Review of Mark Rowlands, The New Science of the Mind

1998

[This paper provides a cross-section of my DPhil thesis] Most cognitive science is thoroughly Cartesian , as it takes for granted a clear and deep cut between two realms; the mental vs. the physical, mind vs. body, inner vs. outer, the subjective vs. the objective, the value-laden vs. the scientific, etc. Evidence for Cartesianism is present wherever there is talk of the 'purely' mental (e.g., qualia) and/or the 'purely' physical (e.g., the body 'as such' which engages in 'mere' behaviour and therefore is denied mental attributes). In this paper, I provide a cursory discussion of the Cartesian features of cognitive science, by focusing on representationalism. Then I lay out some of the foundations of a non-Cartesian cognitive science, which is capable of taking seriously the experiences of cognizers by taking seriously embodiment. Finally, I make some gestures as to what such a new science could look like.

Biology and Philosophy, 2003

I argue against a growing radical trend in current theoretical cognitive science that moves from the premises of embedded cognition, embodied cognition, dynamical systems theory and/or situated robotics to conclusions either to the effect that the mind is not in the brain or that cognition does not require representation, or both. I unearth the considerations at the foundation of this view: Haugeland’s bandwidth-component argument to the effect that the brain is not a component in cognitive activity, and arguments inspired by dynamical systems theory and situated robotics to the effect that cognitive activity does not involve representations. Both of these strands depend not only on a shift of emphasis from higher cognitive functions to things like sensorimotor processes, but also depend on a certain under- standing of how sensorimotor processes are implemented - as closed-loop control systems. I describe a much more sophisticated model of sensorimotor processing that is not only more powerful and robust than simple closed-loop control, but for which there is great evidence that it is implemented in the nervous system. The is the emulation theory of representation, according to which the brain constructs inner dynamical models, or emulators, of the body and environment which are used in parallel with the body and environment to enhance motor control and perception and to provide faster feedback during motor processes, and can be run off-line to produce imagery and evaluate sensorimotor counterfactuals. I then show that the emulation framework is immune to the radical arguments, and makes apparent why the brain is a component in the cognitive activity, and exactly what the representations are in sensorimotor control.

2022

Like the multitude of living organisms, we have a privileged access to our environment as a consequence of being endowed with a sensitivity that distinguishes us from things in the mineral world. Unlike the vegetal world, this sensitivity becomes an irritation associated with motor capacities that organize into a complex activation recruiting multiple sensory-motor channels, i.e., functional sets that characterize the animal kingdom: a directed gesture, intentional, combative and engaging the whole organism. In the field of cognitive neuroscience, many researchers defend the idea that "internal representations", "ideas" are built in the brain from interactions with its extracorporeal environment and gradually adjusted by repeated exercise. From these contacts created by actions, like measurements confirming or disappointing, more or less, expectations, a model of the “external” world is supposed to be constituted, more or less exact. Memory processes would then take over to build a permanence. While in nature, everything is doomed to change and to disintegrate, a permanent and stable entity would resist disintegration to generate within the brain functioning, a “space” endowed with a geometry. In this thesis, we address several criticisms to the cognitive neurosciences for having proceeded to cerebralize notions used in the physico-mathematical sciences, as if a bridge existed between, on the one hand, the concepts used to communicate and structure these fields of scientific thought, and on the other hand, the intrinsic properties of the central nervous system. Beyond the fact that the latter is not a machine created by man, this method seems comparable to that which consists in understanding the software program of a computer from its structure and its material organization. This method is inappropriate because the program is not engendered by the spontaneous operation of the circuits of the machine. A complex set of meaningful actions is required from outside. Space and physico-mathematical notions are idealities, instruments created by something whose origin is not biological, namely culture, with its habits, customs and disruptive innovations.

2000

Philosophy of Science, 2008

We provide a taxonomy of the two most important debates in the philosophy of the cognitive and neural sciences. The first debate is over methodological individualism: is the object of the cognitive and neural sciences the brain, the whole animal, or the animal--environment system? The second is over explanatory style: should explanation in cognitive and neural science be reductionist-mechanistic, inter-level mechanistic, or dynamical? After setting out the debates, we discuss the ways in which they are interconnected.

One of the liveliest debates about cognition concerns whether our cognition sometimes extends beyond our brains and bodies. One party says Yes, another No. This paper shows that debate between these parties has been epistemologically confused and requires reorienting. Both parties frequently appeal to empirical considerations and to extra-empirical theoretical virtues to support claims about where cognition is. These things should constrain their claims, but cannot do all the work hoped. This is because of the overlooked fact, uncovered in this paper, that we could never distinguish the rival views empirically or by typical theoretical virtues. I show this by drawing on recent work on testing, predictive accuracy, and theoretical virtues. The recommendation to emerge is that we step back from debate about where cognition is, to the epistemology of what cognition is.

Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 2018

The Extended Mind Hypothesis (EMH) has given rise to stimulating philosophical debates about the boundaries of the realm of the cognitive. This paper first investigates the usefulness of a " mark of the cognitive, " and then focuses on two accounts that aim to provide such a mark, put forward by Fred Adams and Rebecca Garrison on one side and Mark Rowlands on the other. The paper provides a critical assessment of these accounts and uses empirical work on emotion regulation in infants to unearth some crucial challenges that any attempt at offering a mark of the cognitive should address.

Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization -- Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 3rd Ed 686p(2017)

Before remarking on “The New Science of the Mind”, I first offer some comments on philosophy and its relationship to contemporary psychological research as exemplified in the works of Searle (S), Wittgenstein (W), Hacker (H) et al. It will help to see my reviews of PNC (Philosophy in a New Century), TLP, PI, OC, Making the Social World (MSW) and other books by and about these geniuses, who provide a clear description of higher order behavior, not found in psychology nor philosophy, that I will refer to as the WS framework. As with so many philosophy books, we might stop with the title. As the quotes and comments above and in my other reviews and the books they cover indicate, there are compelling reasons for regarding the problems we face in describing the psychology of higher order thought as conceptual and not scientific. This ought to be crystal clear to all, but science envy and almost complete oblivion to WSH etc. is a la mode! But as H notes above, the issues discussed here are all about language games and have nothing to do with science. In fact, as usual, if one translates into plain English there is very little of interest here, and certainly nothing not said before and better by WS etc. countless times since the 30’s (see e.g., The Blue and Brown Books from 1933-35). It is not surprising that he makes no significant references to any of the above books or persons (the only reference to S is an article from 1958!), though in my view they are at the top of the list of the major figures in descriptive psychology. On p119 he tells us that the key to all this is to figure out how “…a personal level cognitive process can belong to a representational subject. This is the task of the second half of the book.” But W did this 80 years ago and since we have the beautifully clear explanations of WSH, H&M etc., there is no point to torturing oneself with the rather aimless and opaque prose that veers off at the end into Sartre, Heidegger, Husserl, and Frege, with a dash of postmodernist word salad for good measure. A valiant effort on an interesting topic, but ultimately exhausting and fruitless. Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle 59p(2016). For all my articles on Wittgenstein and Searle see my e-book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Wittgenstein and Searle 367p (2016). Those interested in all my writings in their most recent versions may consult my e-book Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 662p (2016). All of my papers and books have now been published in revised versions both in ebooks and in printed books. Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B071HVC7YP. The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle--Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B071P1RP1B. Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0711R5LGX Suicide by Democracy: an Obituary for America and the World (2018) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B07CQVWV9C

We provide a taxonomy of the two most important debates in the philosophy of the cognitive and neural sciences. The first debate is over methodological individualism: is the object of the cognitive and neural sciences the brain, the whole animal, or the animal-environment system? The second is over explanatory style: should explanation in cognitive and neural science be reductionist-mechanistic, interlevel mechanistic, or dynamical? After setting out the debates, we discuss the ways in which they are interconnected. Finally, we make some recommendations that we hope will help philosophers interested in the cognitive and neural sciences to avoid dead ends.