Notes Towards an Ash'arite Theodicy

Islam and civilisational renewal, 2020

This article endeavours to show the compatibility of significant trends in the largest Islamic theological school, namely the Ash'ari, with the authority of reason in ethics. On the one hand, this authority requires reason to understand moral values while, on the other, proving that this authority does not conflict with the creation of actions by God. Ash'arism has accepted the ability of reason to understand moral values, while also accepting practical reason. Moral values and their antithesis are examples of good and evil and can be understood by rational reasoning. Nevertheless, Ash'arism also regards acts as the creation of God, yet without negating the ability of reason to understand good and evil. This article explains the differences between the Ash'arites and Mu'tazilites regarding the authority of independent reason in ethics. The negation of the ability of reason to discern God's acts and commands, thereby accepting the need for religion, has made the Ash'arite theological school unique. Accordingly, religion and reason are the two references in ethics within this school. This article concludes that the authority of reason is compatible with Ash'arism if we base our reading on the view of many prominent Ash'ari scholars. Furthermore, this foundation could be used to study the compatibility of Islam with modern ethical theories.

Islamic Ethics: Divine Command Theory in Arabo-Islamic Thought, 2010

The book investigate the theories and ideas that are developed in Arabo-Islamic thought and underscore its ethical significance. The introduction sketches the development of Islamic ethical though, reviews previous literature on Islamic ethics, explains the framework and the methodology and explains concepts and theories used in the rest of the chapter such as normative ethic, metaethics and ethical voluntarism. First chapter: "Theoretical and historical backgrounds" analyses Euthyphro's dialogue and underscores its relevance to Islamic ethics and sheds light on some historical developments relevant to Euthyphro's dilemma. Second chapter: "Ethical Presuppositions of the Qur'an and the Hadith" focuses on Divine justice and human free will in the Qur'an, the ontological status of ethical values concepts and the source of ethical knowledge according to Islamic scripture. Third chapter: "Pre-Mu'tazilite Ethical Doctrines" focuses on the ethically significant doctrines of the Kharijites and the Murji'ites. The fourth chapter: "Mu'tazilites ethics" provides a moral interpretation of their five principles. The fifth chapter: "Ethics of 'Abd al-Jabbar" studies the presuppositions of ethical judgments of al-Qadi 'Abd al-Jabbar al-Asadabadi. The sixth chapter "Analysis of Normative ethical Judgments" analyses normative judgments developed by the Mu'tazilites and sheds some light on the post-Mu'tazilite or Ash'arite moral theory. The last two chapters are primarily concerned in interpreting Mu'tazilite ethics and reconstruct a moral theory, based on the Basrian Mu'tazilite moral thought, that can appeal to the contemporary reader interested in moral philosophy.

Abstract During the last centuries, great religious traditions as well as prominent philosophical and theological schools have been facing the so-called "problem of evil" and trying to solve it in a reasonable and convincing way. This paper seeks to explore Muslim philosophers' approach to the problem and examine their proposed solutions for it. After the main versions of the problem in Islamic philosophy are briefly sketched, the author explains its view about the non-existential nature of evil. At this stage, he discusses the challenge of "apprehensional evil" and three reactions to it. Then he turns to three main solutions proposed by Muslim philosophers in order to meet three versions of the problem of evil, i.e., the problem of evils and God's decree, the problem of creation-dualism and the problem of evils and Divine wisdom. Keywords: Evil, God's decree, God's wisdom, Islamic philosophy, Avicenna, Mulla Sadra.

Divine command theory is a theory of ethics that grounds the nature of ethical demands in the fact that they represent the command of God. It posit that God"s command is the ultimate source of moral obligation or that God"s will is the basis of moral laws. This position was held by the medieval theologians and philosophers like Anselm, Abelard, Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. Endorsed by Locke and Berkeley, and in the modern age it has been especially elaborated by Kierkegaard and Barth, it was criticized by Aquinas, who emphasized God"s intellect rather than His will. The divine command theory of ethics, however, faces a philosophical difficulty. Interestingly, is that in spite of some disagreeing debates within, the divine command theory is supported in all the Abrahamic religions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam). This article, therefore, aims to critique the arguments of some scholars for and against the theory. A hermeneutic framework is employed. The significance of all critique is that looking at morality within the religious tradition, solutions are provided to the moral problems within human conflicting societies.

Oriens, 2021

The challenge of evil to rational Abrahamic religions has clearly been articulated in modern philosophy of religion predicated on the incompatibility of the omnipotence, omnibenevolence, and omniscience of God with the existence of evils. Even within the Islamic theological and philosophical traditions, there is a venerable history of theodicies and defences of a good God and the efficacy of human free will. That is the context in which we wish to locate the contributions in this special issue that examine the ways in which evil is considered in Islamic philosophical accounts (particularly of the Šiʿi traditions) from the classical period to the present.

Islamic Theology and the Problem of Evil, 2021

Like their Jewish and Christian co-religionists, Muslims have grappled with how God, who is perfectly good, compassionate, merciful, powerful, and wise permits intense and profuse evil and suffering in the world. At its core, The Problem of Evil in Islamic Theology explores four different problems of evil: human disability, animal suffering, evolutionary natural selection, and Hell. Each study argues in favor of a particular kind of explanation or justification (theodicy) for the respective evil. Safaruk Chowdhury unpacks the notion of evil and its conceptualization within the mainstream Sunni theological tradition, and the various ways in which theologians and philosophers within that tradition have advanced different types of theodicies. He not only builds on previous works on the topic, but also looks at kinds of theodicies previously unexplored within Islamic theology, such as an evolutionary theodicy. Distinguished by its application of an analytic-theology approach to the subject and drawing on insights from works of both medieval Muslim theologians and philosophers and contemporary philosophers of religion, this novel and highly systematic study will appeal to students and scholars, not only of theology but of philosophy as well.

S. Kutlu (Ed.): International Symposium on Māturidism: Past, Present and the Future. Papers, Ankara 2018., 2018

In Islamic theology, the fact that God is willing is indisputable. After all, the Qur’ān shows numerous verses that prove this statement. Yet, concerning content and significance of the Divine will, the schools of kalām differed considerably. One important point of controversy regards the reference of God’s will in detail. The Sunnī doctrine of God’s will as an attribute existing from all eternity in the Divine essence indicates that everything exists through the Divine will; sins, evil, and unbelief included. On the one hand, it is hardly imaginable that God really wants these negative entities. On the other hands, the exhortations to do good, and the warning of the consequences of evil behavior, as mentioned in so many places in the Qur’ān, seem incomprehensible. This last objection caused a problem especially for the Muctazilites, particularly as their concept of God inseparably included the Divine justice. And God’s willing the evil, and subsequently punishing man who performs this, seems incompatible with this justice. The Muctazilites found the solution of this problem in limiting God’s will to the good deeds, belief, and acts of obedience. This means that God only wants those positive acts He imposes on mankind. The undeniable existence of evil was consequently attributed to man’s absolute freedom of decision and act, as held by the Muctazilites. For the Sunnites, this restriction of God’s will is unimaginable. After all, they see God as the creator of all that exists. So they consider all good and evil as predestinated by the Divine will. Against this background, Ashcarites and Māturīdites explain man’s responsibility for his own acts in different ways. Following Ashcarite doctrines, God’s will refers to His knowledge. Hence, it is not impossible that God imposes something He does not want to happen. As a consequence, not everything He wants is necessarily good. By these statements, al-Ashcarī differs clearly from the Muctazila. Yet, what is more, he held the opinion that God approves everything He wants, so evil as well. Following Ḥanafī doctrines, al-Māturīdī and his adherents in contrast distinguish between God’s will and His contentment (mahabba) and agreement (ridhan). Therefore, God is able to want what He does not approve. In the course of this paper, I will discuss these explanatory models and investigate their applicability to ethical and juridical questions. Paper held at the International Symposium on Maturidism, May 04-06, 2015, Turkestan/Kazakhstan

Journal of Philosophical Theological Research, 2022

This article first explains the classical version of the Divine command ethics in both Christian and Islamic traditions, and then by pointing out its coherency, at least in appearance, with Divine sovereignty and absolute power, it tries to show why this idea is not accepted by a significant number of the Christian and Muslim theologians. William Wainwright answers this question by using Ralph Cudworth's objections to Divine command ethics. In total, he considers seven objections and criticisms as the main reasons for Christian theologians' turning away from the theory. By presenting these seven objections, which are mainly taken from Ralph Cudworth's book, we try to find similar examples in the Islamic tradition and compare them with Wainwrights' arguments. Some of these objections can be seen in both Christian and Islamic traditions of moral rationalism. But some of them, despite the similarity in content, have different formulations. Also, some objections are specific to Christian or Islamic theology. Last but not least, there are intra-religious objections based on revelations in Islam and Christianity against the theory of Divine command, which is not the subject of my discussion in this article.