Epistemic Contextualism and the Semantics-Pragmatics Distinction

Modeling and Using Context, 2005

Metaphilosophy, 2015

Contextualism in epistemology has traditionally been understood as the view that `know' functions semantically like an indexical term, encoding different contents in contexts with different epistemic standards. But the indexical hypothesis about `know' faces a range of objections. This paper explores an alternative version of contextualism on which `know' is a semantically stable term, and the truth-conditional variability in knowledge claims is a matter of pragmatic enrichment. The central idea is that in contexts with stringent epistemic standards, knowledge claims are narrowed: `know' is used in such contexts to make assertions about particularly demanding types of knowledge. The resulting picture captures all of the intuitive data that motivate traditional contextualism while sidestepping the controversial linguistic thesis at its heart. After developing the view, I show in detail how it avoids one influential linguistic objection to traditional contextualism concerning indirect speech reports, and then answer an objection concerning the unavailability of certain types of clarification speeches.

According to the thesis of epistemological contextualism, the truth conditions of sentences of the form 'S knows that P' and 'S does not know that P' vary according to the context in which they are uttered, where this variation is due to the semantics of 'knows'. Among the linguistic data that have been offered in support of epistemological contextualism are cases that are ordinary in the sense that they involve a consideration neither of skeptical hypotheses nor of skeptical arguments. Both Stewart Cohen and Keith DeRose, contextualism's two most prominent proponents, provide such cases. In a recent paper, DeRose goes so far as to claim that such cases provide the best grounds for accepting contextualism. 1 In what follows, we argue that these cases do not support contextualism. In fact, they point in the direction of epistemological invariantism-the thesis that sentences of the form 'S knows that P' and 'S does not know that P' do not vary according to the context in which they are uttered.

2005

Contextualists with regard to knowledge argue that the truth of the claim 'x knows that P' is contextually dependent. In doing so, they attempt to articulate the nature of the contextual dependence. Since part of making knowledge claims involves the adequate justification of beliefs, I shall explore whether any epistemic contextualist theories can be modified or adapted to provide an account of the context-dependence of justificatory strength for arguments. I shall conclude that the prospects are not promising.

Any contextualist approach to knowledge has to provide a plausible definition of the concept of context and spell out the mechanisms of context changes. Since it is the dynamics of context change that carry the main weight of the contextualist position, not every mechanism will be capable of filling that role. In particular, I argue that one class of mechanisms that is most popularly held to account for context changes, namely those that arise out of shifts of conversational parameters in discourses involving knowledge claims, are not suited to the job because they cannot account for the genuinely epistemic nature of the context shift. A form of epistemic contextualism that defines the context through the structure of our epistemic projects is suggested. Context changes in this account are linked to changes in the background assumptions operative in our epistemic projects and the methods used to carry out our inquiries.

Oxford Handbooks Online, 2015

In epistemology, contextualism is the view that the truth-conditions of knowledge claims vary with the contexts in which those claims are made. This article surveys the main arguments for contextualism, describes a variety of different approaches to developing the view, and discusses how contextualism has been used to treat the problem of radical skepticism. It then presents and responds to a range of objections to contextualism arising from aspects of the linguistic behavior of the word `know' and its cognates. Finally, several alternatives to contextualism are presented, including traditional invariantism, subject-sensitive invariantism, and relativism.

Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present

2014

According to a popular objection against epistemic contextualism, contextualists who endorse the factivity of knowledge, the principle of epistemic closure and the knowledge norm of assertion cannot coherently defend their theory without abandoning their response to skepticism. After examining and criticizing three responses to this objection, we offer our own solution. First, we question the assumption that contextualists ought to be interpreted as asserting the content of their theory. Second, we argue that contextualists need not hold that high epistemic standards govern contexts in which they defend their theory. In recent works, several authors have challenged the coherence of epistemic contextualism. 1 They hold that assuming the factivity of knowledge and epistemic closure, the contextualist cannot coherently assert, or know, the content of her theory. After presenting the objection in section 1, we will examine three responses we deem unsatisfactory in section 2, and then put forward our own solution in sections 3 and 4. In a nutshell, our solution rejects the idea that the contextualist should be construed as asserting that her theory is true. We also argue that the contextualist framework does not entail that high epistemic standards are in place in a context in which contextualism is presented. Let 'K(S, h)' stand for 'S knows that h,' where S is a contextualist and 'h' denotes the proposition that S has hands. According to contextualism, there are ordinary, low-standards, contexts (hereafter C L ) in which 'K(S, h)' is true. Now, contextualism holds that there is no such thing as knowing that p, simpliciter. On this view, in uttering 'K(S, h)' in C L , S asserts that she knows that h relative to low epistemic standards. 2 In other words, we have (1) K L (S, h), 1 See, among others, Brueckner (2004), Brendel (2005), Wright (2005), and Jäger (2012). 2 This notation is meant to be neutral between two linguistic accounts, one according to which the predicate 'know' is context-sensitive and designates a binary relation (between a person and a proposition) corresponding to different epistemic standards in different contexts, and another that holds that 'know' designates a ternary relation between a subject, a proposition and (context-dependent) epistemic standards.

2011