Nonprobabilistic Chance?

2020

Probabilistic theism according to Dariusz Łukaszewicz is a theism which ennobles the concept of chance and explains the role which chance plays in the context of Divine Providence. An epistemologist can, however, be interested in a much more basic issue and ask whether our beliefs concerning chance can be called knowledge. This article is divided into three parts. In the first one I discuss selected ways of justifying knowledge of chance, namely common sense justification, pragmatic justification, empirical justification, and a priori justification and I conclude that we possess tychical knowledge in reference to non-intentional chance (C2), epistemic chance (C3), probabilistic chance (C5), and causal chance (C6). In the second part I undertake the problem of skepticism in the problem of chance and I suggest that a significant role in the discussion with tychical skepticism is played by the standards of rationality. In the third section I refer to the concept of composite chance discussed by Łukasiewicz, and I claim that (i) we do not possess knowledge of composite chance as understood by Łukasiewicz, and that (ii) this fact should not be treated as a reason in favor of tychical skepticism.

Mathematics Education Library, 2005

Some have argued that chance and determinism are compatible in order to account for the objectivity of probabilities in theories that are compatible with deter-minism, like Classical Statistical Mechanics (CSM) and Evolutionary Theory (ET). Contrarily, some have argued that chance and determinism are incompatible, and so such probabilities are subjective. In this paper, I argue that both of these positions are unsatisfactory. I argue that the probabilities of theories like CSM and ET are not chances, but also that they are not subjective probabilities either. Rather, they are a third type of probability, which I call counterfactual probability. The main distinguishing feature of counterfactual-probability is the role it plays in conveying important coun-terfactual information in explanations. This distinguishes counterfactual probability from chance as a second concept of objective probability.

"ABSTRACT (follow link above for preprint, or below for published version): I argue that there are non-trivial objective chances (objective chances other than 0 and 1) even in deterministic worlds. The argument is as follows. I observe that there are probabilistic special scientific laws even in deterministic worlds. These laws project non-trivial probabilities for the events that they concern. And these probabilities play the chance role and so should be regarded as chances as opposed, for example, to epistemic probabilities or credences. The supposition of non-trivial deterministic chances might seem to land us in contradiction. The fundamental laws of deterministic worlds project trivial probabilities for the very same events that are assigned non-trivial probabilities by the special scientific laws. I argue that any appearance of tension is dissolved by recognition of the level-relativity of chances. There is therefore no obstacle to accepting non-trivial chance-role-playing deterministic probabilities as genuine chances."

Philosophy of Science, 2017

I argue that there are such things as nomological probabilities-probabilities that play a certain explanatory role with respect to stable, long-run relative frequencies. Indeed, I argue, we should be willing to accept nomological probabilities even if they turn out to be metaphysically weird or even wholly sui generis entities. I then give an example of one way in which this argument should shape future work on the metaphysics of chance by describing a challenge to a common group of analyses of objective probability-Humean analyses-understood as analyses of nomological probability.

Philosophy Compass, 2010

This article surveys several interrelated issues in the metaphysics of chance. First, what is the relationship between the probabilities associated with types of trials (for instance, the chance that a twenty-eight-year old develops diabetes before age thirty) and the probabilities associated with individual token trials (for instance, the chance that I develop diabetes before age thirty)? Second, which features of the the world fix the chances: are there objective chances at all, and if so, are there non-chancy facts on which they supervene? Third, can chance be reconciled with determinism, and if so, how? Philosophy Compass 5/11 (2010):

2018

In this paper I will examine and defend a type of propensity theory of objective chance that, while far from new, has been largely neglected in recent decades. I am not aware of a general term for views of this sort, but I will call it the epistemic view of chance. Physical chances, on this view, have all their generally-accepted properties, so that the view does not offer some mere epistemic surrogate for chance, but the real thing. After surveying the history of this approach to chance, I will advocate a particular version of it. The epistemic view of chance has a long history, and (as shown in Section 6) it entails all our common beliefs about chance, so why is it often overlooked? The main reason, as far as I can judge, is that it conflicts with accepted views in related areas such as causation, laws of nature, and the extent of rational constraints on subjective probability. In particular, the three problems of chance, causation, and natural laws are interlocked, like pieces of...

European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, 2015