Altruism across disciplines: one word, multiple meanings

The integration of an evolutionary origin of human behavior with the capacity to symbolically idealize concepts such as altruism may help our understanding of the human yearning for transcendence and its biological roots. Biological adaptation has somehow created a brain that yearns for transcendent idealizations of behavior beyond our capability such as utopian ideals of altruism. We explore whether or not evolutionary explanations of altruism show that self-sacrificial behavior is a biological adaptation, a transcendent ideal, or some combination of the two. Using adoption of non-relatives as a model, we review existing data to determine if adoption behavior is altruism or if sociobiological explanations sufficiently show it to be egoistic. Human adoption practices are mostly amenable to evolutionary explanations. The best one can say about most adoption practices with respect to self-sacrifice is that they exhibit pro-social behavior, not altruism. In those few cases where adoption appears to be genetically altruistic, the behavior is most often explained as mis-directed adaptive behavior. To explain the exceptions that still exist, celibates who adopt, in this way is a form of question begging; this behavior deserves a more nuanced description. Although most adoptions are a result of pro-social behavior at best or mis-directed adaptation at worse, we still idealize the concept of adoption as altruism (genetic selfsacrifice), admiring the rare celibates willing to sacrifice reproductive imperatives to raise others' children. Therefore, altruism can be realized within a few who develop in an environment emphasizing transcendent conceptions. It appears that our ability to symbolically idealize altruism makes humans unique considering that our ability to biologically achieve it seems highly limited. Provided we continue striving to meet the ideal, humans can foster hope and purpose rooted in an eschatological future rather than a present reality.

In evolutionary biology, an organism is said to behave altruistically when its behaviour benefits other organisms, at a cost to itself. The costs and benefits are measured in terms of reproductive fitness, or expected number of offspring. So by behaving altruistically, an organism reduces the number of offspring it is likely to produce itself, but boosts the number that other organisms are likely to produce. This biological notion of altruism is not identical to the everyday concept. In everyday parlance, an action would only be called 'altruistic' if it was done with the conscious intention of helping another. But in the biological sense there is no such requirement. Indeed, some of the most interesting examples of biological altruism are found among creatures that are (presumably) not capable of conscious thought at all, e.g. insects. For the biologist, it is the consequences of an action for reproductive fitness that determine whether the action counts as altruistic, not the intentions, if any, with which the action is performed. Altruistic behaviour is common throughout the animal kingdom, particularly in species with complex social structures. For example, vampire bats regularly regurgitate blood and donate it to other members of their group who have failed to feed that night, ensuring they do not starve. In numerous bird species, a breeding pair receives help in raising its young from other 'helper' birds, who protect the nest from predators and help to feed the fledglings. Vervet monkeys give alarm calls to warn fellow monkeys of the presence of predators, even though in doing so they attract attention to themselves, increasing their personal chance of being attacked. In social insect colonies (ants, wasps, bees and termites), sterile workers devote their whole lives to caring for the queen, constructing and protecting the nest, foraging for food, and tending the larvae. Such behaviour is maximally altruistic: sterile workers obviously do not leave any offspring of their own — so have personal fitness of zero — but their actions greatly assist the reproductive efforts of the queen. From a Darwinian viewpoint, the existence of altruism in nature is at first sight puzzling, as Darwin himself realized. Natural selection leads us to expect animals to behave in ways that increase their own chances of survival and reproduction, not those of others. But by behaving altruistically an animal reduces its own fitness, so should be at a selective disadvantage vis-à-vis one which behaves selfishly. To see this, imagine that some members of a group of Vervet monkeys give alarm calls when they see predators, but others do not. Other things being equal, the latter will have an advantage. By selfishly refusing to give an alarm call, a monkey can reduce the chance that it will itself be attacked, while at the same time benefiting from the alarm calls of others. So we should expect natural selection to favour those monkeys that do not give alarm calls over those that do. But this raises an immediate puzzle. How did the alarm-calling behaviour evolve in the first place, and why has it not been eliminated by natural selection? How can the existence of altruism be reconciled with basic Darwinian principles? 1. Altruism and the Levels of Selection The problem of altruism is intimately connected with questions about the level at which natural selection acts. If selection acts exclusively at the individual level, favouring some individual organisms over others, then it seems that altruism cannot evolve, for behaving altruistically is disadvantageous for the individual organism itself, by definition. However, it is possible that altruism may be advantageous at the group level. A group containing lots of altruists, each ready to subordinate their own selfish interests for the greater good of the group, may well have a survival advantage over a group composed mainly or exclusively of selfish

Those with an interest in the origin of altruism have to deal with an unnecessary complicating factor; an intrusion by evolutionary biologists into the discussion, which has had serious negative outcomes. The ascendancy of gene-centric thinking in evolutionary biology led to the perceived need to analyse altruism in a way that is consistent with the gene-centric world view. That is, with evolution being seen incorrectly as a process of continuous struggle and competition from which the development of selfishness and individuality are allegedly inevitable, the very existence of altruism was a challenge to that view. Two linked definitions were involved in solving the problem of altruism, biological altruism and biological fitness. (1) Biological fitness is seen as the capacity of an organism to produce adult offspring. Biological altruism is an act which lowers the fitness of the actor while raising the fitness of the recipient. The alleged existence of biological altruism means that we now see the existence of two forms, biological and psychological altruism. The difference between the two is explained here; " This biological notion of altruism is not identical to the everyday concept. In everyday parlance, an action would only be called 'altruistic' if it was done with the conscious intention of helping another. But in the biological sense there is no such requirement. Indeed, some of the most interesting examples of biological altruism are found among creatures that are (presumably) not capable of conscious thought at all, e.g. insects. For the biologist, it is the consequences of an action for reproductive fitness that determine whether the action counts as altruistic, not the intentions, if any, with which the action is performed. " (2) It was W.D. Hamilton's 1964 work on inclusive fitness that allowed altruism to be drawn into the propaganda web to which modern evolutionary orthodoxy has been reduced.

2000

As one might have deduced from the few comments I offered in our course, DNA, Evolution and the Soul, the idea of the self and the pursuit of ones own growth, betterment and fulfillment occupy the position of central importance in my mind and heart. Within a seminarian setting, amidst many companions preparing themselves for lives of social leadership, group dynamics and moral guidance within the clergy, my own incentives, philosophy and spiritual practice often seem (to me at least) to stand at odds with the majority. Self-criticism and self-doubt mask the, often purposively hidden, foundation of guilt which underlies much of my personal perspective. 1 When Professor Pollack suggested that we choose a topic in the realm of science and religion which makes us uncomfortable, I decided to address the question of whether altruistic behavior in humans can be comprehensively explained within biological theory; namely the schools of evolutionary, behavioral and genetic science. If so, then to what degree can such behavior, and its seemingly moral focus on the well-being of another, be considered to distinguish human beings from other animal species? Furthermore, to what extent may altruistic, seemingly selfless and morally 'good' behavior be explained through, and thus attributed to, selfish 2

Journal of Economic Psychology, 2004

Altruism is generally understood to be behavior that benefits others at a personal cost to the behaving individual. However, within evolutionary biology, different authors have interpreted the concept of altruism differently, leading to dissimilar predictions about the evolution of altruistic behavior. Generally, different interpretations diverge on which party receives the benefit from altruism and on how the cost of altruism is assessed. Using a simple trait-group framework, we delineate the assumptions underlying different interpretations and show how they relate to one another. We feel that a thorough examination of the connections between interpretations not only reveals why different authors have arrived at disparate conclusions about altruism, but also illuminates the conditions that are likely to favor the evolution of altruism.

The profound benefits of altruism in modern society are self-evident. However, the potential hurtful aspects of altruism have gone largely unrecognized in scientific inquiry. This is despite the fact that virtually all forms of altruism are associated with tradeoffs-some of enormous importance and sensitivity-and notwithstanding that examples of pathologies of altruism abound. Presented here are the mechanistic bases and potential ramifications of pathological altruism, that is, altruism in which attempts to promote the welfare of others instead result in unanticipated harm. A basic conceptual approach toward the quantification of altruism bias is presented. Guardian systems and their over arching importance in the evolution of cooperation are also discussed. Concepts of pathological altruism, altruism bias, and guardian systems may help open many new, potentially useful lines of inquiry and provide a framework to begin moving toward a more mature, scientifically informed understanding of altruism and cooperative behavior. cooperation | empathy | codependency | narcissism | philanthropy Reality must take precedence over public relations, for nature cannot be fooled.

Zygon®, 2010

One of the central tenets of Christian theology is the denial of self for the benefit of another. However, many views on the evolution of altruism presume that natural selection inevitably leads to a self-seeking human nature and that altruism is merely a façade to cover underlying selfish motives. I argue that human altruism is an emergent characteristic that cannot be reduced to any one particular evolutionary explanation. The evolutionary processes at work in the formation of human nature are not necessarily in conflict with the possibility of altruism; rather, aspects of human nature are uniquely directed toward the care and concern of others. The relationship between altruism, human nature, and evolution can be reimagined by adopting an emergent view of the hierarchy of science and a theological worldview that emphasizes self-renunciation. The investigation of altruism necessitates an approach that analyzes several aspects of altruistic behavior at different levels in the hierarchy of sciences. This research includes the study of evolutionary adaptations, neurological systems, cognitive functions, behavioral traits, and cultural influences. No one level is able to offer a full explanation, but each piece adds a unique dimension to a much larger puzzle.

Recently, a number of prominent evolutionary biologists have contested the theory of kin selection and have in turn been strongly challenged by the majority of their colleagues. The heated nature of the argument over the role of kin and group selection in the evolution of altruism is a testament to the ways in which vested interests and intellectual territory disputes play out in scientific proceedings. However, a closer look at the history of attempts to understand the evolution of altruism, going back to Darwin, suggests that something more than mere academic sword-fighting is going on. There is a long history of social and biological thought intermingling and influencing each other when it comes to the study of social behavior. A consideration of this history, alongside a consideration of possible significant parallels in the evolution of sociality in nature and in man, may help to make better sense of why an entire community is up in arms about ants.

Acta Biotheoretica, 2005

This paper defends the position that the supposed gap between biological altruism and psychological altruism is not nearly as wide as some scholars (e.g., Elliott Sober) insist. Crucial to this defense is the use of James Mark Baldwin's concepts of "organic selection" and "social heredity" to assist in revealing that the gap between biological and psychological altruism is more of a small lacuna. Specifically, this paper argues that ontogenetic behavioral adjustments, which are crucial to individual survival and reproduction, are also crucial to species survival. In particular, it is argued that human psychological altruism is produced and maintained by various sorts of mimicry and self-reflection in the aid of both individual and species survival. The upshot of this analysis is that it is possible to offer an account of psychological altruism that is closely tethered to biological altruism without reducing entirely the former to the latter.

Evolutionary Biological Science

We argue that some organisms are altruistically motivated and such altruistic motivation is adaptive. We lay out the helper’s decision problem—determining whether to help another organism. We point out that there are more ways of solving this problem than most people recognize. Specifically, we distinguish two kinds of altruistic motivations, depending on whether a desire to help is produced for one’s own sake or for others’ sake. We identify circumstances in which either kind of psychological altruism provides the most adaptive solution to the helper’s decision problem. As a result, we show that both kinds of psychological altruism are likely to be instantiated and selected for.

British Journal of Psychology, 2009

The current response discusses the insightful commentaries by Dale Hay (2009) and Karen Wynn (2009) on the proposal that human altruism has deep roots both in phylogeny and ontogeny (Warneken & Tomasello, 2009). In particular, I focus on (a) what observational and experimental methods can reveal about altruistic motivations in children, (b) Wynn’s idea that early altruism might confer a selective advantage to the infants themselves, and (c) how recent findings on young children’s social ontology will enable us to test the hypothesis that ontogeny proceeds from rather global to more differentiated altruistic behaviours.

christineclavien.ch