Causation and Determinate Existence of Finite Modes in Spinoza

Spinoza's rejection of Aristotelian final causation seems to create a difficulty for his account of individuation. If causation is indeed blind, how do finite modes come to assume complex, differentiated forms? And why do we find in nature a great regularity of such forms? Several recent commentators have proposed that Spinoza maintains something of the Aristotelian conception of causation where the formal essences of individuals guide the process of individuation toward certain desirable outcomes. But this sort of approach introduces other difficulties that threaten to undermine Spinoza's naturalistic framework and his ontology of immanence. This paper outlines a mechanistic and probabilistic account of individuation whereby modes are individuated by entering into relations that increase their mutual power of enduring. Together with conatus as the principle of individuation, this mechanistic this mechanistic account suffices to explain the individuation of finite bodies without introducing additional kinds of causation into Spinoza's philosophy.

International Philosophical Quarterly, 2015

The theory of ininite modes is not only one of the most controversial points in the philosophy of Spinoza, but also a kind of crossroads concept on whose clariication or interpretation the deinition of his philosophy's overall meaning depends. This article aims to examine Spinoza's theory of ininite modes, mediate and immediate, in relation to other elements of Spinoza's theory. Through an analysis of Spinoza's writings, it proposes an inner reconstruction of the theory in order to ensure the consistency of the dificulties pointed out by several critics and to provide a solution. Spinoza's identiication of immediate ininite in motion, rest, and ininite intellect involves the questions of "what" they really are and what their role is within his system. About mediate ininite modes, Spinoza talks very little and only in terms of facies totius universi. This "silence" is closely linked to the "false" problem of the deduction/mediation of the inite from the ininite, a problem for which Spinoza himself was partly responsible by his statements on motion and the need to analyze the topic in more depth.

Spinoza's bold claim that there exists only a single infinite substance entails that finite things pose a deep challenge: How can Spinoza account for their finitude and their plurality? Taking finite bodies as a test case for finite modes in general I articulate the necessary conditions for the existence of finite things. The key to my argument is the recognition that Spinoza's account of finite bodies reflects both Cartesian and Hobbesian influences. This recognition leads to the surprising realization there must be more to finite bodies than their finitude, a claim that goes well beyond the basic substance-monism claim, namely, that anything that is, is in God. This leads to the conclusion, which may seem paradoxical, that finite bodies have both an infinite as well as a finite aspect to them. Finite bodies, I argue, both actively partially determine all the other finite bodies, thereby partially causing their existence insofar as they are finite, as well as are determined by the totality of other bodies. I articulate precisely what this infinite aspect is and how it is distinct from the general substance-monism dictum. 1 The Problem of Finite Modes A predictable tension arises between Spinoza's aim to maintain that, strictly speaking, there is only a single infinite substance and his desire to account for diversity within his metaphysics. The diversity of finite things is particularly difficult to account for: not only due to their plurality, but also because of their very nature qua finite. To pinpoint what seems to be problematic about finite modes, we can consider the way Spinoza

Infinity in Early Modern Philosophy, Ohad Nachtomy and Reed Winegar (Eds), 2018

There are many aspects of the Ethics that seem to suggest the possibility of deducing finite modes from the infinite substance. This way of proceeding would track the ontological order, going from cause to effect, and from what is in itself to what is in another. In spite of the inviting and elegant nature of this top-down trajectory, once we try to actually follow it, things become complicated very quickly. In this paper I argue that a demand for an abstracted top-down trajectory is unwarranted because a top-down trajectory presupposes a previous ascent from confusion to adequacy. Furthermore, I argue that the state of confusion itself, which is our undeniable starting point, is made metaphysically possible only in virtue of there being a real plurality of modes, and hence in that sense in no need of a deduction.

Causation and Cognition in Early Modern Philosophy, 2019

Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 2022

Spinoza's own words seem to commit him to necessitarianism. Nonetheless attempts have been made to make room for contingency in Spinozism. Two impressive arguments of this kind are Curley 1969 and Newlands 2010. Both these arguments appeal to Spinoza's claim that all finite things are locked in an infinite nexus of causal relations (1p28). The question central to this paper is whether contingency can indeed be derived from an infinity of causal ancestors. The goal of the paper is twofold. First, I aim to present an alternative reading of the relation between infinity and Spinoza's concept of contingency. On my reading, while the infinity of the causal ancestry of finite things does not ground any objective metaphysical contingency on their part, it is a condition which must obtain if they are to appear as contingent. Second, I aim to challenge the derivations of contingency from infinity mentioned above. I will do so by targeting Curley's assumption that propositions rather than things are the main bearers of modality. On Newlands' interpretation, the conceivability of things as either contingent or necessary makes the world more perfect than it would otherwise have been. By drawing upon Spinoza's analysis of "negative" properties (such as evil), I question whether beliefs about contingency contribute to the perfection of the world in virtue of truly attributing the property of objective contingency to things.

Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 2020

I address an apparent conflict between Spinoza’s concepts ofimmanent causationandacting/doing [agere]. Spinoza apparently holds that an immanent causeundergoes [patitur]whatever itdoes. Yet according to his stated definition of acting and undergoing in theEthics, this is impossible; to act is to be anadequatecause, while to undergo is to be merely a partial cause. Spinoza also seems committed to God’s being the adequate cause of all things, and, in a well-known passage, appears to deny categorically that God is capable of undergoing. How then can God also be the immanent cause of all things, as Spinoza claims? On the basis of a close reading of the passage in question, I argue that Spinoza actually distinguishes between two senses of undergoing. An immanent cause undergoes not by being a partial cause but rather by being themetaphysical subjectof its effect. While this sense of undergoing has its roots in scholasticism, Spinoza’s willingness to attribute such a capacity to undergo t...

In this paper I suggest a new interpretation of the relations of inherence, causation and conception in Spinoza. I discuss the views of Don Garrett on this issue and argue against Della Rocca's recent suggestion that a strict endorsement of the PSR leads necessarily to the identification of the relations of inherence, causation and conception. I argue that (1) Spinoza never endorsed this identity, and (2) that Della Rocca's suggestion could not be considered as a legitimate reconstruction or friendly amendment to Spinoza's system because it creates several severe and irresolvable problems in the system. In the first part of the paper, I present the considerations and arguments that motivated Don Garrett's and Della Rocca's interpretations. In the second part, I present and examine several problems that result from Della Rocca's reading. In the third and final part, I (1) present my own view on the relation among inherence, causation, and conception; (2) offer a new interpretation of the conceived through relation in Spinoza; and finally, (3) defend and justify the presence of (non-arbitrary) bifurcations at the very center of Spinoza's system.

The main claim of this paper is that, in Spinoza's metaphysics, causal relations are more basic than relationships of conceptual dependence. I will support this claim in two parts. I will first show that Della Rocca's main argument for the claim that causation is identical to conceptual dependence (which he calls " explicability argument ") does not work as an interpretive principle for Spinoza's philosophy. I will also show that texts that are usually interpreted as supporting the equivalence of causation and conceptual dependence do not unequivocally support it. In the second part of this paper, I will show that there are several reasons to think that the relationship of causation is more basic than the relationship of conceptual dependence, such as the fact that the relationships among ideas themselves are first and foremost causal. Della Rocca: PSR, causation and existence.