : "All theory is against the freedom of the will; all experience for it." 1 He was only half right. As we will see, St. Thomas Aquinas offers a strong theory in favor of the freedom of choice. In this essay, I will weigh three objections to fully voluntary acts: those derived from neuroscience, physicalist determinism, and the problem of habituation. Although many other objections to free choice exist, these represent some of the most serious assaults on the idea of human freedom, and therefore human responsibility. In a final section, I will address Aquinas's claim that freedom is rooted in reason. With these considerations in place, we will be well on our way to establishing a solid theory of morality in all its subtlety and richness.
inter-disciplinary.net
I present a diversity of theories of freedom which I compare and contrast. I begin with a brief summary of my own recently published theory, which I show to be superior to the other theories considered. I find that there are various weaknesses or errors in the other theories and that my own theory is the only one that gives an adequate explanation of why freedom, or a free society, is desirable.
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