Moral Relativism

The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Disagreement, edited by Maria Baghramian, Adam Carter, and Rach Cosker-Rowland, 2024

This chapter focuses on the connection between moral disagreement and moral relativism. Moral relativists, generally speaking, think both (i) that there is no unique objectively correct moral standard and (ii) that the rightness and wrongness of an action depends in some way on a moral standard accepted by some group or an individual. This chapter will first consider the metaphysical and epistemic arguments for moral relativism that begin from the premise that there is considerable amount of moral disagreement both within individual societies and between them. The second half of the chapter, by contrast, focuses on the objection that moral relativism threatens to make us unable to have moral disagreements because it seems to make us speak past one another. This part of the chapter also evaluates relativist responses to this disagreement problem that rely on semantic opacity, disagreement in attitude, metalinguistic negotiations, and truth relativism. The chapter finally concludes by considering future directions of research in this area.

Kpanie Addy MA Philosophy 'The very existence of other cultures with different moralities from ours is, in itself, enough to show that moral relativism is true.' Discuss. This essay discusses the view that the very existence of other cultures with different moralities from ours is, in itself, enough to show that moral relativism is true. To reformulate the issue as a question: does the existence of other cultures with moral views dissimilar to ours constitute a condition sufficient for establishing the truth of moral relativism? A careful treatment of this issue requires understanding moral relativism; I shall therefore begin by briefly sketching out this viewpoint. A focused discussion of the matter in hand will then follow. I shall deploy arguments in support of my opinion that the case for moral relativism actually seems to founder when premised on moral diversity. I shall conclude this essay by stating why in my view moral relativism lacks viability as an ethical position. Moral relativism, as Harman explains, is the view that "moral right and wrong (good and bad, justice and injustice, virtue and vice etc.) are always relative to a choice of moral framework. What is morally right in relation to one moral framework can be morally wrong in relation to a different moral framework. And no moral framework is objectively privileged as the one true morality" (Harman and Thomson 1996: 3). Meiland and Krausz express a similar view: "moral relativism tells us that an action is morally right only relative to a particular moral code or set of moral principles" (1982: 8). The term, moral relativism (MR) or ethical relativism, thus aptly reflects the general idea underlying this viewpoint that moral truth is relative to or contingent on a specific moral framework and equally relative is the justifiability of such truth. MR contrasts sharply with the view that there is an objective, universal, absolute moral truth which exists, as Mackie picturesquely puts it, as part of the fabric of the world. It thus diametrically opposes moral objectivism and universalism, both of which, in very simple terms, are claims supporting the position that objective standards bearing on truth or falsity obtain with regard to evaluating moral judgments and that such judgments have universal application. MR, although often likened to moral scepticism, differs significantly from the latter viewpoint. Outlining this difference helps to further clarify what MR consists in. Meiland and Krausz highlight the key similarity and difference as follows:

Philosophical Topics, 2010

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Cambridge University Press eBooks, 1996

Southern Journal of Philosophy (Special 50th Anniversary Issue)

I consider sophisticated forms of relativism and their effectiveness at responding to the skeptical argument from moral disagreement. In order to do so, I argue that the relativist must do justice to our intuitions about the depth of moral disagreement, while also explaining why it can be rational to be relatively insensitive to such disagreements. I argue that the relativist can provide an account with these features, at least in some form, but that there remain serious questions about the viability of the resulting account.

Cultura. International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology, 2020

This paper is a response to Park Seungbae's article, "Defence of Cultural Relativism". Some of the typical criticisms of moral relativism are the following: moral relativism is erroneously committed to the principle of tolerance, which is a universal principle; there are a number of objective moral rules; a moral relativist must admit that Hitler was right, which is absurd; a moral relativist must deny, in the face of evidence, that moral progress is possible; and, since every individual belongs to multiple cultures at once, the concept of moral relativism is vague. Park argues that such contentions do not affect moral relativism and that the moral relativist may respond that the value of tolerance, Hitler's actions, and the concept of culture are themselves relative. In what follows, I show that Park's adroit strategy is unsuccessful. Consequently, moral relativism is incoherent.

The Journal of Value Inquiry, 1981

In a typical introductory ethics course, moral relativism is presented only to be exposed as contradictory or confused. Ethical relativists are accused of inconsistency when they attempt to use relativism as a reason for advocating universal tolerance. They are said to be confused when they think that cultural diversity indicates genuine moral disagreement, or that moral disagreement is itself proof that truth is relative. It is safe to say that ethical relativism in its "vulgar and unregenerate forms" has little or no philosophical credibility. 1

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 2004

This paper defines moral relativism, refutes it, explores its motivations, and examines its social consequences.