The Fate of Iraq

Middle East Policy, 2002

I. Ness, Z. Cope (eds.), The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Imperialism and Anti-Imperialism., 2019

The period of no-peace no-war that followed the ceasefire with Iran in August 1988 exposed the imbalances in the Iraqi polity and society. Iraq looked like a giant trying to balance himself on a tightrope and though quite successful, the inherent dangers in the situation could not be overlooked. If geographically Iraq emerged from the war intact, the outcome was less clear-cut on the national level. About 20% of the Iraqi population — the Kurds — proved they were " Kurds first, " and it was now the task of the rulers in Baghdad to inculcate them with the Iraqi patriotism which they had always rejected, and to integrate them forcibly into the national body. The Hashemite family, which had ruled Iraq from 1921-58 and which the Ba'th had vilified as a symbol of anti-Iraqism, was now suddenly raised from the ashes to provide the depth lacking in Iraq's modern history and nationalism. This search for positive symbols of unity was complemented by energetic efforts to reconstruct both ancient Babylon and the modern cities and towns which had been damaged during the eight-year-long war. But the manipulation of history did not hide the problems of the present and the growing pressures for change in the totalitarian system. The regime attempted to swim with the tide by declaring its commitment to democracy, but it did little more than make cosmetic changes. The disliked Ba'th Party was losing more and more ground, but no alternatives were allowed to emerge. Nor was a free press tolerated beyond providing a safety valve for public frustration. This frustration was sharpened by the lack of progress in the peace talks with Iran, by the serious economic and social dislocations which both the war and the move toward privatization had caused, and finally by the heavy expenditures on the standing Army and the development of military industry. If Iraqis had expected that the end of the war would alleviate pressures and better their economic conditions, they were deeply disappointed. The military industrialization gained further impetus after the war, throwing into relief the imbalance between a developed arms industry and a fragile economy, between a strong Army and a weakened society. Displaying Iraq's military might became an important device not only for quelling dissent at home but also for promoting Iraq's standing abroad. The conventional and nonconventional arms in its arsenal and the reputation it had gained by using them were manipulated by Iraq to deter Iran from renewing the fighting. In also signaling its peaceful intentions toward Iran, Iraq often threatened Israel, thus attempting to strike a renewed balance between its orientations on the Gulf and on the Fertile Crescent. Iraq's self-projection as a regional power encouraged it to stake a claim, however disguised, to a leading role in the Arab world. Though the general atmosphere in the Arab arena was no longer congenial to such a role, Baghdad came to be viewed

International Journal of Emerging Markets, 2007

Purpose -To shed light on the political economy aspect of post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq and illustrate how bad governance and economic mismanagement has devastated a country once endowed with abundant natural and human resources. Design/methodology/approach -The wealth of heritage, culture, and economy that Iraq enjoyed is highlighted. The paper presents a brief overview of economic mismanagement, corruption, and political blunders of Saddam Hussein's regime, which led to sapping the country of its wealth and degraded its human resources. In view of that, the political impediments to the reconstruction process are outlined. Hence, the significance of democratic and participatory approaches to sustainable development. Findings -The paper reveals that the years of oppressive, myopic, and self-serving policies of Saddam Hussein's regime have incapacitated Iraq and its people. Income per capita in 2003 was less than 15 percent of its value in 1980 and Iraq's debt amounted to about 600 percent of national output. The paper also indicates that international, regional, and local politics has been the primary hindrance to Iraq's reconstruction and development. Originality/value -If history is any guide, the peoples of all non-democratic and corrupt regimes throughout the world ought to heed the lessons imparted by the Saddam's model of governance, that is, sustainable economic development and improving the standards of living can best be attained through democratic and participatory governance.

International Journal of Middle East Studies, 2011

This article examines the role that the US’ intransigent foreign policy played in the creation of the critical state Iraq now finds itself in. It also analyses the influence recent changes to US polices may play in the restructuring of the Iraqi state. Since the 2003 invasion the US has backed a centralised Iraq and its over-commitment to this solution blinded it to the unconstitutional acts and growing authoritarianism under Nuri al-Maliki. It took the rise of the Islamic State for the US to finally change their policies away from championing a strong centralised state and towards a more federal Iraq. At the same time, US foreign policy in Iraq does not have the leverage it once had, with Iran – who still favours a centralised state – having far more influence. Correspondingly, this article argues that the US completely misunderstood the situation in Iraq and their diminishing influence compounds this mistake. It also makes it harder for the US to play a major role in bringing about the much-needed changes to the Iraqi political system.

Third World Quarterly, 2005

The Iraqi state is not representing Iraq in a globalising world: it is representing the globalising world in Iraq. The fact that the USA physically occupied Iraq, installed a government and passed a raft of legislation by decree might suggest almost total US dominance over broader globalising forces and thus that the Iraqi state is almost solely an instrument of US empire. Certainly, Iraq's imperial globalisation from above is not primarily decentred in terms of the actors involved or the interests served: US actors and interests are at the forefront. However, other actors have played a significant role, and the actions of the US agents have tended to favour US political power and the US-based fraction of capital less than the fact of occupation would suggest. Furthermore, this advantage has declined over time. In addition, there is a second force for decentred globalisation in Iraq, namely, globalisation from below by means of the workings of the transborder informal economy. Many but not all of the activities of this informal economy are closely related to the insurgency. The interaction of all these forces is generating sometimes competing and sometimes mutually reinforcing effects, and these effects are highly contingent and continue to be contested. What has been the relationship between the Iraqi state, on the one hand, and globalising processes and actors, on the other, after the dissolution of the US-dominated Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the installation by the Coalition of the Iraqi Interim Government on 28 June 2004? Most of the debate has focused on a traditionally liberal theme of the locus of sovereignty, that is, final authority exercised effectively and legally by a discrete state apparatus over a bounded territory and citizenry. From this perspective the debate is over the extent to which the Iraqi state has become sovereign. The first position is that the Iraqi state is now fully sovereign, as it has had sovereignty transferred to it by an external body, and thus the acts of its government are contingent solely upon the decisions of Iraqis. The second position is that Iraq is incompletely but potentially sovereign: the Interim Government remains hemmed in by the restrictions imposed upon it by external powers and by its own limited abilities, both of which are obstacles that can be alleviated through the process of state building and the exclusion Eric Herring is in the

Foreign Affairs, 2001

List of illustrations page ix Chronology x Glossary xvi Map  Iraq: principal towns xviii Map  Basra, Kuwait and the Shatt al-Arab xix Map  Iraq in the Middle East xx Re-establishing the regime  vii Thwarted liberalisation  Foreign policies: Arab issues, Palestine and the Portsmouth Treaty  Economic development and party politics  Nuri al-Sa id: the politics of reform and repression  Nuri al-Sa id: foreign initiatives and domestic challenges  The coup d'état of    The republic -  Abd al-Karim Qasim: dictatorship and disillusion  Iraqi foreign policy under Qasim  The politics of conspiracy and the coup d'état of February   Ba thist control and loss of control in   Abd al-Salam Arif: Nasserist aspirations and Iraqi realities  Patrimonialism and the rule of the clan  Abd al-Rahman Arif: a weakening hold on power   The Ba th and the rule of Saddam Husain  Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr and the consolidation of power  Kurdish and Shi i challenges and relations with Iran  Economic patronage, political control and foreign policy alignments  War in Kurdistan  Oil revenues, foreign policies and the rise of Saddam Husain  Saddam Husain's presidency and the war with Iran in   Defending the regime and Iraq after   A war of attrition -    Resistance among the Kurds and the Shi a  The aftermath of war and the invasion of Kuwait -  The war for Kuwait and the uprisings of   Iraq under sanctions and the long aftermath of the Gulf war  The resilience of Saddam Husain's regime  Kurdish autonomy and Kurdish politics  The limitations of opposition  Conclusion  Notes  Bibliography  Further reading and research  Index  viii Contents Illustrations

2005

ABSTRACT The Iraqi state is not representing Iraq in a globalising world. it is representing the globalising world in Iraq. The fact that the USA physically occupied Iraq, installed a government and passed a raft of legislation by decree might suggest almost total US dominance over ...