Semantic primitivism and normativity

2007

The aim of this thesis is to provide an answer to the problem of meaning scepticism as presented by Kripke by appealing to facets of a person's mental history. Following Wright's strategy, the sceptic's demand for a fact that determines meaning is placated by appealing to intentions. The focus of the problem becomes the need for a satisfactory account of first-person authority that also answers Kripke's argument from 'queerness'. Two approaches are presented, one from the traditional first-person perspective, and the other from Davidson's standpoint of the interdependence of self-knowledge, knowledge of other minds and knowledge of the external world. It will be shown that Davidson's approach is preferable because it answers Kripke's three problems. An interesting corollary of this research exposes similarities between Wright's judgement-dependence and Davidson's views on the theory of interpretation.

Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication, 2009

Here the relationship between understanding and knowledge of meaning is discussed from two different perspectives: that of Dummettian semantic anti-realism and that of the semantic externalism of Putnam and others. The question addressed is whether or not the truth of semantic externalism would undermine a central premise in one of Dummetts key arguments for anti-realism, insofar as Dummetts premise involves an assumption about the transparency of meaning and semantic externalism is often taken to undermine such transparency. Several notions of transparency and conveyability of meaning are distinguished and it is argued that, though the Dummettian argument for anti-realism presupposes only a weak connection between knowledge of meaning and understanding, even this much is not trivially true in light of semantic externalism, and that semantic externalism, if true, would thus represent a reason for rejecting the crucial assumption on which the Dummettian argument depends.

2019

The Kripke-Wittgenstein (KW) sceptical argument, presented in Chapter 2 of Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982), concludes that there are no meaning facts. While realism has been denied for a great many subject matters, the meaning irrealism motivated by KW’s argument has particularly farreaching consequences. This thesis is an investigation into some of these consequences, in an effort to determine what is at stake in accepting the argument as sound. In Chapter 2, I summarise the argument, assume that it is sound, and consider the consequences for one particular body of talk: discourse about meaning itself. Three models for characterising that discourse are canvassed: error-theory, non-factualism, and mere minimalism. The latter characterisation is made available by adopting the framework for realism debates proposed by Crispin Wright in Truth and Objectivity (1992), of which I give an exposition in Chapter 1. I find in Chapter 2 that the three models of meani...

2019

In this reflection I address one of the critical questions this monograph is about: How to justify proposing yet another semantic theory in the light of Wittgenstein's strong warnings against it. I see two clear motives for Wittgenstein's semantic nihilism. The first one is the view that philosophical problems arise from postulating hypothetical entities such as 'meanings'. To dissolve the philosophical problems rather than create new ones, Wittgenstein suggests substituting 'meaning' with 'use' and avoiding scientism in philosophy together with the urge to penetrate in one's investigation to unobservable depths. I believe this first motive constitutes only a weak motive for Wittgenstein's quietism, because there are substantial differences between empirical theories in natural sciences and semantic theories in philosophy that leave Wittgenstein's assimilation of both open to criticism. But Wittgenstein is right, on the second motive, that...

Minds and Machines, 2003

A central part of Kripke's influential interpretation of Wittgenstein's sceptical argument about meaning is the rejection of dispositional analyses of what it is for a word to mean what it does . In this paper I show that Kripke's arguments prove too much: if they were right, they would preclude not only the idea that dispositional properties can make statements about the meanings of words true, but also the idea that dispositional properties can make true statements about paradigmatic dispositional properties such as a cup's fragility or a person's bravery. However, since dispositional properties can make such statements true, Kripke-Wittgenstein's arguments against dispositionalism about meaning are mistaken.

Philosophical Approaches to Language and Communication (eds. P. Stalmaszczyk & M. Hilton), 2022

The objective of this paper is twofold. First, it aims to contribute to the debate about the normativity of meaning not by means of providing and defending new arguments, but by analysing and reflecting on some of the presuppositions and seemingly irresolvable dialectical points of disagreement. Second, it seeks to achieve the first aim by critically engaging with some of the objections raised against semantic normativity by anti-normativists like Kathrin Glüer, Anandi Hattiangadi and Åsa Wikforss as well as discussing some of the ideas defended by normativists like Hans-Johann Glock, Severin Schroeder and Daniel Whiting. The upshot of the discussion is meant to provide a clearer representation of some of the arguments and concepts that guide the debate, though the proposed analysis, if correct, should also add some support for the normativist’s case.

Problems of Normativity, Rules, and Rule-Following, 2015

In the three decades since the publication of Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language the claim that the meaning of linguistic expressions should be explained in normative terms has been one of the most debated issues in the analytic philosophy of language. A line of arguing against this claim that has gained prominence in the recent years starts off with the assumption that the norms that are involved in linguistic meanings must be either constitutive or prescriptive.

Inquiry, 2018

In the book Gibbard proposes, first, that statements about meaning are normative statements and, second, that they can be given an expressivist treatment, along the lines of Gibbard's preferred metaethics. In my paper, I examine the first step: The claim that meaning statements are to be construed as being normative, as involving 'oughts'. Gibbard distinguishes two versions of the normativity of meaning thesis-a weak version, according to which every means implies an ought, and a strong version, according to which for every means, there is an ought that implies it. I argue that neither thesis withstands scrutiny. The weak thesis depends on assumptions about the notion of semantic correctness that the anti-normativist rejects, and the strong thesis does not solve the problems Gibbard wants it to solve: the problems of indeterminacy and meaning skepticism. I conclude that semantics does not need normativity.

Cognitio Estudos, 2021

We want to explore in this article the characteristics of prescriptive semantics and its usefulness to solve pragmatic problems, both analytical and synthetic, on meaning. We will proceed in the following way: 1. arguing about the limitations of a non-prescriptive and purely extensional semantics, based on the prediction of formulas of an object-language system; and 2. projecting the advantages of a theory that can pragmatically regulate meaning schemes, to enrich our instruments of meaning and consensus production with the results of scientific innovation and the interaction between different languages. The two authors we used to show this path were Alfred Tarski and Rudolph Carnap on the classical extensionalist side, and Robert Brandom and C.I Lewis on the pragmatist side. The first two were mentioned for an exhibition of formal semantics and its limits; the second two were mentioned for an exposition of a prescriptive and intensional theory and its pragmatic advantages for regulating the prediction of new truths and adaptation to the old ones.

Philosophical Investigations, 2003

The past few years have seen a revival of interest in Kripke's controversial reading of Wittgenstein's remarks about rule-following. 1 Thus, on the one hand, George Wilson has tried to defend Kripke's claim that Wittgenstein can be understood as providing a sceptical solution to a sceptical problem about meaning -a solution which, though sceptical, can nonetheless, according to Wilson, yield a kind of semantic realism. 2 On the other hand, John McDowell and other 'new Wittgensteinians' have attempted to show that Wittgenstein intended to dissolve, rather than solve, all philosophical problems about meaning and so intended to leave no room for any philosophical account of meaning whatsoever. 3 It seems to me, however, that Wilson's sceptical solution is more scepticism than solution and that McDowell's quietism also leaves untouched a problem that really needs to be addressed. Moreover, I believe that Wittgenstein himself recognized this need. 4 The problem I have in mind concerns the normativity and objectivity of meaning; it is different from the rule-following paradox, though we are led into the paradox by certain ways of trying to solve it. Contra McDowell, I shall argue that dissolving the paradox leaves the problem, and hence the need for constructive philosophy, still standing. But I shall also argue, contra Wilson, that it is only by