(Re-) Constructing the Self

This paper outlines the results of a phenomenological investigation into the nature of the self. It is a conceptual model of the composition and functional structure which is, I hope, true for all human selves. Phenomenology is biasless reflective examination of experience, in this case experience of the self. Thus, the model of the self presented is a model of the self as experienced by itself. To do phenomenology, each person must examine his or her own experience. Thus, this essay is devoted to outlining the results of my own examination of my experience of myself. By reporting these results in a language publicly available to all, I make it possible for others to compare the findings of their own reflective examination of themselves with my results, thereby making possible consensual validation or disconfirmation of assertions regarding the nature of the self. The investigation proceeds from the transcendental Self (what Husserl calls the transcendental Ego) taken as that-which-is-conscious to the empirical self, that synthetic unity of diverse elements available as objects of consciousness which each of us is, to the transcendental Self taken as agent, as that-which-acts. The transcendental Self is inherently incapable of becoming an object of consciousness, for it is that which is itself conscious. Strictly speaking we should not use a noun phrase, but should rather speak of experiencing and acting as functions of the self to which no particular experiencable objects or types of objects correspond. The empirical self is the self as available in experience to conscious examination; it is that complex of affairs of which I am or can become conscious which has or can rationally acquire the sense “me” or “mine.” It is composed of thinking and thoughts, perceptions, bodily sensations, emotions, moods, the self-concept, and deliberate and habitual action viewed from the point of view of that person whose action it is. Though composed of many elements, the self is a unity in that it is located in a single place, is embodied, and its elements are functionally related to each other and to the whole in a teleological drive toward survival, health and happiness. The self is intrinsically related to its world, to other selves, and to itself. By virtue of its relation to itself, the self is free to choose courses of action and to perform them. It is free to determine for itself ethical maxims by which to guide its actions fruitfully. Determination of such ethical maxims is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.

This is a book about the self, self-consciousness, and subjectivity. Clearly we are animal creatures, with animal bodies and animal desires and appetites. Equally clearly, we are conscious beings with interiority, able to think of ourselves as ourselves. Two influential depictions of our humanity have increasingly come to seem unworkable: the scientistic picture, that we are nothing but especially complex networks of neural firings; and the Abrahamic picture, that we are immaterial souls associated with but separable from our animal bodies. Do the Indians, who thought long and hard about the question of what it is to be a human being, have any alternative advice? I believe so. The answer I will offer arises out of my reflection upon their discussion, but is not the view of any single participant within it. My proposal will draw from Buddhist analyses of subjectivity and self-consciousness, and on other Indian theories of emergence, subconscious mechanisms, embodiment, and the emotions. What will gradually emerge from this exercise in conceptual retrieval from historical sources is a philosophical explanation of the compatibility of naturalism with the first-person stance, within the parameters of a new conception of self. Selves, embodied subjects of consciousness, come into view from the standpoint of a liberal naturalism. "Ganeri's book is truly impressive in its scope and sophistication. Even if one is not enamored of the idea of selves that are distinct from persons—as I am not—one will flnd this book a creative contribution to the discussion of persons. Although I lack the competence to judge Ganeri's interpretation of Indian texts, I highly recommend this book for its rich discussion as well as its complex account of the self. Ganeri's holistic, nonscientistic, and nonreductive approach to our mental lives will be highly congenial to those who appreciate the richness of mental life, including its flrst-personal aspects." —Lynne Rudder Baker, Review of Metaphysics 2013 "Ganeri manages the amazing feat of writing for two different audiences at once. One is Western-trained philosophers looking for answers to the puzzling questions the various properties of the self. They will find a thorough and sophisticated discussion that at the same time introduces them to a stunning set of intellectual gems from India's philosophical history. The second audience consists of scholars working on Ancient Indian materials dealing with the relation of body, mind, and self. Even though the discussion is going to be considerably more hard-going for this audience, they will find new insights into ways of thinking about the Ancient Indian discussion and the interrelation between various philosophical traditions on almost every page. The ease with which Ganeri manages to keep both audiences on board without sacrificing either philosophical sophistication, or distorting the nuances of the historical discussion by broad- brush generalizations found in less accomplished works on cross-cultural philosophical debates is nothing less than astonishing. It is no exaggeration to say that this book marks the beginning of a completely new phase in the study of Indian philosophy, one in which a firm grasp of the historical material forms the basis for going beyond pure exegesis, opening up the way for doing philosophy with ancient sources." —Jan Westerhoff, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2013 "Emergence is but one of the many important issues tackled in a book whose scope extends over a large range of philosophical puzzles about the self. There are intriguing taxonomies of theories of the mind, ancient and modern, and an abundance of critical discus- sion, including an acute critique of the Buddhist view of the self. Both because of the clarity of its grasp of the contemporary landscape in analytic philosophy of mind, and because of the special slant given by the author’s knowledge of Indian philosophy, the work has a lot to offer. While it would be unrealistic to expect from this (or perhaps any) book definitive solutions to the intractable problems of mind and body, Ganeri’s understanding of what it means to ap- proach these problems from a broadly naturalist perspective seems to me to be a good deal more nuanced, and more philosophically in- teresting, than much of the contemporary literature in the philosophy of mind." —John Cottingham, Philosophy, 2013

2014

Master's Thesis, 2014. Disclaimer: My views have changed drastically since writing this paper. While I still endorse some of its claims, I disavow others. The central work of this thesis is to compare and contrast two phenomenological notions of self: the minimal self, a Husserlian notion articulated by Dan Zahavi, and SESMET, as developed by Galen Strawson. The minimal self conception takes the self to be a kind of diachronically unified owner of experience and agent of action, but takes unification and ownership to entail more than may be justified. Strawson neglects to construe diachronicity appropriately, misconstruing the phenomenological nature of the stream and rejecting agency in toto, but covertly reintroduces agency in a metaphysical guise. Neither conception is an appropriate notion of self, but I propose a “hybrid” account that incorporates appropriately nuanced views of persistence and agency. I conclude by suggesting potential problems for this view, while highlighting its applications. In Chapter 1 I explicate and critique Strawson’s SESMET, detailing its insights into the investigation of self and developing concerns with the account. In Chapter 2 I analyze Edmund Husserl’s account of internal time-consciousness, which serves as the foundation of Zahavi’s minimal self. In Chapter 3 I link this Husserlian framework to the basic sense of self (the feeling of being a self), proceeding by philosophical and psychopathological considerations, clearly define the minimal self, compare it to SESMET, and argue that these notions are prima facie equally legitimate. In Chapter 4 I contrast these notions, focusing on issues raised throughout and the resolutions available for each “self”. I reject both notions, but use their respective strengths and weaknesses to propose a promising hybrid view. I then suggest possible faults of this view.

Psyccritiques, 2001

In the following contribution, I will outline and discuss some central elements in the phenomenological account of consciousness. Generally, one should not overestimate the homogeneity of the phenomenological tradition-a tradition inaugurated by Husserl (1859Husserl ( -1938, and comprising among its most well-known champions philosophers like Scheler, Heidegger, Schutz, Gurwitsch, Fink, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Levinas, Ricoeur, and Henry. Like any other tradition, it spans many differences. When it comes to the question concerning the relation between consciousness and selfconsciousness, however, one will fi nd a case of widespread agreement. Literally all of the major fi gures defend the view that the experiential dimension of consciousness is as such characterized by a tacit self-consciousness.

2002

The article examines some of the main theses about self-awareness developed in recent analytic philosophy of mind (especially the work of Bermúdez), and points to a number of striking overlaps between these accounts and the ones to be found in phenomenology. Given the real risk of unintended repetitions, it is argued that it would be counterproductive for philosophy of mind to ignore already existing resources, and that both analytical philosophy and phenomenology would profit from a more open exchange.

Initially, three different philosophical concepts of self are distinguished: a Kantian, a hermeneutical, and a phenomenological concept. The phenomenological concept is then analysed in detail. The first step of the analysis consists in an investigation of the first-personal givenness of phenomenal consciousness; the second step involves a discussion of different concepts of self-consciousness, a discussion which culminates in a criticism of the so-called higher-order representation theory. In conclusion, the article provides some examples of how the phenomenological concept of self may be of use in empirical science (psychiatry and developmental psychology).

The principle of transcendence, implicit in any consciousness, sets the stage for a variety of psychological experiences indispensable to being human. Can we fully claim the knowledge of all forms of psychological self-transcendence? I will present the findings concerning the robust introspective self-experience in Christian prayer, whereby transcendence is internal, and is realized as an embodied stratified self-constitution engaging the internal I-Thou. Two different forms of experience, egological and non-egological, contribute to shaping the important religious concepts of the Ladder and of the Ascent of the Soul. This experience leads to self-knowledge, and to positive characterological transformation, which in turn heals the traces of prior traumas and integrate the " shadow ". Using the example of this experience, I will show how the psychology of transcendence pushes the boundaries of neuroscience by challenging the latter to expand its old theories and generate new ones, such as non-linear dynamics or neuroquantology. I will begin with reflection on the foundational role of transcendence in human experience. Experience equals consciousness, and consciousness amounts to self-transcendence. In fact, empirical consciousness is self-transcendence: while the contents of consciousness consists of one's self and the world, consciousness is implicitly subjective. Insofar as this subjective consciousness is intertwined the world, the subject matter of psychology is the self's responses to the world. These responses were researched to a great extent, both by psychology and natural science; by contrast, the responses of consciousness to itself, which is its introspective self-knowledge, are much less researched; next to nothing has been done in terms of thematization of introspection necessary to conduct such research.

In this paper, I take up the problem of the self through bringing together the insights, while correcting some of the shortcomings, of Indo–Tibetan Buddhist and enactivist accounts of the self. I begin with an examination of the Buddhist theory of non-self (anātman) and the rigorously reductionist interpretation of this doctrine developed by the Abhidharma school of Buddhism. After discussing some of the fundamental problems for Buddhist reductionism, I turn to the enactive approach to philosophy of mind and cognitive science. I argue that human beings, as dynamic systems, are characterized by a high degree of self-organizing autonomy. Therefore, human beings are not reducible to the more basic mental and physical events that constitute them. I critically examine Francisco Varela’s enactivist account of the self as virtual and his use of Buddhist ideas in support of this view. I argue, in contrast, that while the self is emergent and constructed, it is not merely virtual. Finally I sketch a Buddhist-enactivist account of the self. I argue for a non- reductionist view of the self as an active, embodied, embedded, self-organizing process—what the Buddhists call ‘I’-making (ahaṃkāra). This emergent process of self-making is grounded in the fundamentally recursive processes that characterize lived experience: autopoiesis at the biological level, temporalization and self- reference at the level of conscious experience, and conceptual and narrative construction at the level of intersubjectivity. In Buddhist terms, I will develop an account of the self as dependently originated and empty, but nevertheless real.

Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology Vol.10 N0.3 1979, 1979