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2014, Reproductive technologies and reproductive rights
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5 pages
1 file
We observe a modern approach that allows for the possibility of a planned separation between sexual relations and procreation. The widespread use of contraceptives created the possibility of sex without reproduction, just as reproductive technologies created the possibility of reproduction without sex. Consequentially, the individual`s ability to control and plan childbirth has expanded, but parallel possibilities have been created for societal intervention in that process. The question whether society may limit one`s right to be a parent through the use of reproductive technologies has become a crucial legal issue. Artificial techniques of procreation present a special problem. On the one hand, we are concerned with planning the birth of a child and not with establishing what is best for a child already born. On the other hand, it is not a matter that begins and ends in the bedroom. Moreover: persons requiring artificial techniques expect not merely non-intervention but positive aid. It is submitted that a distinction should be drawn between limiting a person`s freedom to realize his right to parenthood as he sees fit, and the denying societal aid. The limits of positive societal aid are established through the changes in the legal definition of parenthood that society is willing to accept in order to meet individual desires. Thus, while we may question the existence of a justification for denying single woman`s freedom to procreate, or the freedom of a couple to seek the aid of a surrogate mother - that does not mean that society must provide the legal framework that might have the effect of denying parenthood to other partners to the procreative process.
Procreation traditionally is seen as an expression of the desire of a man and a woman, who generally were related in a marriage, to maintain and strengthen their bonds. This sense of procreation is based on the sexual intercourse between two partners. From 1978, where the first artificial insemination upon human beings took place, procreation was not only based in the " natural " , sexual way of reproduction. The development of the artificial reproductive techniques resulted in new opportunities and new choices which were unimaginable a few decades ago. But this process is becoming " uncontrollable ". From the possibility of artificial reproduction for infertile couples, the ability to reproduce through a donor, to the possibility of artificial reproduction of homosexuals seems that this kind of mechanism requires to be controlled. The aim of this paper is to analyze " the right to access to artificial reproduction techniques " as a procreation right, part of the fundamental human rights. The boundaries of the procreation rights would also be analyzed in order to be determined the limit of the state intervention as a warrantor of the public order clause. As a result of rapid development of these techniques, legal regulations have failed to contemplate with the new legal and ethical issues that have arisen. For this reason this analyze will be based mostly in the jurisprudence of foreign courts and that of the ECHR.
2015
(In)Fertile Citizens reconsiders topics of reproductive citizenship in relation to the specific cultural contexts, local/global exchanges and social/technological networks they emerge from. The book aims to explore these issues adopting two axes of research. The first one (Part I and II) calls for cooperation between anthropological and legal studies and aims at exploring its potentialities in the field of reproductive rights and ART. Papers by Joan Bestard, Judit Sándor, Lina Papadopoulou, Enrica Bracchi, Vasiliki Kokota, Anna Carastathis, Michael Nebeling Petersen, Aspa Chalkidou and Despina Naziri closely examine issues of politics, citizenship and human rights such as: (i) politics of reproduction and exclusions/inclusions in terms of age, gender, sexuality, economic background, (ii) subtle social mechanisms leading to exclusion of (in)fertile citizens, especially women, (iii) human rights concerns and laws that define who is eligible to become parent and who is not, (iv) the socially constructed value of “having children from one’s own genetic material” and how this is being informed by the legal framework, (v) the medicalisation of conception as both an opportunity and a threat for personal autonomy, (vi) the ways in which reproductive “freedom” as a manifestation of one’s autonomy is transformed into a “right” to assisted reproduction, (vii) which kinship units are to be valued and supported according to the local cultural-legal-religious contexts (the couple, the mother or father to be, single mothers, “other” parents, the child, the nuclear family, the extended family, etc). A second axis of interest (Part III and IV) invites to reflect upon the ethnographic and analytical value of comparison, by investigating ART implementation in different neighbouring European and non-European countries and transnational reproductive networks emerging within, across and beyond them. Papers by Lia Lombardi, Christodoulos Bellas and Albert Dicran Matossian, Ivi Daskalaki, Aglaia Chatjouli, Sven Bergmann, Polina Vlasenko, Burcu Mutlu, Giula Zanini examine the availability of infertility treatments and of specific techniques and procedures in each national context. Individual responses to ART are the result of a number of factors including the way in which people experience infertility and reproductive expectations, the understandings they display of different techniques and the practical, legal and moral accessibility of treatments both locally and translocally.
Ethics, law, and society, 2009
Prizren Social Science Journal, 2020
Developments in science and technology have, among other things, challenged the family. Human values, which change in step with this technological progress, have faced many legal, moral and ethical dilemmas which await answers from the science on bioethics. We are in such a situation when we discuss about many advances in contemporary and national family law, including new forms of family reproduction that differ from a natural process of child conceiving. The authors in this paper bring comparative aspects of biomedical and family legislation of the Republic of North Macedonia and Republic of Kosovo. Among other things, they emphasize that given the traditional and biological model of the family in our society, new reproductive forms are a very reserved topic in the family and biomedical field, but it awakens a curiosity of discussions on ethics, philosophy and legal regulation of reproduction of human beings in both countries. The numerous stereotypes that prevail in the society of both countries regarding the application of artificial reproduction technology methods are contrary to many legal and medical justifications for couples who do not have the opportunity to become parents in a biological (natural) way. Therefore, the purpose of the authors is to provide accurate and grounded information through this text about the legal framework and medical options available to all persons who wish to exercise their reproductive right to establish a family.
Filozofija i drustvo, 2012
Permissibility of contraception as a method of birth control is closely connected with issues of moral justification of reproductive autonomy, namely the question whether or not individuals should be allowed to autonomously and freely decide if they are going to have children, when and how many. The development of medical and scientific technologies led to the usage of artificial methods of contraception that can prevent concep?tion with the goal of postponing and planning the birth of a child. In the first part I analyze the bioethical arguments that appear in debates about reproductive autonomy and which can be mobilized against the permissibility of contraception. In the second part I have compared the bioethical arguments to those used against the artificial contraception in the literature about the philosophy of sexuality. In the third and final part, I have argued against the stance of G.E.M. Anscombe and J. Finnis that there is morally relevant distinction be?tween artificial...
Polish Law Review
and Philosophy of Law and State of the University of Gdańsk. His field of research includes constitutional and medical law. He concentrates on hierarchical congruence of legal regulations of biomedical law and the constitution. Author of the term "conditional medical statement".
Philosophy and Canon Law
The author of the study deliberates whether the right to contraception can be described as a human right. He makes his speculations on the basis of a broader context of reflections concerning the relationship of human rights with the natural law, to which the former ones refer. The point of reference is recognizing the right as a good which co-creates a man. Contraception is not such a good since it is not an ontological value, that is, the one which does not entail anti-values.
Assisted Reproduction, especially IVF; an ethical reflection on the cultural tendencies regarding assisted reproductive techniques and the rights and responsibilities of prospective parents. Contrasting the relevant documents of the Church on assisted reproduction and comparing that with the relevant clauses in Italian law on assisted reproduction.
Talk given at National Catholic Bioethics Center, Bishops’ Workshop, Dallas/TX in February 2011. Content can be found on DVD of National Catholic Bioethics Center. In addressing the moral problems surrounding reproductive technologies in front of you today, I want to emphasize that this is not an abstract problem for my husband and me, since we suffered from infertility for over 8 years before having our little Thérèse in September 2009. Infertility causes much pain and is a challenge for the couple, their family, friends, and for their pastors. It can be daunting to have to raise the issues regarding artificial reproductive technologies with people who are suffering intensely from their infertility and to tell them de facto that the seemingly only options available for having a child are not acceptable. The bearer of bad news is never welcome; those telling the couple that they may not use in vitro fertilization (IVF), surrogacy, donor sperm or eggs, may worry about the reactions they will receive. But the infertile couple often does not know what further suffering is awaiting them if they opt for these technologies, and especially what pain they might inflict on their children. Accepting their infertility and exploring morally acceptable treatment options will ultimately allow the couple to grow in many ways while the facile answer of an IVF-child will be fraught with new trauma. There are different ways of approaching the issue and helping infertile couples gain much needed clarity. To show that this is possible from a common sense perspective, using the moral law and medical data, is the purpose of this talk.
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