Notes on the Intentionality of Consciousness

For the last few decades, consciousness has been in the forefront of neuroscience as well as in the forefront of religious doctrines for further investigation. Indeed it is a vast subject, thus more specifically, what I will investigate and convey in this essay is the interdisciplinary correlatives between the scientific perspectives and that of Buddhist teachings. In regards to science, I will include neuroscientific perspectives without this constricting this essay to include other point of views that originate in different disciplines but nevertheless integrate well with science, such as psychological and philosophical perspectives. In regards to the Buddhist doctrine I will refer to fundamental principles of emptiness (Suññata) and dependent co-arising (paticcasamuppāda) to exemplify notions of experience related to consciousness. Passing through these contradictory disciplines in the past but cooperative at present, and taking in account important philosophies of science and Buddhism to explore “consciousness” in its broad and complex view, I will offer a perspective on what can be reasoned as ‘essence consciousness’ and 'Information Data'.

Given the recent interest in the subjective or phenomenal dimension of consciousness it is no wonder that many authors have once more started to speak of the need for phenomenological considerations. Often however the term 'phenomenology' is being used simply as a synonym for 'folk psychology', and in our article we argue that it would be far more fruitful to turn to the argumentation to be found within the continental tradition inaugurated by Husserl. In order to exemplify this claim, we criticize Rosenthal's higher-order thought theory as well as Strawson's recent contribution in this journal, and argue that a phenomenological analysis of the nature of self-awareness can provide us with a more sophisticated and accurate model for understanding both phenomenal consciousness and the notion of self.

Immanuel Kant is known for his contribution on the idea of " Perspectivism " which came from Plato and become one of the major problems of the Modern Philosophy and the history of Western philosophy in general. This concept is how we should view thing that which is not appears but rather how our mind imposes its understanding on the object. In this paper, we will tackle the similarities of Kant's Copernican Revolution and Edmund Husserl's Intentionality. These similarities of these two concepts must know is all about how we know things in the light of how mind gives meaning to the things being cogitated. We will understand how these concepts work together and also what will be the future of phenomenology especially like those of Heidegger.

Theory & Psychology, 2019

In this article, I consider the possibility of a theoretical integration of phenomenology and a mechanistic framework. First, I discuss the mechanistic model of explanation and the idea of theoretical integration in science as opposed to unification. I argue that the mechanistic model of explanation is preferable for integrating the cognitive sciences, although it is limited and in the case of consciousness studies should be complemented with phenomenology. Second, I examine three possible approaches to the integration of phenomenology and the mechanistic model of explanation. First, I discuss Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of consciousness and propose a new argument against IIT's axiomatic method-namely, I argue that IIT misuses the notion of axiom. Next, I discuss two different proposals for the integration of phenomenology with cognitive sciences: front-loaded phenomenology and neurophenomenology. I argue that these proposals cannot be integrated with a mechanistic framework unless requisite modifications are made.

Routledge eBooks, 2016

Definitions of consciousness need to be sufficiently broad to include all examples of conscious states and sufficiently narrow to exclude entities, events and processes that are not conscious. Unfortunately, deviations from these simple principles are common in modern consciousness studies, with consequent confusion and internal division in the field. The present paper gives example of ways in which definitions of consciousness can be either too broad or too narrow. It also discusses some of the main ways in which pre-existing theoretical commitments (about the nature of consciousness, mind and world) have intruded into definitions. Similar problems can arise in the way a "conscious process" is defined, potentially obscuring the way that conscious phenomenology actually relates to its neural correlates and antecedent causes in the brain, body and external world. Once a definition of "consciousness" is firmly grounded in its phenomenology, investigations of its ontology and its relationships to entities, events and processes that are not conscious can begin, and this may in time transmute the meaning (or sense) of the term. As our scientific understanding of these relationships deepen, our understanding of what consciousness is will also deepen. A similar transmutation of meaning (with growth of knowledge) occurs with basic terms in physics such as "energy", and "time." 1 I have given a detailed critique of this aspect of Dennett's position that I do not have space to repeat here (see Velmans, , 2009 chapter 5) chapter 5); see also Zahavi (2007), Beenfeldt (2008). 2 See Gallagher, 2007, Zahavi, 2007 for recent reviews of European phenomenological approaches. Note however that classical Indian conclusions about the nature of consciousness arise largely from altered conscious states consequent on prolonged periods of meditation, and this can be an additional source of confusion when comparing Eastern and Western understanding of everyday conscious phenomenology. The pure, contentless consciousness said to be experienced in such states is, in various writings, thought to underly all of Nature, which makes this a claim about what in the West is sometimes referred to as "the ground of being" or, in Kantian terms, "the thing in itself," rather than a claim about the forms of "phenomenal consciousness," that are more usually investigated in modern consciousness studies.

2016

abstract According to a position which has dominated the theoretical landscape in the philosophy of mind until recently, only sensory states exhibit a characteristic phenomenal dimension, whereas cognitive states either utterly lack it, or inherit it from some of their accompanying sensory states. This position has recently been challenged by several scholars who have stressed the irreducibility of cognitive phenomenology to a merely sensory one. The aim of this introductory paper is to provide a general overview of the debate on cognitive phenomenology in order to give the reader a flavor of the richness of the themes that surround this area of investigation centered on the relationship between consciousness and cognition.

About the applicability of phenomenology in empirical research concerning a subcortical theory of minimal consciousness or minimal mind.

Phenomenology is the study of structures of consciousness as experienced from the firstperson point of view. The central structure of an experience is its intentionality, its being directed toward something, as it is an experience of or about some object. An experience is directed toward an object by virtue of its content or meaning (which represents the object) together with appropriate enabling conditions. Phenomenology as a discipline is distinct from but related to other key disciplines in philosophy, such as ontology, epistemology, logic, and ethics. Phenomenology has been practiced in various guises for centuries, but it came into its own in the early 20th century in the works of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and others. Phenomenological issues of intentionality, consciousness, qualia, and first-person perspective have been prominent in recent philosophy of mind.  1. What is Phenomenology?  2. The Discipline of Phenomenology  3. From Phenomena to Phenomenology

The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness

Philosophers traditionally recognize two main features of mental states: intentionality and phenomenal consciousness. To a first approximation, intentionality is the aboutness of mental states, and phenomenal consciousness is the felt, experiential, qualitative, or "what it's like" aspect of mental states. In the past few decades, these features have been widely assumed to be distinct and independent. But several philosophers have recently challenged this assumption, arguing that intentionality and consciousness are importantly related. This article overviews the key views on the relationship between consciousness and intentionality and describes our favored view, which is a version of the phenomenal intentionality theory, roughly the view that the most fundamental kind of intentionality arises from phenomenal consciousness.

2007

This book appears in a series-Understanding Movements in Modern Thought-that aims to provide, primarily for undergraduates, accessible and concise introductions to central philosophical themes. David Cerbone's very readable and helpful book on phenomenology certainly lives up to the series' aim. In recent years there has been an extraordinary resurgence of interest in phenomenology both in continental philosophy (with students anxious to understand the tradition which has given rise to the complex thought of Derrida, Levinas, Lacan, and others) and in analytic philosophy (where the intersection between philosophy of mind and cognitive science has stimulated interest in the first-person experience of consciousness). To assist in understanding the phenomenological movement Cerbone has contributed a very useful book that is accessible to students trained in either tradition. Cerbone explains phenomenology as follows: Phenomenology is precisely concerned with the way in which things show up or are manifest to us, with the shape and structure of manifestation. (Cerbone, p. 7) Cerbone goes on to acknowledge that phenomenology as a movement is a very broad church; nevertheless, he believes that certain key aspects of its method are quite clearly discernible, and he goes on to argue for its continued relevance for addressing issues in contemporary philosophy, including issues in the philosophy of consciousness (at the end of the book he discusses Daniel Dennett, for instance).