History Revisited: Changing America&#39;s Military Advising Paradigm

zachary shore

History Revisited: Changing America's Military Advising Paradigm

Abstract

As the United States continues to unwind its commitments in Afghanistan, policy makers find many pressing international challenges still confronting the nation. In the Pacific, American interests are being contested with China’s increasingly nationalistic inspired rise. In Africa, al Qaeda offshoots fester in Somalia, Libya, and Mali. Even old fault lines, such as Eastern Europe, are proving unstable as evidenced by Russia’s recent annexation of Crimea in the Ukraine. With so many persistent challenges, the United States lacks the manpower, economic strength, or social will to endeavor to confront these issues on its own. Alternatively, training and empowering our global partners may offer a more fiscally responsible and politically manageable option for meeting these challenges. The United States has a natural interest in enhancing the military capabilities of friendly nations, especially those currently under threat. An ally more capable of defending itself invariably yields an America less likely to be engaged in an unwanted foreign conflict. Security force assistance (SFA) missions aim to provide just such aid in the form of military advising. However, recent efforts within the Army and Marine Corps have been uncoordinated, inconsistent and disconnected from historical lessons learned. While policy makers in Washington have demonstrated a renewed interest in the SFA approach, the current advisor training and deployment scheme requires immediate review and revision. This paper will explore 4 historical cases of the United States’ efforts in the arena of military advising: the Philippines at the turn of the 20th century, South Korea before the Korean War, Vietnam, and Iraq. Each of these cases offer American policy makers invaluable lessons, often learned and then re-learned at great cost, which inform my ultimate policy prescription. As America’s military shifts SFA responsibilities to the general purposes forces, the Department of Defense should establish a Joint Advisor Command (JAC). Currently, the Marine Corps’ temporary duty assignments and the Army’s new regionally aligned Brigades offer some advising capabilities; however, they fall well short of institutionalizing a growing Department of Defense priority. Furthermore, Special Forces personnel are less and less available for this mission as they are heavily engaged in counter-terror operations. A consolidated, dedicated, and institutionally supported Joint Advisor Command offers the Department of Defense a low cost solution for promoting and defending American interests. This policy solution recognizes that advising needs to be resourced and embraced with a level of commitment commensurate with the mission’s importance. Furthermore, this policy advocates that military advising, while increasingly a function of the general-purpose forces, is in fact its own unique military occupational specialty (MOS). Through adopting the Joint Advisor Command policy recommendation, the Department of Defense would greatly enhance its SFA capacity and capability without having to compromise the more conventional Marine Corps and Army missions. As America will likely remain the pre-eminent global force well into the 21st century, it is vital that we remedy this shortcoming as soon as possible.

Key takeaways

While policy makers in Washington have demonstrated a renewed interest in the SFA approach, the current advisor training and deployment scheme requires immediate review and revision.
Conversely, America's advising mission during the Vietnam War, despite coming about so shortly after the advisor effort in Korea, embodied a regression in cultural attitudes and basic advising techniques -despite providing formal advisor training for the first time.
Despite nearly a century of lessons, America's military and civilian leadership seemingly cannot accept that the advisor mission is critical and recurring.
Given the current inability of the Marine Corps and the Army to construct an effective military advisor apparatus, as well as the absence of Special Forces from the advisor mission, a gaping requirement exists for a consolidated effort within the Department of Defense.
This title-10 mandate would work to combat the historical practice of offering up poorly qualified personnel for advisor duty.

To say that the strategic landscape remains unsettled would be an understatement.1 In the brief period since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. military has fought one major war (Iraq), performed numerous "non-traditional" humanitarian and peacekeeping missions, struggled to adjust to a variety of social demands such as the full integration of women and gays in the ranks, and at the same time attempted to prepare for the twenty-first century. What is more, the armed services have been asked to do all this within the worst budgetary environment in fifty years. As a result, the U.S. military faces a dilemma: how to respond to the uncertainties of the new domestic and strategic landscapes, maintain a healthy relationship with American civil society, and yet retain its core raison d'être, which is to deter or win war against the nation's enemies. The American military faced similar dilemmas after the Civil War and World War I, for a brief time after World War II, and following the Vietnam War. 1 At least one lesson clearly emerged from those experiences: the military profession dare not withdraw into an ethical cocoon and take on a defensive posture. Instead, it must make a prudent and positive response to the travails imposed on it and not shrink from articulating its views in the public square. In short, senior military officers must reshape the very notion of military professionalism by candidly admitting the impact of politics on the military's ability to do its job and daring to practice constructive political engagement. This would appear to violate the sacred code of silence by which the U.S. military is strictly apolitical, offers technical advice only, and goes out of its way to honour the principle of civilian control. But only through constructive political engagement can military professionals legitimate their role in policy debates, mark a clear boundary between defence policy and merely partisan politics, and provide the American public with a clearer understanding of military life and culture. Nor are constructive political engagement and loyalty to the country, civilian leadership, and the Constitution in any way incongruous. Indeed, such constructive political engagement, far from threatening to make the military an independent actor, presupposes that the military is dependent upon a variety of political actors and the public at large. It is because the U.S. military is under such tight civilian control that it needs to make its voice heard in civilian councils. Any number of issues might fall within the scope of constructive political engagement, but the two most critical are the so-called democratization of the military (the convergence or divergence between the military and society) and the problematical utility of military force in the foreign policy contingencies of the century to come. These issues are interconnected and have a profound impact on the military's operational effectiveness. To be sure, it has been an article of faith among military professionals and civilians alike that a wall exists in America between the military and politics. But that faith is not only historically invalid, it denies current reality. The American domestic landscape and the international strategic landscape are, and have always been, politically and militarily inextricable, while the use of military force has always been shaped by political considerations. If the skill, wisdom, and experience residing in our officers corps are to be tapped by our national leadership, the military profession itself must be philosophically broadened and encouraged to involve itself judiciously in the policy arena. 2 This would include the development of a more comprehensive view of politics, greater sensitivity to the realities underpinning the American political system, and more assertive presentation of the military viewpoint within the parameters of American democracy. Nothing makes the point more eloquently than the Vietnam War, the mismanagement of which forced military professionals, especially in the army, to go through an agonizing reappraisal of the meaning of the military profession. 3 In the broader policy arena, the failure of senior military leaders to speak out with a realistic military perspective on that war provides an enduring lesson for military professionals. 4 Recently, the role of the chiefs of staff in the decision to go to war in Vietnam and in its conduct has been studied by H. R. McMaster and found 1 See, for example, C. Robert Kemble, The Image of the Army Officer in America: Background for Current Views (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973);

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press publications enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited. * * * * * This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be copyrighted. x * * * * * Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, 47 Ashburn Drive, Carlisle, PA 17013xxix xxxvi as much of that information as we can. Neither the enemy forces nor the Iraqi security forces have yet told their own story, and, until they do, historians' understanding of their perspective is necessarily incomplete. A few other areas of research were beyond the scope of this history but should be undertaken by researchers, including the shared logistics that supported both Iraq and Afghanistan, air power in Iraq, and the maritime component of the Iraq campaign. The functional areas of information operations and reconstruction efforts deserve their own treatment as well. Even more importantly, the Defense Department needs to produce a history of U.S. Central Command in the post-9/11 wars, so that the operational histories of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars-as well as other smaller operations-can be put into their regional and strategic context. The fight against al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) or the Islamic State in Iraq was part of a broader campaign against al-Qaeda and its associated movements. Fighting in Yemen, Somalia, Mali, and other locations was connected through a strategic framework-both ours and our enemies'-with the fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. This strategic history should be modeled on the U.S. Army in World War II series, The Supreme Command, an overarching history of the Allies in the European theater, without which the operational histories of the European theater cannot be fully appreciated. A history set in Iraq will contain many Arabic personal and place names, many of which have no standard English spelling. In rendering these Arabic names into English, we have followed standard transliteration in many cases, but in others, we have used the spelling most common within the U.S. military, whether that spelling followed transliteration rules or not. We also generally chose to refer to Iraqis using English formalities rather than the more familiar Iraqi style. Therefore, instead of the Iraqi style of referring to General Babakir Zebari as General Babakir, we refer to him as General Zebari. For simplicity's sake, and to reflect U.S. military and Iraqi usage, we have also tended to drop the articles from the spelling of place names in the text. The maps are more formal and retain the article. Finally, throughout these volumes, we, the authors, retain full responsibility for all matters of interpretation as well as for any errors or omissions of fact. xxxvii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS These volumes could not have been produced without a team effort by a wide range of leaders, experts, and organizations across and outside the Army. Without a doubt, the greatest influence and inspiration came from General (Ret.) Raymond T. Odierno, who conceived this project, provided continuous encouragement, and was generous with his time throughout our work. His support, leadership, and mentorship were invaluable to us. We also want to recognize Brigadier General Bradley T. Gericke, our liaison in the Office of the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, who helped us overcome dozens of bureaucratic obstacles while providing the wise counsel of a senior Army historian. Across the Pentagon hallway from General Gericke is Steven J. Redmann, Vice Director of the Army Staff, who was a true champion of our work. He ensured that we had the resources we needed and provided the help of his accomplished team on many occasions. Similarly, Lieutenant General Gary H. Cheek, the Director of the Army Staff, ensured our project remained a high priority after General Mark A. Milley became the Chief of Staff of the Army. Without his stalwart support, it is unclear whether this book would ever have been published. At the National Defense University, Michael S. Bell, Chancellor of the College of International Security Affairs (NDU-CISA), in Washington, DC, provided us a home for more than 2 years and treated us as colleagues, providing resources and people to help us in our work. We were fortunate to have an external advisory board whose members graciously volunteered their time and advice to help make our work better. Conrad C. Crane and Steven Metz at the U.S. Army War College, Kenneth M. Pollack of the Brookings Institution, and David A. "Scotty" Dawson of U.S. Central Command spent many hours reviewing and rigorously critiquing our draft chapters. Other experts who read all or most of our manuscript and provided valuable input included Seth Center of the U.S. State Department, Peter Bergen of the New America Foundation, and Lieutenant General Herbert Raymond "H. R." McMaster of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). As a small team focused on a specific task for a fixed duration, we relied frequently on larger Army and joint organizations that generously contributed their input, time, and resources. Within the Army, we are grateful to the Center of Military History and the Histories Division for providing an array of resources for this project, including historians who helped edit chapters and footnotes, shared ideas, and furnished valuable primary sources. We also would like to thank the Historical Products Branch for its professional editors, cartographers, and visual information specialists who helped turn our manuscript into printed form. Our team is also indebted to the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) at the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) for further editing and ultimately publishing our work. We owe special thanks to Steve Metz from SSI as well as Conrad Crane and Mike Lynch from the USAWC's Army Heritage and Education Center (USAHEC) for the countless hours they spent scrutinizing our final drafts. Their efforts considerably improved our product. Several branches of TRADOC provided us with timely assistance and material support. At the USAHEC in Carlisle, PA, Colonel Matthew Q. Dawson and Colonel Robert A.

Log In

History Revisited: Changing America's Military Advising Paradigm

Sign up for access to the world's latest research

Abstract

Key takeaways

Related papers

Related topics