David Hume on Race

The Scottish Enlightenment has often been regarded by historical scholarship as having paved the way for the abolition of African chattel slavery in the 19th century due to their early critiques of the practice contained in their philosophical writings. Of particular interest is David Hume, whose essay ‘Of the populousness of ancient nations’ is widely regarded as being one of the earliest critiques of slavery from the Scottish literati and a milestone in the movement toward the change in attitudes of the British public toward seeing slavery as an unacceptable institution. Despite Hume’s infamous other writings which are considered to be exceptionally racist, enlightenment scholars have often argued, on the strength of the above mentioned essay, that these ‘side remarks’ are an aberration and not representative of ‘the good David’s’ true sentiments. This paper contests the long accepted view that Hume’s essay ‘Of the populousness of ancient nations’ represents his rejection of contemporary colonial slavery, but instead that the essay represents a denial of its true nature. By comparing the essay to his other writings on the topic and on other writings dealing with personal liberty, this paper argues that Hume cannot be considered a proto-abolitionist but merely a political pragmatist who regarded individual liberty as being secondary to national interest.

Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2023

The new two volume edition of Hume’s Essays, Moral, Political and Literary, edited by Tom Beauchamp and Mark Box, is the first critical edition.[3] What primarily distinguishes a critical edition is that it collates the copy-text with all other editions and provides a complete record of variations in the texts. Beauchamp and Box provide readers with detailed, informative notes and annotations that describe the variations and revisions that have been made to the Essays published within Hume’s lifetime. They also provide a table that catalogues the contents of the various editions from 1741 to 1771 and several helpful appendixes relating to their publication. The final text of the essays has been carefully edited and annotated. The second volume contains the editors’ extensive annotations, which are both informed and illuminating. All the editorial work has been done with enormous attention to detail and precision....

Political Studies (forthcoming), 2024

David Hume alluded to the politics of slaveholding throughout his career and was among the first to observe that the republican tradition has an awkward relationship with slavery. This article places Hume's critique of Roman slavery in conversation with recent debates over 'neo-Roman' liberty, paying special attention to Hume's complaint that some republican advocates for political liberty have also apologized for personal slavery. Most of Hume's direct comments on slaveholding appear in the essay, 'Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations' (1752), where Hume criticized Roman slavery for its negative effects on population growth. But more was at stake than ancient demography. Even abolitionists who abhorred Hume's racism still drew upon his argument against ancient slavery-which they read as a commentary on the modern colonies.

SAGE, 2017

As a response to the question posed in the title, this article presents a critical assessment of how the works of the nationalist– ideological philosophers can be seen as evidence against David Hume’s and Immanuel Kant’s ideas of race. Hume and Kant have certain ideas about race; if these ideas are true, then there is—and indeed, can be—no African philosophy. But there is African philosophy—that of nationalist–ideological philosophy; therefore, Hume’s and Kant’s ideas about race are incorrect.

Journal of the History of Philosophy, 2009

Upon the whole, we may conclude, that the Christian Religion not only was at first attended with miracles, but even at this day cannot be believed by any reasonable person without one.' (Hume, 'Of Miracles', Enquiries ). Critically outline and discuss Hume's essay 'Of Miracles' as an attack on the foundations of religion. In discussing this topic also provide an argument to show whether Hume uses irony as part of his strategy.

2016

This paper urges a reconsideration of Hume’s role in the philosophy of history. It begins by challenging the common perception of Hume as a proto-positivist hoping to draw from history a mechanical causal account of the unchanging human nature. It draws attention instead to his grasp of historical contingency, the sui generis nature of the social world, and the complexity of the relationships of recognition and identity-formation which structure its operation. The paper goes on to examine Hume’s position in the light of the idea of the historicity of human nature. It is argued that Hume could be perfectly comfortable with the idea of changes in human nature as well as with the contextual dependence of terms in which human nature comes to define and redefine itself over time. What Hume cannot countenance is the prospect of a radical discontinuity within human nature, the potential significance of which is downplayed by his methodological reliance, qua a historian, on critical common sense and the moralistic vocabulary of folk psychology associated with it.

The missing shade of blue is an alleged counter-example to Hume’s theory of “perceptions” raised by Hume himself (Hume, [1748] 2011: §2.16). This essay proceeds as follows; firstly, a brief summary of Hume’s ([1748] 2011) conceptual distinctions regarding perceptions and the empiricist principle; secondly, the problem of the missing shade of blue counter-example; responses to the missing shade of blue; assessing these responses and addressing other issues with Humean empiricism; finally, assessing the viability of a Humean empiricism. As a result, this essay will argue that Hume is correct in his assessment of the missing shade of blue and that, furthermore, the correct solution to this issue (and the correct account of the empiricist principle) is as a purely empirical claim that does not require any significant revision to Hume’s core position.

2013

In this paper I try to explain a strange omission in Hume's methodological descriptions in his first Enquiry. In the course of this explanation I reveal a kind of rationalistic tendency of the latter work. It seems to contrast with "experimental method" of his early Treatise of Human Nature, but, as I show that there is no discrepancy between the actual methods of both works, I make an attempt to explain the change in Hume's characterization of his own methods. This attempt leads to the question about his interpretation of the science of human nature. I argue that his view on this science was not a constant one and that initially he identified this science with his account of passions. As this presupposes the primacy of Book 2 of his Treatise I try to find new confirmations of the old hypothesis that this Book had been written before the Book 1, dealing with understanding. Finally, I show that this discussion of Hume's methodology may be of some interest to proponents of conceptual analysis. Every Hume scholar knows that in his Treatise of Human Nature Hume constructs a "science of human nature", or "science of man", which, as he believes, is a basis of other sciences; and that he is sure that "the only solid foundation we can give to this science itself must be laid on experience and observation" 1. Indeed, according to the subtitle of the Treatise, it was "an attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects". Hume confirms this position in his Abstract of the Treatise. Here he writes that in the Treatise its author "proposes to anatomize human nature in a regular manner, and promises to draw no conclusions but where he is authorized by experience" (T Abstract. 2; SBNT 646). So, Hume's position seems to be clear enough. And it is quite natural to expect that this is the end of story. Of course, Hume published other books dealing with his science of man, but it is widely held that in them, and, in particular, in An