On Peirce's Late Proof of Pragmaticism

Semiotica, 1983

But first, what is its purpose? It is expected to bring to an end those prolonged disputes of philosophers which no observations of facts could settle, and yet in which each side Claims to prove that the other side is in the wrong. Pragmatism maintains that the disputants must be of cross-purposes. They either attach different meanings to words, or eise one side of the other (or both) uses a word without any definite meaning. What is wanted, therefore, is a method for ascertaining the real meaning of any concept, doctrine, proposition, word, or other sign. The object of a sign is one thing; its meaning is another. (5.6, 1905(7); cf. 5.33) This program in regard to the specific meaning of a specific kind of sign is to some extent similar to Kant's program in CPR (1787) with regard to truth, and to Wittgenstein's program in the Tractatus in regard to the meaning of linguistic expressions: to demarcate the explainable from the unexplainable and to give it a philosophical account. There is, however, quite a difference between the ways in which Peirce and Wittgenstein try to achieve their programs. Wittgenstein uses the 'analytical method' in order to eliminate all nonsense from the descriptive language; Peirce uses the 'experimental method', by which all 'successful sciences' have reached a degree of certainty (5.465), in order to develop and clarify further the meanings of all intellectual concepts (cf. 6.490, 6.481, 1908; and Wennerberg 1962: 132). 2 This 'experimental method' used by pragmatism is a double-edged sword, and has therefore two functions: (1) 'in the first place, to give us an expeditious riddance of all ideas essentially unclear', and (2) 'in the second place, ... to lend support, and help to render distinct, ideas essentially clear, but more or less difficult of apprehension; and in particular, it ought to take a satisfactory attitude toward the element of a thirdness'. These two functions are fulfilled by abduction and induction respectively (5.197). (On the notion of 'experimental' in Peirce's use cf. MS 283, 1905: ll;cf. 5.168). Now it may be asked, can this program's aim to eliminate all philosophical (and scientific) disputes be achieved at all? I do not believe that the purpose of this program is to solve or settle all philosophical

Semiotica, 2011

Peirce believed that his pragmaticism can be conclusively proven. Beginning in 1903, he drafted several attempts, ending by 1908 with a semeiotic proof. Around 1905, he exposes the proof using the theory of Existential Graphs (EGs). This paper modernises the semantics Peirce proposed for EGs in terms of game-theoretic semantics (GTS). Peirce's 1905 proof is then reconstructed in three parts, by (i) relating pragmaticism to the GTS conception of meaning, (ii) showing that Peirce's proof is an argument for a relational structure of the meaning of intellectual signs that our interpretative and strategic practices give rise to, and (iii) bringing out the key links between EGs and pragmaticism.

Pragmatics and Cognition, 2020

Although most contemporary philosophers of language hold that semantics and pragmatics require separate study, there is surprisingly little agreement on where exactly the line should be drawn between these two areas, and why. In this paper I suggest that this lack of clarity is at least partly caused by a certain historical obfuscation of the roots of the founding three-way distinction between syntax, semantics and pragmatics in Charles Peirce's pragmatist philosophy of language. I then argue for recovering and revisiting these original roots, taking indexicality as a case-study of how certain questions connected with the distinction which are currently considered complex and difficult may be clarified by a 'properly pragmatist pragmatics'. Such a view, I shall argue, upends a certain priority usually accorded to semantics over pragmatics, teaching that we do not work out what terms mean in some abstract overall sense and then work out to what use they are being put; rather, we must understand to what use terms are being put in order to understand what they mean.

Philosophica, 1977

phases of the ego, -so that, being dialogical, it is essentially composed of signs, as its Matter, in the sense in which a game of chess has the chessmen for its matter.

"[...] a "must-have" for both the Peircean scholar and any other philosopher who wishes to relate Peirce's thinking on language and logic to other major thinkers and logical themes of the twentieth century (and beyond)." Robert W. Burch, Texas A&M University, USA, in 'Project Muse - Scholarly Journals Online' "Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen’s Signs of Logic is a ground-breaking contribution to Peircean semiotics, impressive in its scope and depth. It is the first book where Peirce’s pragmatic theory of meaning, logic of existential graphs, and theory of communication are presented in a unified game-theoretical framework. This work is indispensable to all serious students of Peirce’s philosophy of logic, language, and communication." Risto Hilpinen, Professor of Philosophy, University of Miami, Coral Gables, USA "Charles Peirce, America’s great scientific philosopher, was convinced that his late logic could contribute significantly to ‘man’s future intellectual development’, but he never got the chance to make his case. Now, a century later, Pietarinen shows that Peirce was right and that Peirce’s semiotic and logic can inform the theory of games and strategy and contribute to a general theory of intelligent agency. This is cutting edge philosophy and it is much to Pietarinen’s credit that he has been able to find such up-to-date relevance and significance in Peirce’s century old writings." Nathan Houser, Professor of Philosophy, Director of the Institute for American Thought, Director and General Editor of the Peirce Edition Project "In this magisterial work Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen has performed the valuable service of demonstrating the extent that Peirce’s logic admits of systematic expression, notwithstanding the scatter and fragmentariness of his writings. Even more impressive is the success of Signs of Logic in establishing Peirce’s remarkable prescience as anticipator of developments ranging from game-theoretic logic to dialogue logic, from Gricean pragmatics to the economics of cognitive practice, and so on. Signs of Logic is essential reading for the Peirce scholar and for any one interested in the development of logic in the century just past and beyond." John Woods, Professor, FRSC, Dept. of Philosophy, University of British Columbia, Canada, and Charles S. Peirce Professor of Logic, Dept. of Computer Science, King’s College London, UK "Pietarinen’s book fills an important void in the contemporary understanding of Peirce’s logical heritage. Its thorough intertwining of Peirce’s game-theoretic ideas and Peirce’s existential graphs opens up an immense panorama. Combining precision and perspective, mathematical detail and philosophical architectonics, the work presents one of the best available accounts of Peirce’s kinetic thought." Fernando Zalamea, Profesor Asociado, Departamento de Matemáticas, Universidad Nacional de Colombia

2009

What is the logical background of pragmatism? The answer I want to suggest in this paper is that pragmatism is supported by some mathematical and logical ideas that provide a logical background for it. That is to say, they may be used to back up pragmatism’s claim to give us a viable account of thought and knowledge acquisition that describes some of the crucial relations by which knowledge acquisition and action are guided. I will start by giving a short account of why some mathematical and logical ideas coming from the logic of relations, order theory in particular, might be helpful for pragmatism’s view of knowledge and praxis. That is, I claim that they support, clarify and strengthen some of the claims made by the pragmatic maxim. In a second step I describe why these logical concepts and rules of reasoning acquire a normative meaning when they become part of pragmatism‘s semiotic, methodology and epistemology. In particular, the normative role of a semiotic concept of the iden...

Peirce‘s conception of logic and pragmaticism is virtually that of Hintikka‘s game-theoretical semantics (GTS), including the idea of players "feigned in our make believe". Peirce was interested in logic as a theory of normative, conventional, habitual and strategic action. Later Grice erected his theory of conversation on Peircean background. But cooperation is a property of model-building games and an integral part of Peirce‘s method. Cooperative model-building resorts to the same theoretical construct as the strictly competitive semantic games do. The two kinds of games, the semantic and the model-construction games, are two sides of the same conceptual coin. General principles governing mathematical practices are related to model-building activities.

In the seminal essay " Pragmatism " , Peirce discusses the end of interpretation in terms of the ultimate logical interpretant, which is varyingly characterized as habit or habit-change. While it is broadly accepted that his conception of pragmatic meaning rests on habit, the precise role of habit-change in his account of conceptual purport has not been examined in detail. In this chapter, I address this issue, which turns out to be closely linked to the pivotal question of the purpose of Peircean pragmatism itself. My primary aim is to demonstrate that Peirce's pragmatic account of the interpretant surpasses that of mere explication of habitual meaning, something that can be teased out from an embryonic account of three logical interpretants, sketched in " Pragmatism " and supported by certain suggestive references to first, second, and third pragmatistic interpretation in other writings. This investigation not only exposes the hitherto overlooked fact that Peirce recognizes a stage of conceptual clarification beyond that of the ultimate logical interpretant; it also paves the way for a reassessment of the significance of the pragmatist approach within a broader developmental-normative framework aimed at the improvements of our habits.

_________________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT— This article is an effort to understand how the Peirce's Arrow (Logical NOR), as a logical operation, can act within the concept of Ludwig Wittgenstein's language-game, considering that the language game is a satzsystem, i.e., a system of propositions. To accomplish this task, we will cover four steps: (1) understand the possible relationship of the thought of C. S. Peirce with the founding trio of analytic philosophy, namely Frege-Russell-Wittgenstein, looking for similarities between the logic of Peirce and his students (notably Christine Ladd and O.H. Mitchell) with a New Wittgenstein's approach, which sees Early Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus), Middle Wittgenstein and Last Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations) while a coherent way of thinking and not a theoretical break; (2) describe the operation of the Peirce's Arrow (Logical NOR) as a logical connective; (3) understand the notion of satzsystem (Middle Wittgenstein) and the possibility of applying the concept of language-game (Last Wittgenstein) on it; and (4) understand how the Logical NOR can operate within a satzsystem. The goal here is a search for the logic of the language-game and how the logical ideas of C. S. Peirce can help in this construction. And this construction might be interesting for a better understanding of the analytic philosophy of language. It is well known the position of Jaako Hintikka (1997, p. 145) that puts the logic of Peirce as a modal logician, i.e. model-theoretical tradition of logic, in opposition to the universalist logic's trio Frege-Russell-Wittgenstein. Hintikka sets, as a deciding factor of its position in the broad debate about Peirce in analytic philosophy of language, the question of metalogic. A metalogical approach would only be possible for the members of modal logic thanks to their beliefs in a non-linkage between language and world. One particular consequence of the universalist position is that our language and its logic can neither be self-applied, as a whole nor discussed in its entirety in a separate metalanguage (except for its purely formal features of course). This consequence, which was noted by van Heijenoort in his pioneering paper, offers some of the most useful tests of actual historical membership in the two traditions. If there were any lingering doubts about Peirce's allegiance to the model-theoretical tradition, they would hence be quickly dispelled by his willingness to discuss logic by means of logic (Hintikka, 1997, p. 148). Hintikka uses, as an example for his theory, the existential graphs. Here there is a clear reference to the so-called gamma graphs. However, it is worth remembering that the alpha graphs have a mechanism almost identical to the Boolean logic and beta graphs are a first-order logic, such as that of Frege's. The question we must ask here is if the metalogic of gamma graphs can assure a Peircean full turn to modal logic or whether it is, actually, a metalogical device used by an universalist logic, which is not uncommon. We can is an example of this in the concept of truth conditions (analogous to truth functions) presented in the Tractatus: We might say that the system of the Tractatus is reflexively self-destructive. In effect, Wittgenstein presents a metalanguage specifying the truth-conditions for a set of propositions that make up an object