Technical Issues in Naive Sense Datum Theory

The familiar arguments against Sense Datum Theory (SDT) are wrong-headed. What kinds of real difficulties and new questions do we face if we adopt SDT, for example, in looking for a locus in the brain at which colours, and other phenomenal qualities, are assembled in a Phenomenal Array? If we initially formulate SDT in a relatively simple minded --Naive --way, what kinds of issues do we encounter? I offer some illustrations of likely issues, and also examine in a beginning way, how SDT might have to be less Naive.

I argue that perceptual content involves representations both of aspects of objects, and of objects themselves, whether at the level of conscious perception, or of low-level perceptual processing—a double content structure. I present an 'orientational' theory of the relations of the two kinds of perceptual content, which can accommodate both the general semantic possibility of perceptual misrepresentation, and also species of it involving characteristic perceptual confusions of aspectual and intrinsic content. The resulting theoretical structure is argued to be a broadly methodological or logical one, rather than a substantive theory that is open to empirical refutation.

From the point of view of the cognitive dynamicist the organization of brain circuitry into assemblies defined by their synchrony at particular (and precise) oscillation frequencies is important for the correct correlation of all independent cortical responses to the different aspects of a given complex thought or object. From the point of view of anyone operating complex mechanical systems, i.e., those comprising independent components that are required to interact precisely in time, it follows that the precise timing of such a system is essential – not only essential but measurable, and scalable. It must also be reliable over observations to bring about consistent behavior, whatever that behavior is. The catastrophic consequence of an absence of such precision, for instance that required to govern the interference engine in many automobiles, is indicative of how important timing is for the function of dynamical systems at all levels of operation. The dynamics and temporal considerations combined indicate that it is necessary to consider the operating characteristic of any dynamical, cognitive brain system in terms, superficially at least, of oscillation frequencies. These may, themselves, be forensic of an underlying time-related taxonomy. Currently there are only two sets of relevant and necessarily systematic observations in this field: one of these reports the precise dynamical structure of the perceptual systems engaged in dynamical binding across form and time; the second, derived both empirically from perceptual performance data, as well as obtained from theoretical models, demonstrates a timing taxonomy related to a fundamental operator referred to as the time quantum. In this contribution both sets of theory and observations are reviewed and compared for their predictive consistency. Conclusions about direct comparability are discussed for both theories of cognitive dynamics and time quantum models. Finally, a brief review of some experimental data measuring sensitivity to visual information presented to the visual blind field (blindsight), as well as from studies of temporal processing in autism and schizophrenia, indicates that an understanding of a precise and metrical dynamic structure may be very important for an operational understanding of perception as well as more general cognitive function in psychopathology.

Diametros, 2010

Perception, Action, and Consciousness, 2010

Memory & Cognition, 2010

Neuropsychologia, 1998

Spatial stimulus*response "S!R# compatibility designates the observation that speeded reactions to unilateral stimuli are faster for the hand ipsilateral than for the hand contralateral to the sensory hemi_eld containing the stimulus[ In two experiments involving presentation of the numbers 0 to 00 in the center of the visual _eld we show "0# a left!hand reaction time "RT# advantage for numerals ³5 and a right!hand advantage for those ×5 for subjects who conceive of the numbers as distances on a ruler\ and "1# a reversal of this RT advantage for subjects who conceive of them as hours on a clock face[ While the results in the _rst task "RULER# replicate a robust _nding from the neuropsychology of number processing "the {{SNARC e}ect||# those in the second task "CLOCK# show that extension of the number scale from left to right in representational space cannot be the decisive factor for the observed interaction between hand and number size[ Taken together\ the _ndings in the two tasks are best accounted for in terms of an interaction between lateralized mental representations and lateralized motor outputs "i[e[ an analog of traditional spatial S!R compatibility e}ects in representational space# [ We discuss potential clinical applications of the two tasks in patients with neglect of representational space[ Þ 0887 Elsevier Science Ltd[ All rights reserved[ Key Words] Spatial S!R compatibility^choice reaction time task^number processing^SNARC e}ect^representational neglect[ Address for correspondence] Peter

Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2003

The aim of the present paper is to sketch a new structural version of the Representative Theory of Perception which is supported both by conceptual and empirical arguments. To this end, I will discuss, in a first step, the structural approach to representation and show how it can be applied to perceptual consciousness. This discussion will demonstrate that perceptual experiences possess representational as well as purely sensational properties. In a second step, the focus will switch to empirical cases of synaesthesia. In particular, I will stress that certain synaesthetic experiences are well-suited to corroborating a structural account of the perceptual mind. The overall picture that emerges in this paper prompts a new view of perceptual consciousness that is ruthlessly structural.

We present a cognitive-physicalist account of phenomenal consciousness. We argue that phenomenal concepts do not differ from other types of concepts. When explaining the peculiarities of conscious experience, the right place to look at is sensory/ perceptual representations and their interaction with general conceptual structures. We utilize Jerry Fodor's psychosemantic theory to formulate our view. We compare and contrast our view with that of Murat Aydede and Güven Güzeldere, who, using Dretskean psychosemantic theory, arrived at a solution different from ours in some ways. We have suggested that the representational atomism of certain sensory experiences plays a central role in reconstructing the epistemic gap associated with conscious experience, still, atomism is not the whole story. It needs to be supplemented by some additional principles. We also add an account of introspection, and suggest some cognitive features that might distinguish representational atoms with phenomenal character from those without it.