Epicurean education and the rhetoric of concern

Journal of Student Research, 2021

Ancient Greece gave rise to many prominent philosophical figures. Of these, a notable academic was Epicurus (341-270 BC), a Samoan who was influential in the development of the Stoic school of thought. While Epicurus's scholarship includes several subject areas, he is most notable for his work in ethics and egoism. As a subset of this philosophical field, Epicurus investigates the role of a selfless, virtuous friendship in the cultivation of a moral life, as well as the need for a selfish and rational egoism. Thus, as scholars have pointed out, the notions of selfless friendship and self-interest egoism, while maintained parallelly by Epicurus, seem to be in tension with each other. This paper examines the relationship between an ideal Epicurean friendship and Epicurus's concept of egoism, and attempts to resolve both notions under a reading of rule egoism.

Emidio Spinelli, 2019

After a short introduction to Epicurus’s theories about the origins of social groups and after presenting some key concepts related to his more general approach to politics, the paper will focus on the Epicurean notions of justice, law, friendship, and the philosophical community. Considerable space will be given both to the complex idea of the preconception/prolepsis of justice, which is also linked to some questions that are epistemologically crucial for Epicurean doctrine, and to its origins and evolution. By examining Epicurus’s Principle Doctrines (especially XXXI-XXXVIII), but also by usefully checking the evidence offered by Hermarchus (esp. fr. 34 Longo Auricchio) – the first scholarch of the Garden after Epicurus’s death – and Lucretius (esp. DRN, Book V), one can hope to reconstruct a global picture of the ‘relativity’ of justice as well as the role of law against the background of the Epicurean engagement with previous political theories. In this respect, the paper will show both that Epicurus’s solutions can be compared (although not equated) with some old ideas defended by the sophistic movement and that they have as their main target Plato’s absolute notion of Justice (especially in the Republic). Rather than presenting this ‘in its own right’ or physei, Epicurus insists that to dikaion can be only thought of as an agreement rooted in mutual human dealings, which should therefore always be considered in its strict relationship with what is useful, since it has a strong yet exclusively symbolic value and acts as a powerful warning “to prevent one man from harming or being harmed by another” (see KD XXXI). What this doctrine tries to establish is a difficult equilibrium between physis and nomos. In other words, it presents politics as a sort of wavering compromise between natural elements on the one hand and conventional obedience to social rules on the other. From an historical point of view, it must be interpreted as a peculiar and original reaction to the new circumstances brought about by the crisis of the Greek polis and its social and political structures, and the emergence of new political realms after Alexander The Great’s death. Against many (malevolent and polemical) ancient sources – as well as several modern scholars – and their attempt to depict Epicurus’s attitude to politics by taking his famous maxim ‘live unnoticed’ (lathe biosas) à la lettre, the paper will try to give a more careful reading of this famous statement. It will show that what one finds in this and many others passages is rather a sort of primitive but clear form of ‘political contractualism’ or ‘juridical conventionalism’ ante litteram, based on the notion of strict and useful control over mutual social exchanges. That means that according to Epicurus there is no absolute and unchangeable notion of justice: justice is indeed linked to mutual relationships, which can obviously change according to different times and places (as is the case with the birth and evolution of language: see Letter to Herodotus 75-76). More in-depth: if there is justice, there is a mutual and useful agreement (this precisely the unalterable core of the prolepsis of justice), but this agreement (for example the laws of a polis) can vary on the basis of different historical and geographical conditions. This kind of reciprocal benefit becomes the basic element for shaping our condition of political security or asphaleia, although it does not exhaust the complete range of Epicurus’s ideas about the relationship between human beings. Besides and apart from such a form of external control, which is certainly useful but still ethically feeble or even insufficient, Epicurean doctrine aims to put at the core of any productive human action something else and more personal, namely the best means we have to ensure happiness throughout our life: friendship or better, as we read in KD XXVII, not the abstract notion of philia, but rather the concrete praxis of it – the actual possession of friendship, especially within a philosophical community (as clearly exemplified by the concrete concern shown by Mithres the Syrian, an attendant of Lysimachus, to economically contribute to the Epicurean school). The circle of friends in the Garden, envisaged as the perfect form of society, is the final Epicurean answer to all political problems (although from several sources we learn that the Epicureans were also involved in political activities, as in the case of Idomeneus of Lampsacus for example: politics, therefore, is not necessarily evil in itself, but can become a detrimental practice in specific historical situations and particular instances). The establishment of circle of friends guarantees that reciprocal exchanges will be based not on superficial or opportunistic attitudes on the part of the moral agents, but on a full and conscious agreement among them about a common, solid and unchangeable Weltanschauung.

Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal

In full-fledged practical wisdom the correct conception of doing well. with the understanding that the worthwhileness that it embraces is pre-eminent, is so ingrained into one's motivational make-up that when an action is singled out as doing well. any attractions that alternatives might have are seen as having no bearing on the question what to do. An incontinent or continent person has a flawed approximation to practical wisdom . He has.

2014

Faculté des arts et des sciences Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maîtres ès arts (M.A.) en philosophie. Août 2013 © Fabian Garcia, 2013 Ultimately, as an exercise, it has helped see joy in the world and discover new friends. And this echoes even beyond the harshest critiques and my often estranged ambition. I thank Horst Hutter. From no one else have I better understood the healing value of philosophy. I am deeply thankful to him for offering me his guidance both as teacher and friend. I am also thankful to professor Richard Bodéüs for giving me the freedom to explore Hadot's ideas concerning the predominance of ethics in ancient philosophy. His work has certainly inspired my life and these pages. Finally, I thank my friends, my partner and my children for all the great chats and support and especially for being such great part of my day-today life, for allowing me to test over and over again the value of the things I learn and still be there with me.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.

2nd Applied Positive Psychology Symposium Proceedings of Presented Papers, 2016

The wisdom doctrines of the Ancient Greek philosophical schools provide modern Positive Psychologists with readymade templates for developing empirically testable models of what it means to live 'the good life'. However, while PP has long recognised the foundational contribution of Aristotle to concepts such as eudaimonia, and modern cognitive therapies acknowledge Stoicism as their common ancestor, far less attention has been paid to the ethical-therapeutic system of Epicurus of Samos (341-270 BCE), whose take on notions such as 'virtue' and what it means to live 'the good life' is sometimes surprisingly forward-thinking, sometimes radically different from that of Aristotle et al, and sometimes presents a direct challenge to modern PP notions of, for example, meaning or what constitutes a positive emotion. This paper examines what PP can learn from Epicurus. Following Wong's (2011) prescription for developing a new 'PP 2.0' in which 'moral psychology' assumes a greater importance than is currently the case in PP, Epicureanism is discussed under the rubric of Wong's 'four pillars' of PP 2.0, namely: 'virtue, meaning, resilience, and well-being.'

Apeiron, 2002

Academia.edu

In a postmodern era where philosophy operates as an autonomous mode of inquiry, this paper explores the ancient Greek philosophies of Stoicism and Epicureanism through an interdisciplinary lens. Encountered by the Apostle Paul in Acts 17 on the Areopagus Hill in Athens, these contrasting schools of thought offer unique perspectives on attaining fulfilment and navigating life's complexities. The paper examines the core principles, strengths, and critiques of Stoicism and Epicureanism as independent philosophical systems, untethered from the constraints of science and religion. Drawing from scholarly discourse, it evaluates the relevance of these philosophies in addressing the multifaceted social challenges faced by the postmillennial generation in the post-COVID world. By synthesizing insights from various disciplines, the paper presents a framework for applying Stoic concepts of virtue, reason, and acceptance alongside Epicurean ideals of pleasure and freedom from perturbation. It proposes strategies for youth to cultivate resilience, self-discovery, and personal growth by judiciously integrating principles from these ancient philosophies into their modern lived experiences.