The Meta-Justification of Reflective Equilibrium

1998

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 1998

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 1984

Ethics, Politics & Society, 2022

In this paper, we focus on one controversial element of the method of reflective equilibrium, namely Rawls’ idea that the commitments that enter the justificatory procedure should be pre-selected or filtered: According to him, only considered judgements should be taken into account in moral philosophy. There are two camps of critics of this filtering process: 1) Critics of reflective equilibrium: They reject the Rawlsian filtering process as too weak and seek a more reliable one, which would actually constitute a distinct epistemic method. 2) Proponents of reflective equilibrium: They reject the Rawlsian filtering process as too exclusionary. We defend RE against its critics, arguing that the method can secure reasonable commitments without depending on a strong external filtering process. However, we side with the critical proponents of reflective equilibrium and argue that without the Rawlsian weak filtering process, RE is more plausible both as a general method as well as in the ...

Philosophical Inquiry, 2017

John Rawls' notion of " reflective equilibrium " is one of the most utilised concepts in contemporary ethics when it comes to the basic methodological question of how to establish and trade off different normative positions and attitudes. Even where Rawls' specific con-tractualist account is not adhered to, " reflective equilibrium " is readily adopted as the guiding idea behind coherentist approaches, which seek moral justification not in a purely de-ductive or inductive manner, but in some balancing procedure that will eventually produce a stable adjustment of relevant doctrines and standpoints. However, it appears that the widespread use of this idea has led to some considerable deviations from its meaning within Rawls' original framework and to a critical loss of conceptual cogency as an ethico-hermeneutical tool. This contribution identifies three kinds of " balancing " constellations that are frequently but erroneously brought forward under the heading of Rawlsian " reflective equilibrium " : (a) balancing theoretical accounts against intuitive convictions; (b) balancing general principles against particular judgements; (c) balancing opposite ethical conceptions or divergent moral statements, respectively. It is argued that each of these applications departs from Rawls' original construction of " reflective equilibrium " and also deprives the idea of its reliability in clarifying and weighing moral stances.

2009

This dissertation is dedicated to Robert J. Brophy, my loving father, whose devoted service as a professor of English at California State University, Long Beach, contributed to my own achievements. I would also like to dedicate this dissertation to my mother, Mary Lou Brophy whose professional background in psychology certainly inspired my philosophical approach. Lastly, I would like to dedicate this dissertation to my daughter, Isabella. Thank you for not arriving before your due date, or I might have missed my dissertation defense. I love you, and look forward to watching you grow up in the many years ahead.

Philosophy Compass

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The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 1991

Ethics, 1999

Cambridge University Press eBooks, 2016