Bioethics and Nonhuman Animals

The central purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the relationship between ethics and nonhuman animals. That is, in what way ethics has been understanding and incorporating nonhuman animals as participants in our moral community. To that end, I present how some of the different ethical perspectives concur to offer a more adequate response to the question of how we should include nonhuman animals in morality. The theoretical contributions offered by Peter Singer (utilitarianism), Tom Regan (law), Karen Warren (care) Martha Nussbaum (capabilities) and Maria Clara Dias (functionings) are called for the construction of this panorama and to the development of this debate.

~This paper is a chapter in the book 'Animals in Human Society: Amazing Creatures who Share our Planet' edited by Daniel Moorehead~ - - - Within ‘animal ethics’, and indeed with most debates concerning nonhumans, speciesism is often cited as the prejudice which most human-people (often unknowingly) hold and which ultimately lies as the underlying justification for (i) all of the arguments in support of factory farming, experimentation, hunting, and so on, and (ii) the lesser status and consideration that is given to nonhuman animals in ethical, political, legal, and social deliberations. Despite this, scholars have increasingly argued that ‘human chauvinism’, not speciesism in general, is a more accurate description of this prejudice, as speciesism can apply to any arbitrary species-preference whereas human chauvinism applies specifically to arbitrary preferences in favour of humans. Whichever term one uses, the aim of identifying whether a position rests solely on speciesism or human chauvinism is to see whether the argument put forward has a justifiable basis or is founded merely on a prejudice. The intention of this is usually an aim to demonstrate that the underlying problem that gives rise to the issues in ‘animal ethics’ is speciesism or human chauvinism, and thus that it is either of these that we must understand and eradicate before approaching the issues. In this paper I argue that while this attempt to resolve the issues has generally been a correct philosophical strategy, and largely convincing, it is anthropocentrism that is not only a greater problem for nonhuman animals but that is also the ultimate cause of most of the issues arising in ‘animal ethics’. I begin by considering what anthropocentrism is and how it is distinct from, yet related to, speciesism and human chauvinism. I argue that anthropocentrism is similar to androcentrism, in that it can include a chauvinism but can also involve unintentional world-views and systems of belief that goes beyond this. These additional elements, I argue, bias investigation and any positions put forward in the debates, while also creating new – and often unnoticed – difficulties for nonhumans. I explain why anthropocentrism as thus-defined is problematic for nonhuman animals, emphasizing the additional ways in which anthropocentrism raises difficulties for them, before explaining how anthropocentrism is related to (and likely causes) most of the issues relating to nonhumans; such as questions relating to culture, afterlife, property, intervention, hunting, entertainment, experimentation, consumption, activism, and so on. I finally point out how anthropocentrism is even involved within ‘animal ethics’, including those positions that reject speciesism and human chauvinism, and thus conclude that even while attempting to aid nonhumans these positions do not, and perhaps cannot, do as much as they could due to their implicit anthropocentrism. I then attempt to show how this situation may be resolved by recognizing, and removing (or at least limiting) as much anthropocentrism as possible when approaching the issues. I argue that this can be achieved by (truly) considering humans just as another animal that is no more special than any other, and attempting to consider all nonhuman points of view as of equal relevance in any issue. This, I claim, would have a profound effect not only for nonhumans and for the proposed resolutions made for each issue, but also for ‘animal ethics’, and more importantly for humanity and human society at large.

Ethical and Political Approaches to Nonhuman Animal Issues: Towards an Undivided Future, 2017

**Due to the publisher holding the copyright to the book, drafts of the book unfortunately cannot be circulated. This includes the introduction. Upon release of the book the freely available front matter will be made accessible online and here. Until this changes, which is beyond my authority, all I can do is direct you to the book's site and Amazon. Abstracts of the chapters will be available. Apologies, and thank you for being interested. A.** This book offers ethical and political approaches to issues that nonhuman animals face. The recent ‘political turn’ in interspecies ethics, from ethical to political approaches, has arisen due to the apparent lack of success of the nonhuman animal movement and dissatisfaction with traditional approaches. Current works largely present general positions rather than address specific issues and principally rely on mainstream approaches. This book offers alternative positions such as cosmopolitan, libertarian, and left humanist thought, as well as applying ethical and political thought to specific issues, such as experimentation, factory farming, nonhuman political agency, and intervention. Presenting work by theorists and activists, insights are offered from both ethics and politics that impact theory and practice and offer essential considerations for those engaging in interspecies ethics within the political turn era. === CONTENTS: Acknowledgements List of Contributors List of Figures Foreword (by Richard D. Ryder) 1. Introduction (Andrew Woodhall & Gabriel Garmendia da Trindade) 2. Making Light of the Ethical? The Ethics and Politics of Animal Rights (Mark Rowlands) 3. Far-persons (Gary Comstock) 4. Evolution to Liberation: Political Reflections on Morality and Nonhumans (Steve F. Sapontzis) 5. Robert Nozick on Nonhuman Animals: Rights, Value and the Meaning of Life (Josh Milburn) 6. Reinventing Left Humanism: Towards an Interspecies Emancipatory Project (Zipporah Weisberg) 7. Justice for Animals in a Globalizing World (Angie Pepper) 8. Animal Rights and the Distorting Power of Anthropocentric Prejudice (Gary Steiner) 9. Interspecies Encounters and the Political Turn: From Dialogues to Deliberation (Eva Meijer) 10. Gandhian Satyagraha and Open Animal Rescue (Tony Milligan) 11. Shame: From Defensive Fury to Epistemological Shifts and Political Change (Elisa Aaltola) 12. Are We Smart Enough to Know When to Take the Political Turn for Animals? (Kim Stallwood) 13. Interspecies Atrocities and the Politics of Memory (Guy Scotton) 14. Animal Research and the Political Theory of Animal Rights (Gardar Arnason) 15. Cross-Species Comparisons of Welfare (Tatjana Višak) 16. Population Dynamics Meets Animal Ethics: The Case for Aiding Animals in Nature (Oscar Horta) 17. Afterword (Carol J. Adams) Index

Views in Animal Welfare, 1984

A bundle of grey and gold hair, three Eulemur fulvus rufus, the red-fronted brown lemur, were huddled on an angled branch at least 50 feet above where I sat. Most lemur species are highly endangered; I watched these fulvus, recognizing that their fate relied not on their survival by finding food and shelter when necessary, but on the fate of a conservation project whose success precariously balances between various interconnected programmes of education, health, research, eco-tourism, and foreign investment. This delicate balancing act attempts to keep itself upright amidst an onslaught of human needs, desires, and at times, greed.

The present article examines a concern I have had for some time about the compatibility of humanistic psychology with the emerging animal rights movement. Beyond working out my position, the paper has the additional educational and, frankly, political purpose of bringing animal rights issues to the attention of humanistic psychologists.

Broadview Press, 2009

Can animals be regarded as part of the moral community? To what extent, if at all, do they have moral rights? Are we wrong to eat them, hunt them, or use them for scientific research? Can animal liberation be squared with the environmental movement? Taylor traces the background of these debates from Aristotle to Darwin and sets out the views of numerous contemporary philosophers – including Peter Singer, Tom Regan, Mary Anne Warren, J. Baird Callicott, and Martha Nussbaum – with ethical theories ranging from utilitarianism to eco-feminism. The new edition also includes provocative quotations from some of the major writers in the field. As the final chapter insists, animal ethics is more than just an “academic” question: it is intimately connected both to our understanding of what it means to be human and to pressing current issues such as food shortages, environmental degradation, and climate change.

Bioethics. Ed. Bruce Jennings. 4th ed. Vol. 1. Farmington Hills, MI: Macmillan Reference USA, 2014. 252-254. Gale Virtual Reference Library. Web. 26 June 2014.

Ethical concerns about nonhuman animals arise from the recognition that many animals, such as mammals, birds, and vertebrates generally, as well as some invertebrate species, are conscious and sentient, that is, capable of negative and positive sensations. Further mental states attributed to many animals include beliefs, desires, reasoning, memory, expectations for the future, rich and varied negative and positive emotions, social engagement, self-awareness, and a psychological unity that enables identity over time. A growing body of research in cognitive ethology, the branch of scientific research focused on animal minds, is providing increasingly stronger reasons—beyond common sense, observations, and arguments from analogy to human behavior, physiology, and evolution—to believe that many animals are, like human beings, minded, psychologically complex beings whose lives can go better and worse for them and thus are capable of being harmed (Armstrong and Botzler 2008). Little scientific research supports an opposing view that all animals are mindless, incapable of suffering or experiencing negative emotions, or are otherwise incapable of being harmed or made worse off. In light of this understanding of animals' cognitive and emotional lives, most contemporary ethicists who address these issues argue that there are some direct moral duties owed to conscious, sentient animals, although they disagree on the extent and seriousness of these obligations. And there are debates about what difference the cognitive sophistication of the species might make to our obligations concerning individuals of that species: for example, might a prima facie obligation to not harm be stronger concerning chimpanzees, less toward chickens, and even less for fish? Answers here depend on our scientific understanding of the mental lives of the species, as well as our moral theorizing.

Годишен зборник на Филозофскиот факултет/The Annual of the Faculty of Philosophy in Skopje

In the last few decades we have witnessed a proliferation of works in the field widely defined as "studies of the relationship between man and animals", "studies of animals", or "anthrozoology", and even "studies of animal ethics". Among the avant-garde in this field there is a confrontation with this naturalized discourse. Over time, this has led to a growing need to reconsider, analyse and upgrade the validity of the argument of different ethical views and their theories that serve to determine and evaluate our behaviour towards animals as morally acceptable or not. Hence, what the author is primarily concerned with, is critical reflection on a wide range of theories that seek to explain relevant positions on our relationship to animals and wildlife on Earth. Taking on this new responsibility in relation to our treatment of animals modifies not only our way of more direct treatment of animals, but also the way we should be constituted as entities in the world. It is an assumption that we share the world with other beings and that this implies a moral obligation that goes beyond the category of belonging to the same species. A new culture of human coexistence with other non-human beings needs to be inaugurated, in line with modern living conditions on this planet.

2018

In this dissertation, I make the case that other animals are political subjects and I offer new proposals for how we should understand the political statuses of different groups of animals. In part one I make the case that other animals should be seen as having full political standing. First, I argue that all conscious individuals have certain basic moral rights and I defend this position against various objections. Once we recognize these rights, I argue that protecting and upholding them requires extending to all conscious animals full political standing, which involves legal rights, legal standing, and some form of institutionalized political representation. I would like to thank the members of my dissertation committee-Amy Mullin, Wayne Sumner, and my supervisor Tom Hurka-for their detailed feedback and guidance on this project. Special thanks are also owed to Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka, who read and provided feedback on several chapters of my dissertation. I would not have completed my dissertation were it not for the encouragement, support, and love of my family and friends. Thank you all for the numerous ways you have given me assistance and support as I worked on and completed my dissertation. v Table of Contents 1 INTRODUCTION 2 THE MORAL RIGHTS OF ANIMALS 2.1 THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS 2.1.1 Conscious Individuality and Moral Rights 2.1.2 The Argument from Human Diversity 2.2 ARGUMENTS AGAINST ANIMAL RIGHTS 2.2.1 Attempts to Secure Rights for All Humans While Excluding Animals 2.2.2 Denying Rights to Non-Persons 2.3 OTHER OBJECTIONS TO ANIMAL RIGHTS 2.3.1 The Will Theory of Rights 2.3.2 Lifeboat Cases 2.3.3 Is Conscious Individuality Sufficient for Basic Moral Rights? 2.3.4 Is Conscious Individuality Too Low a Threshold for A Right to Life? 2.3.5 Rights and Thresholds 2.3.6 Medical Experimentation 2.3.7 Rights and Personhood 2.4 IMPLICATIONS OF THE MORAL RIGHTS OF ANIMALS 2.5 OBLIGATIONS NOT TO HARM ANIMALS 2.5.1 Experimenting on Animals 2.5.2 Against the Superiority Argument 2.5.3 Against the Consequentialist Argument 2.6 CONCLUSION 3 POLITICAL INCLUSION FOR NONHUMAN ANIMALS 3.1 WHAT IS