INTERACT-ED INTERTWINING NATURE OF VIRTUAL REALITY

andrew.cmu.edu

Reality as one of the most intrinsic matters of philosophy has been discussing from the Plato's Ideal world to the virtual environments of the cyber age. In a more speculative point of view, reality, had begun to extend within the invention of the alphabet. Alphabet and so the writing is a kind of extension of reality through the signs and metaphors. What forces the Lascaux's inhabitants to draw the walls of Lascaux shows an analogy within the people of the computer age who participate in computerbased communities. Whether it is a primitive drawing or hyper text of the digital age , the utmost relation between the human and his work should have similar relationship within the 'reality' of their time. But in a time when the reality is experiencing a division (or separation) at first within the language, it is difficult to cover the reality matter: The reality itself and the virtual reality as its extension. Should it be accepted easily as an extension or anything else? How can we approach to the reality which is not real but virtual? Reality that extends, transforms, evolutes is recalling the binary of the term non-real, fake or other synonyms. Virtual reality , as if stated within the traditional terminological approach, " is an event or entity that is real in effect but not in fact" 1 Human, as a part of the event or entity called virtual, experiences a paradoxical situation within the body he owns, and the time he realizes. The statement that every 'body' is a space and the spacing of the event makes the space matter a two fold important matter in the context of the reality which is virtual. From another point of view, Reality which is virtual is, according the forerunner of philosophical account , just a representation of the real world. Such an approach gives the chance to read the works 1 The definition of virtual reality taken from the Webster Dictionary.

Disputatio

What is the status of a cat in a virtual reality environment? Is it a real object? Or part of a fiction? Virtual realism, as defended by D. J. Chalmers, takes it to be a virtual object that really exists, that has properties and is involved in real events. His preferred specification of virtual realism identifies the cat with a digital object. The project of this paper is to use a comparison between virtual reality environments and scientific computer simulations to critically engage with Chalmers’s position. I first argue that, if it is sound, his virtual realism should also be applied to objects that figure in scientific computer simulations, e.g. to simulated galaxies. This leads to a slippery slope because it implies an unreasonable proliferation of digital objects. A philosophical analysis of scientific computer simulations suggests an alternative picture: The cat and the galaxies are parts of fictional models for which the computer provides model descriptions. This result moti...

2014

Presented paper is divided into two parts. The first part concerns the main philosophical aspects of Virtual Reality. At the basis of the J. Baudrillard theory of aesthetic simulacrum the differences between imitation and simulation are considered. The M. Heidegger’s notion of “lifebeing”, Dasein and nature are presented. In the second part, Virtual Reality is analysed from two points of view – as a tool for presentation and as an environment for direct designing in the virtual world.

Disputatio

Are the objects and events that take place in Virtual Reality genuinely real? Those who answer this question in the affirmative are realists, and those who answer in the negative are irrealists. In this paper we argue against the realist position, as given by Chalmers (2017), and present our own preferred irrealist account of the virtual. We start by disambiguat- ing two potential versions of the realist position—weak and strong— and then go on to argue that neither is plausible. We then introduce a Waltonian variety of fictionalism about the virtual, arguing that this sort of irrealist approach avoids the problems of the realist positions, fits with a unifying theory of representational works, and offers a better ac- count of the phenomenology of engaging in virtual experiences.

Filozofski vestnik | Volume XLII | Number 2 | 2021 | 281–303 | doi: 10.3986/fv.42.2.13, 2022

In the chapter “How the ‘true world’ finally became a fable” in Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche enumerates the steps that led from the belief in the accessibility of the true world beyond the illusory world of appearances to the dismissal of this metaphysical myth. However, Nietzsche deems that the elimination of the “true world” brought about the obliteration of the apparent world as well: “The true world is gone: which world is left? The illusory one, perhaps? ... But no! we got rid of the illusory world along with the true one!” In this paper, I will suggest that the philosophical hypothesis that we might live in a simulation can be considered to be the last and most nihilistic episode in the series of narrations about the true and apparent worlds that Nietzsche sketched.

In M. Warnke (Hrsg.), Kulturinformatik. (S. 379-388). Lüneburg: Universität Lüneburg, 2008

HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE / STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY / ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES, 2020

From an ontological point of view, virtuality is generally considered a simulation: i.e. not a case of true being, and never more than an illusory copy, referring in each instance to its real original. It is treated as something imagined — and, phenomenologically speaking, as an intentional object. It is also often characterized as fictive. On the other hand, the virtual world itself is extremely rich, and thanks to new technologies is growing with unbelievable speed, so that it now influences the real world in quite unexpected ways. Thus, it is also sometimes considered real. In this paper, against those who would regard virtuality as fictional or as real, I claim that the virtual world straddles the boundary between these two ways of existence: that it becomes real. I appeal to Roman Ingarden’s existential ontology to show that virtual objects become existentially autonomous, and so can be attributed a form of actuality and causal efficaciousness. I conclude that the existential a...

de arte, 2002

In this article, representations of`real' are investigated in selected technological contexts. 1 It is maintained that, at present, the prevalent technological sophistication in artmaking processes creates diffused boundaries between notions of the real and the non-real due to the naturalism inherent in digital artmaking processes in which photographs or video often forms the`raw' or foundation material. 2 It is demonstrated that the development of photography as well as Surrealism as a stylistic movement have been key forces in the shaping of the current dominant mode of naturalism in visual expressions of virtuality and artifice.

Virtual as Possible as Real as Imaginalis, 2022

In the contemporary sense, virtual refers above all to a computer-based entity, mixed with bits. Ontologically the virtual reality can be supported both by the virtual realism and by the modal realism. In this way real and virtual establish a new kind of relationship that is foundational and absolutely inevitable where the virtual reality is placed. The connection between VR and possible worlds allows the same problems (metaphysical and epistemological) identified for the possibility, to be raised for the VR. However, while it is not possible to speak of aisthesis referring to the possible worlds, the aisthesis of the virtual reality is closely linked to its medial nature. This nature grounds an intrinsically relational experience in which the category of relationship precedes that of substance. These characteristics seem to refer, according to an archaeological media perspective, to the mundus imaginalis of the ancient Persian Masters of the 12th century.

De arte , 2002

In synopsis, in this article representations of 'real' 1 are investigated in selected technological contexts.