Liberty and Leviathan

Jurisprudence, 2010

INTRODUCTION Hobbes's definition and use of the term 'liberty' has been and continues to be the subject of much debate within Hobbes scholarship. The change in definition from De Cive 1 to Leviathan 2 is one such focus of commentary; 3 another is his purported change in definition between applications of 'liberty' to the state of nature and to civil society. 4 Other commentators also discuss his use in Leviathan of more than one meaning for the term. 5 The focus of a recent study is Hobbes's purported rejection of the rich 'republican' traditional understanding of liberty, in order to champion a radically restricted application of the term to mean nothing more than the absence of external impediments to one's actions. 6 In this article I examine (2010) 1 Jurisprudence 85-104 85

The Journal of Politics, 1997

Freedom in the sense of free will is a multiway power to do any one of a number of things, leaving it up to us which one of a range of options by way of action we perform. What are the ethical implications of our possession of such a power? The paper examines the pre-Hobbesian scholastic view of writers such as Peter Lombard and Francisco Suarez: freedom as a multiway power is linked to the right to liberty understood as a right to exercise that power, and to liberation as a desirable goal involving the perfection of that power. Freedom as a power, liberty as a right, and liberation as a desirable goal, are all linked within this scholastic view to a distinctive theory of law as constituting, in its primary form of natural law, the normative recognition of human freedom. Hobbes's denial of the very existence of freedom as a power led him to a radical revision both of the theory of law and of the relation of law to liberty. Law and liberty were no longer harmonious phenomena, but were left in essential conflict. One legacy of Hobbes is the attempt to base a theory of law and liberty not on freedom as a multiway power, but on rationality. Instead of an ethics of freedom, we have an ethics of reason as involving autonomy. The paper expresses some scepticism about the prospects for such an appeal to reason as a replacement for multiway freedom.

Arts the Journal of the Sydney University Arts Association, 2012

Thomas Poole and David Dyzenhaus (eds.), Hobbes and the Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) , 2012

Political Studies, 1965

A N unknown fragment by Thomas Hobbes is published below, in full,,for the first time. It contains new information bearing on both the evolution and the proper interpretation of Hobbes's political thought. The manuscript is contained among the Duke of Devonshire's collection of Hobbes MSS at Chatsworth.' It does not immediately look very promising: it is less than 400 words long, and written in the hand of an amanuensis; it is undated and unsigned. It is possible none the less to establish the manuscript as authentically a piece of Hobbes's own work, and to date it to either the late 1660's or (more probably) the 1670's. It is difficult, first, to think of anyone other than Hobbes who might have composed the piece. The manuscript begins with a question specifically aimed at him, since there is an endorsement on the back 'Questions relative to Hereditary Right. Mr. Hobbes'. The rest of the manuscript consists of an answer which forms a typical example of Hobbes's style of writing. Nevertheless this was overlooked by both Professor Robertson and Professor Tennies? even though both searched the Chatsworth archive specifically for pieces by Hobbes. It is possible that they may have been misled by the fact that the manuscript is not in Hobbes's own hand. It is the handwriting, however, which can be used to establish fully its authenticity as a work by Hobbes. It seems desirable, therefore, to provide this proof before going on to comment on the manuscript itself. The fact that the manuscript is not in Hobbes's own hand need cause no surprise.3 Hobbes suffered from 'a shaking palsey' (as Aubrey called it4) for the last twenty years of his life, and it is evident that his condition was sufficiently serious to make the use of an amanuensis essen-tial5It is also evident that the same amanuensis was being used in all of Hobbes's later writings.6 This establishes, then, 6rst that the manuscript published here is definitely in the hand of a scribe, not of some unknown independent writer; and also, that it has the same claim to authenticity as any other work by Hobbes from the last twenty years of his life. This also Hobbes MSS (Chatsworth) Box 1, @), no. 5. I am very greatly indebted to His Grace the Duke of Devonshire, and to the Trustees of the Chatsworth Settlement, for permission to examine and publish this manuscript. I am also much indebted to Mr. T. S. Wragg, Librarian of Chatsworth, for his kindness in providing me with photographs of the manuscript, and for other invaluable help and advice. Description of manuscript: single folded quarto sheet. Eleven lines of script in hand of unidentified questioner, thirtyeight lines of Hobbes's reply in hand of amanuensis. First side has figure '9' in right-hand corner. Question below. Answer begins halfway down 6rst side and continues to halfway down verso. Remaining two sheets blank. Endorsement on back. 2 G. C. Robertson, Hobbes (Edinburgh, 1886), Appendix on Hobbes MSS, p. 236n. F. Tonnies, Hobbes, k b e n wtdkhre (Stuttgart, 18%), citm Hobbes MSS in sources. The Hobbes papers were then at Hardwick. It may be that the manuscript here was not among them at that time. 3 The information here relates only to Hobbes's answer. The question on the manuscript is in a different, unidentified, hand. 4 A. Clark, Aubrey's Brief Lives (Oxford, 2 ~01s. 1898). 1,352. 5 Evident from some corrections on a fate manuscript at Chatsworth (MSS Box 1, (A), No. 9), signed by Hobbes in a very shaky hand. a The same hand can be seen in MSS Box 1, (A), nos. 6 and 9.

Hobbes Studies, 2019

Hobbes, in his political writing, is generally understood to be arguing for absolutism. I argue that despite apparently supporting absolutism, Hobbes, in Leviathan, also undermines that absolutism in at least two and possibly three ways. First, he makes sovereignty conditional upon the sovereign’s ability to ensure the safety of the people. Second and crucially, he argues that subjects have inalienable rights, rights that are held even against the sovereign. When the subjects’ preservation is threatened they are no longer obliged to obey the sovereign. Third, there is also a possible limitation on the absolute power of the sovereign in the form of restrictions Hobbes puts in place on what laws he may legitimately make. Finally, Hobbesian absolutism is compared to the absolutism of Carl Schmitt. This exercise demonstrates the limitations that Hobbes places on the power and authority of the sovereign.

History of Political Thought, 2015

This article traces the main changes to Thomas Hobbes’s account of liberty between the Elements of Law and Leviathan in order to re-evaluate his challenge to republican ideas of liberty. It contests Quentin Skinner’s recent interpretation while advancing two interrelated theses. First, it argues that between these works Hobbes attempted, but ultimately failed, to reconcile two different conceptions of liberty. Second, it shows that the changes to Hobbes’s account of liberty were not driven by his engagement with republican debates. The article concludes by indicating how the analysis challenges prominent historical narratives about republicanism set forth by its contemporary exponents.

Representations, 2009