Tripartism: Regulatory Capture and Empowerment

RAP. Revista de Administração Pública, 2021

The discussion of regulatory capture is not recent in state studies. However, the criteria to identify capture and the definition of the research protocols to demonstrate and measure the phenomenon have still not reached a consensus. This article carries out a non-exhaustive literature review to identify the main regulatory capture strategies and their respective measurement methods. We organize the regulation studies in four axes of regulatory capture strategies: capture by material incentives, capture by immaterial incentives, capture by threat, and capture by information asymmetry. Furthermore, the study examines the Brazilian case and discusses the contradictory results of recent research on the case of the National Supplementary Health Agency (ANS). We identified that, in general, Brazilian literature starts from a broad approach to understanding regulatory capture. Also, the studies adopt a restrictive approach mainly to explore the "revolving door" mechanism, following a trend in international literature but ignoring other mechanisms with explanatory potential. These findings have implications for research designs in studies of regulation in order to advance analyses beyond initial impressions and toward robust empirical research.

Law <html_ent glyph="@amp;" ascii="&amp;"/> Policy, 2003

It is indisputable that an effective regulatory regime is necessary for network infrastructure to be operated efficiently and equitably. A large and growing body of economic theory explores what an optimal regulatory regime should aim to achieve and the best means for doing this. Meanwhile, on-the-ground experience reveals that weaknesses in the institutional environment can undermine the objectives of regulatory policy. One major weakness is the inability of society to ensure that regulatory agencies are acting in their interest and not being captured by special interest groups. Such regulatory capture is a focus of economic theory. This chapter aims to take stock and evaluate the risks and solutions discussed in the relevant literature.

State of the Art in Regulatory Governance Research Paper – 2021.08

How much politics goes into the development, implementation, evaluation, and reform of regulation? This question has been at the forefront of regulatory scholarship for over four decades. The current chapter maps how scholars of public administration in general and regulatory scholars in particular have theorized the politics of regulation. It first reflects on three of the major theories about the need for regulation: economic perspectives, public interest perspectives, and institutional perspectives. In the slipstream of these theories, regulatory models have for long build on the understanding that either deterrence, intrinsic motivations, or information provision are the best way to achieve compliance with regulation. The second part of the chapter engages with more recent regulatory reforms. These have begun to mix incentives (resulting in models such as Responsive Regulation and Smart Regulation) and have started to embrace insights from behavioural economics (resulting in models such as Nudging). This all to develop regulatory interventions that are more tailored to the characteristics of the individuals and organizations they target. Recent regulatory reforms have also begun to embrace non-governmental individuals and organizations as essential parts of regulatory regimes (resulting in theorizing on co-regulation and regulatory intermediaries), as well as question the need for a (politics of) regulation of regulation (resulting in theorizing on agencification, meta-regulation, and regulatory stewardship).