Letter to the Editor, Centaurus, 37, 1994, 349-52

A standpoint where the right hand does not know what the left hand is doing (this is the result of a far too pointed separation of the specialized sciences from epistemology), can only lead to the sterility of contemporary philosophy.

A standpoint where the right hand does not know what the left hand is doing (this is the result of a far too pointed separation of the specialized sciences from epistemology), can only lead to the sterility of contemporary philosophy.

Social epistemology, 1988

A standpoint where the right hand does not know what the left hand is doing (this is the result of a far too pointed separation of the specialized sciences from epistemology), can only lead to the sterility of contemporary philosophy.

"Central aspects ofKarl Mannheim's sociology of knowledge paradoxically fell victim to the dualism he himself had deplored. This kind of sociology of knowledge, according to the commonly accepted argument, invariably becomes entangled and then entrapped in the problem of relativism, by asserting - as a research hypothesis - a general existential connectedness of thinking. It insists that all knowledge claims are contingent and can be comprehended as sets of belief which, far from being self-evident, are in need of legitimation. One credible answer has been the claim that the sociology of knowledge is immune to the charge of relativism. The classic sociology of knowledge defensively insisted that it is quite possible to do sociology of knowledge without falling victim to relativistic contradictions. This 'resolution' of the relativism charge by the founders of the sociology of knowledge involves very different arguments, but generally converges on the view expressed for example by W ern er Stark ( 1958: 152) that the 'sociology of knowledge is primarily concerned with the origin of ideas, and not with their validity'. This argument means that epistemological issues are increasingly treated in a specialized fashion and emerge as the legitimate subject of epistemology.1 We argue that this all too frequent dogmatic separation between epistemological and social scientific discourse contributes little to a solution of the relativism problem, and that this separation must therefore be overcome."

This paper revisits, from a new angle, some of the debates over the relativism of the "Sociology of Scientific Knowledge" (=SSK). The new angle is provided by recent work on relativism in epistemology and the philosophy of language. I defend three theses. First, SSK-relativism is not an instance of Paul Boghossian's well-known "template" for relativism. Second, SSK-relativism is therefore not directly threatened by arguments targeting this template position. And third, SSK-relativism is nevertheless in the vicinity of this template, and it offers at least sketches of arguments for distinctive and original relativist theses.

Social Epistemology, 1988

A standpoint where the right hand does not know what the left hand is doing (this is the result of a far too pointed separation of the specialized sciences from epistemology), can only lead to the sterility of contemporary philosophy.

The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science, 2010