Why the Demarcation Problem Matters

2022

Popper wanted to distinguish science from non-science-a category said to include "logic, metaphysics, and psychoanalysis." Scientific claims he thought were falsifiable, at least in principle; that's what makes them special. This is apt to seem wrong in both directions. Logical claims, e.g., ϕ is unprovable, can be falsified. And while scientific hypotheses of certain forms («All Fs are G») may be falsifiable, not so hypotheses of other forms: «Each F eventually becomes G».

In her essay Math Matters, Sabine Hossenfelder claims that results in the foundations of mathematics are irrelevant for physics, because physics is science, not mathematics. Her argument is based on the possibility of making a distinction between a scientific and a non-scientific activity or domain. Even though physics and other sciences (like virology or climate science) are relevant in larger non-scientific contexts (like the corona crisis or climate change), the distinction between what is scientific and what is not, remains a case by case matter, not something we can do in principle. The legitimacy of physics to be scientific is entirely apparent for the one who practices it, but is not a particular instance of the more general characteristic ‘scientific’. In the same manner, climate science is entirely apparent for the climate scientist, less so in a larger non-scientific debate. Mathematics is a domain that has established, through a number of definitive foundational theorems (Cantor, Gödel, Turing …) what its own limits and possibilities are. On a general level, no matter in what non-mathematical context it is relevant, mathematics has determined on its own terms, what it can and cannot do. In that sense mathematics – as an example, that a distinction in principle between what is proper to one’s own domain and what is not, can be established – is highly relevant to science, specifically physics.

Theoria, 2022

This paper reviews how research on the demarcation problem has developed, starting from Popper's criterion of falsifiability and ending with recent naturalistically oriented approaches. The main differences between traditional and contemporary approaches to the problem are explicated in terms of six postulates called the traditional assumptions. It is argued that all of the assumptions can be dismissed without giving up on the demarcation problem and that doing so might benefit further discussions on pseudoscience. Four present-day research movements on evaluating the boundaries of science are introduced: (1) philosophy of pseudoscience, (2) social epistemology of dissent, (3) agnotology, and (4) evaluation of expertise. Researchers working within these areas have abandoned some or all traditional assumptions.

Many philosophers have criticized Popper's demarcation of science and pseudo science for the wrong reasons. He is not arguing for how science was, rather should be. He is not arguing for a criteria of truth, rather there are none qua refutations.

This paper deals with the demarcation problem in philosophy of science. In this context, I look for answers from logical positivists to Popper and to nowadays philosophers to the following questions: What makes a text, a theory or a research scientific? How can we demarcate science and scientific views from metaphysical thoughts, ideologies, pseudo-sciences and conspiracy theories? What are the distinguishing characteristics of scientific method?

This paper is based on a criterion recently proposed by Richard Fumerton for demarcating philosophy of mind and cognitive science. I suggest to extend it to a demarcation criterion between philosophy and science in general, and put it in the context of the historical changes of boundaries between the philosophical and the scientifi c fi eld. I point to a number of philosophical claims and approaches that have been made utterly obsolete by the advancement of science, and conjecture that a similar thing may happen in the future with today's philosophy of mind: under the supposition that cognitive science manages to progress very successfully in a certain direction, our concepts for mental states could change, and the type of philosophical interest we put in them, thus reshaping the whole debate on the subject.

An Anthology of Philosophical Studies (volume 7), 2013

Much philosophical energy has been spent on demarcation questions – in philosophy of science, most notoriously, but also in philosophy of logic, and aesthetics. The question of how to demarcate science from pseudo-science, once regarded as central, commands relatively little attention today. In the philosophy of logic, by contrast, the problem of demarcating the logical constants is far less skeptically regarded. In aesthetics, where the problem is how to demarcate art from non-art, the question as to whether the problem is a real one or a pseudo-problem also continues to be debated. This paper discusses the hypothesis that the demarcation questions in these three areas are parallel, or at least similar enough to be interesting. Some arguments for the conclusion that the demarcation problem is a pseudo-problem are considered, as are some demarcation proposals of a deflationist or minimalist sort.

2013