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The paper explores Ahmad Kasravi's complex relationship with Azerbaijan and its role in the broader context of Iran's national identity, particularly during the constitutionalist revolution. It examines Kasravi's conflicting views on Persianization and the significance of Azerbaijani identity in the national consciousness of Iranians, alongside his sympathies for the struggles of Azerbaijanis against central government authority.
Voprosi Istorii, 2021
The article is devoted to the study of the factor of the Azerbaijani Turks in the political and social life of Iran. The focus is on modern concepts of mobilizing the protest activity of this second largest ethnic group in Iran after the Persians. The fact that the Azerbaijani Turks have the ability to quickly mobilize themselves during the events taking place inside Iran increases their importance not only in the internal politics of Iran but also in the Middle East and South Caucasus. However, from time to time, infringement of their interests by the Iranian authorities causes tension and any confrontation that can occur between ethnic groups in Iran can lead to a violation of stability both in this country and in the region as a whole.
The Journal of the Middle East and Africa, 2019
This article examines the roots and development of Azerbaijani identity in Iran. This study aims to demonstrate that the Azerbaijani minority in Iran lacked consciousness of a distinct national identity at the dawn of the twentieth century, and argues that the driving force behind the emergence of the consciousness of Azerbaijani national identity in Iran was the Pahlavi regime’s repressive and exclusivist nationalist policies between 1921 and 1941. Building upon the grievances of the Pahlavi era, the occupation of Iran by Allied forces during the Second World War and the short, Soviet-supported autonomy under the leadership of Sayyed Ja’far Pishevari in 1945–1946 institutionalized and consolidated the Azerbaijani Turkish identity in Iran.
The Azeri question in historical and cultural perspectives: the view from Iran. The Azeri question became a political issue after the fall of the Soviet Union (1991). With Azerbaijan Iran's initial difficulties in the bilateral diplomatic relationship reflected the competitive nature of Turkish-Iranian cultural relationship but also the divergence between Baku and Tehran regarding the future of the Caspian Sea and its pollution. Moreover, the Islamic revolution ideology is both religious and anti-Western. Unlike the Islamic Republic, the post-soviet Azerbaijani state is secular and its foreign policy's main strategic orientation favours the search of a modus vivendi with the European Union and the United States. The cultural proximity is reinforced by the ethnic dimension of Iranian-Azerbaijani relationship since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Before that, the Soviet Union used Iranian Azerbaijan as a diplomatic tool for political penetration and to increase its ideological influence. In the 20th century, the Soviets were particularly active in Iranian Azerbaijan, more specifically in three distinct periods: 1905-1921, 1941-1947 and 1979-1981. During the last period, Moscow tried to benefit from the post-revolutionary disorder, instrumentalizing Azeri cultural opening in Iran to diffuse Soviet propaganda in Iranian Azerbaijan. After Azerbaijan's independence in 1991, the first priority of Iranian foreign policy was to maintain the territorial integrity threatened by some Azerbaijani political groups who claimed to unify “the so-called thwarted nation – separated because of imperial rivalries and the vagaries of international politics”. This intervention will shed lights on the historical and cultural factors that shape the contemporary relationship between Baku and Tehran. For the historical dimension, I will focus on the Azeri contribution to Iranian nationalism, especially during the first half of the 20th century. The cultural and ethnic aspects will be studied through the transnational links between Azeri and Talesh population living in the territory of the Azerbaijani and Iranian states. Dr Clément Therme is a Teaching Fellow at Sciences Po, Paris. He is also a Research Associate at the Centre d’études turques, ottomanes, balkaniques et centrasiatiques (CETOBAC) and at the Centre d’Analyse et d’Intervention Sociologiques (CADIS) at the École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS, Paris). He is the author of Les Relations entre Téhéran et Moscou depuis 1979 (PUF, 2012). He is also the co editor (with Houchang E. Chehabi and Farhad Khosrokhavar) of a book entitled Iran and the Challenges of the Twenty First Century (Mazda Publishers, 2013).
John F. Kennedy School of Government Harvard University , 2002
The research in this book is based on a number of primary sources, mostly in Azerbaijani, Persian, and Russian. The sources in Azerbaijani are written in three different alphabets: Latin, Cyrillic, and Arabic. In Soviet Azerbaijan, the Cyrillic alphabet was in use for Azerbaijani for most of the period under analysis. In the successor Republic of Azerbaijan, the Latin alphabet is officially in use. In Iran, Azerbaijanis use the Arabic alphabet to write the Azerbaijani language. To help researchers locate the original sources, separate transliteration systems have been used for each alphabet. As a result, in the notes some Azerbaijani words and names appear in different forms. There are differences between the transliteration used within the text and in the footnotes. In the text, many non-English terms, names and writings are referred to phonetically, so that readers who are not familiar with Turkic languages can read the text freely. The notes have precise transliterations. In the notes, the open pronounced an in Azerbaijani is represented by Many of the references to Azerbaijani texts written in the Arabic alphabet appear in the notes without precise vowel representation, since the original texts provide no vowel notation. Some personal and place names that have a widely known spelling in English have not been transliterated from the Azerbaijani original, such as the name Aliyev and the city Baku. In Azerbaijani, the city is called Baki. The spelling of the names of some major figures as they have appeared in other academic works has been retained, and this has caused some inconsistency in spelling in this work. For instance, in some cases there are two spellings for a name pronounced the same: For example, ‘Ali bay Huseynzade, and Sheikh Husayn Najaf. journals that are widely-known by certain transliterations, such as Ädäbiyyät vä Injäsänät, are referred to in the commonly known manner in the text and notes. Most of the geographical place names in areas where Azerbaijanis live are spelled according to Azerbaijani pronunciations. The term Araz River is used, rather than the Persian Aras or the Russian Araxs; Ardebilis used and not the Persian version, Ardabil; Savalan Mountain and not Sabalan; and Shamakhi rather than the Russian pronunciation, Shemakha. The names of some individuals mentioned in this work appear with varying name endings. For instance, the nineteenth-century writer and political thinker known as Mirza Fath’Ali Akhundzade in İran is often referred to in Azerbaijan as Akhundov, with a Russian name ending. Some individuals have changed their name endings as a conscious reflection of their identity. For instance, Nasib Nasibzade, a Baku scholar who served as the Republic of Azerbaijan’s first ambassador to Iran, changed his last name to Nasibli, replacing the Persian name ending with a Turkic one. Until the early 19905, most Azerbaijanis in Iran referred to themselves as Turks. Some researchers and Azerbaijanis themselves refer to this group as the Azerbaijani Turks, emphasizing that the group is basically Turkic and that the Azerbaijani identity is as such a shade of Turkic identity. However, in conducting the research it became apparent that the term used in self-reference is not necessarily an expression of identity, except among highly educated and very politically conscious Azerbaijanis. I have used the term most commonly employed by the Azerbaijanis today, and which is considered most neutral. This is “Azerbaijani.” In this book, the terms north and south Azerbaijan are used without a political connotation and only to denote geographic areas north and south of the Araz River. Since the political division of Azerbaijan in 1828, the area north of the Araz River has been part of the Russian Empire; was the short lived Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (1918-1920); became Soviet Azerbaijan; and since 1991 has been independent again as the Republic of Azerbaijani South of the Araz today is land within Iran. When Azerbaijanis use the terms north and south Azerbaijan, they do not always have a political intention either. For instance, Ayatollah Shariatmadari, who firmly defended the preservation of the territorial integrity of Iran, referred to the Azerbaijani provinces in Iran at times as “south Azerbaijan.”
http://azoh.info/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=23544:azerbaijan-south-azerbaijan-iran-persia-turkey-orientalism-and-freemasonic-historiography-by-muhammad-shamsaddin-megalommatis&catid=33:english To study the texts published by the leading Azeri intellectuals (I hereby specify that I use the terms Azeri and Azerbaijani as fully equivalent and as originating from the earlier Adhurbadhagan or Adharbadhagan), one realizes that they fail to evidently draw a line fully and convincingly separating Azerbaijan from Iran. This unfortunate event further affects Azerbaijan’s struggle for political reunification and national consolidation. At this point, I want to specify that, contrarily to the other oppressed nations of Iran, namely the Laris, the Arabic speaking Aramaeans, the Soranis, the Hewramis and the Goranis (fallaciously regrouped as "Kurds"), the Qashqais, the Luris, the Bakhtiaris, the Lakis, the Baluchis, the Gilakis, the Mazandaranis, and the Turkmen, the Azeris are the only to possibly counterbalance the Persians in terms of either sizeable territory and numerous population or diachronic presence and historical continuity. The latter is very critical because it is on this element whereby modern historiography is based, and this helps create consolidated nations with historical – cultural integrity and well perceived identity. In other words, the Azeris (both those living free in Azerbaijan and those suffering in Iran) are the only among the aforementioned tyrannized nations of Iran who can be empowered in their nation building effort by the institutionalization of an Azeri National History that opposes and eclipses that of the Persians. Azeri Prevalence over the Persians The pledge to Azeri prevalence over the Persians throughout the plateau in the east of Zagros mountains has to become the foundation of the South Azeris’ struggle for independence and national – cultural self-determination.
Journal of History Culture and Art Research, 2022
Many researchers studying the Turkic peoples have always referred to the Iranian Turks in their scientific activities and, considered Azerbaijan to be the center of Iranian Turkism. Therefore, it is extremely important to promote the issue of Iranian or Southern Azerbaijan when talking about Iranian Turks or Iranian Turkism. However, Azerbaijan is the center and thinking brain of Iranian Turkism not only during the millennial Turkic power but also today. Iran's political history has repeatedly shown that the Azerbaijanis living in Iran play a decisive role in society and it is taken as a paragon for all Iranian Turks. Definitely, the Tabriz environment, which has an ideological and cultural impact on all Iranian Turks, is the main center of Azerbaijan. After the overthrow of Ahmad Shah Qajar in 1925, the Pahlavi dynasty took the throne of Iran and began to pursue a policy of discrimination against the Turkic peoples in all spheres of society throughout his rule. This process took a different form after the overthrow of the Pahlavis. However, the Azerbaijanis never remained silent against national oppression and fought with honor to protect their rights. Both during the Pahlavi period and after the Islamic regime came to power, Azerbaijanis living in Iran made serious efforts to protect their rights.
International Journal of Middle East Studies, 1996
This article is an attempt to highlight the evolution of self- consciousness of Iranian Azerbaijanis in recent decades, shedding light on the key issues that have caused this evolution with the aim of exploring the prospects of Azerbaijani secessionism or anti-regime sentiments in the strategically important northwest region of Iran inhabited by ethnic Azerbaijanis.
Khazar Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2013
The history of the formation of the Iranian Community in Azerbaijan traces back to the South Caucasian region's inclusion as part of the Russian Empire in the beginning of the XIX century under the Gulistan (1813) and Turkmenchay (1828) treaties after the Iran-Russia Wars. These events not only radically changed the geopolitical situation in the region but also turned out to be a historical turning point for the peoples of this region, particularly the Azerbaijani, who had lived compactly until that time on the vast territories from the north of Iran to the south of the Caucasus.
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