The Problem of Evil Revisited

University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, 2024

In this paper, I seek to introduce, define, and ultimately defend the concept of 'evil law', which is needed to make sense of what Green calls the 'immorality that law makes possible', i.e., the recognition that law has the capacity not only to deter, but also to produce moral iniquity. Firstly, I argue that evil law is distinct from merely bad or unjust law in that it does not create even pro tanto moral duties and can be defined as law, which, if interpreted in its best light, will inflict or enable intolerable harm (including atrocities) to victims themselves. Secondly, I claim that evil law is indeed law despite objections from both its external and internal immorality. Instead of eschewing legality, evil regimes benefit from it in a number of ways. Thirdly, I answer the challenge that using the vocabulary of 'evil' law is at best reductive and at worst dangerous. Correctly defined, the concept of evil law does not hinder but instead aids us in asking further questions about this phenomenon's nature. Even more so, proper use of the concept helps to articulate the horror evil law inflicts on those marginalised and corrupted by it. Fourthly and finally, I look at the reasonsboth theoretical and moralwhy using the concept of evil law is valuable. Theoretically, employing the concept introduced in the paper helps to understand evil law as a phenomenon with a familiar legal nature and, at the same time, a distinct normative payoff. Morally, it aids us in searching for the best ways of responding to it, both contemporaneously and in its aftermath.

2021

This book is an inquiry into particular matters concerning the nature, normativity, and aftermath of evil action. It combines philosophical conceptual analysis with empirical studies in psychology and discussions of historical events to provide an innovative analysis of evil action. The book considers unresolved questions belonging to metaethical, normative, and practical characteristics of evil action. It begins by asking whether Kant's historical account of evil is still relevant for contemporary thinkers. Then it addresses features of evil action that distinguish it from mundane wrongdoing, thereby placing it as a proper category of philosophical inquiry. Next, the author inquires into how evil acts affect moral relationships and challenge Strawsonian accounts of moral responsibility. He then draws conceptual and empirical connections between evil acts such as genocide, torture, and slavery and collective agency, and asks why evil acts are often collective acts. Finally, the author questions both the possibility and propriety of forgiveness and vengeance in the aftermath of evil and discusses how individuals ought to cope with the pervasiveness of evil in human interaction.

Ethics & International Affairs, 2002

In the aftermath of the attacks in New York and Washington on September 11, the categories of “good” and “evil” have come to dominate the rhetorical response of the U.S. government. This article investigates the implications of using the concept of “evil” as a major public policy rationale. The article focuses on the Bush Administration's attempts to frame its policy around this term in the current campaign against terrorism, but also considers recent uses of the term in the growing literature on war crimes, genocide, and domestic repression. Because the concept of evil has deep roots in various theological understandings, we examine its religious meanings (largely within the Christian tradition) and the problems that arise when applying it in the secular context of government policy. In assessing these problems, we focus on Hannah Arendt's efforts to comprehend the evils of totalitarianism within a secular perspective.We argue that in contemporary policy discourse, “evil” i...

Wozu ist das Böse gut? Mentis. ISBN: 9783957430502, 2016

This essay will address the question: “Wozu ist das Böse gut?”, or in English translation, for what good or purpose is evil. First, an examination of the use-mention distinction between evil and “evil” produces two distinct questions: what good is the presence of evil in the world, and what good is the concept of evil as part of our ethical vocabulary describing human interaction. By severing all logically necessary connections between evil and greater goods, we discover that the answer to the first question—what good is evil in the world—is none whatsoever. Evil deeds leave an enduring and destructive impact on people’s lives. Attempts to justify this ruination belittle the torment that sufferers of evil sustain. Because there is no normative vindication of evil’s existence, recognizing it as an indelible fact of human interaction proves to be crucial to understanding elemental features of the moral community and one’s role within it. Hence, the answer to the second question—what good is the concept of evil—is that it is of the utmost importance. Insofar as evil is a perpetual element of human interaction, being aware of this very fact—that is, understanding the concept of evil—is central to comprehending one’s moral agency, to appropriately reacting to others in the moral community, and to possibly inhibiting future incidents of evil.

The Journal of Value Inquiry, 2018

Contemporary Political Theory, 2008

2023

The problem of evil is and ought to be an ethical problem. This book tries to show that by saying something else: I argue that theism is morally wrong. I introduce the logical problem of morally-impossible evil. This establishes an inconsistency between belief in the perfect goodness of God and a responsive recognition of moral necessity. When combined with the moral objections of anti-theodicy, this forces the theist to either deny that the morally impossible happens (which is clearly false) or else reject the meaningfulness of the concept (which is not reasonable). Since neither option comes without great moral cost, a consistent set of theistic beliefs must be seen to be morally problematic. But it doesn’t really matter whether this conclusion is true. This argument is not the purpose of the book; it’s only serving a purpose, as a provocation. What I hope is that the process of engaging with this argument will cause philosophers to attend to, and thus reflect on, important elements of the topic that might have been overlooked.