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"The basic Mīmāṃsā approach to the issue of agency and free will is compatibilist, namely, the psychological experience of one's freedom of action is asumed to be valid, since one experiences one's actions as free and since the karman- or apūrva-based causalities cannot be ascertained to eliminate all precincts of application of free will. In fact, human beings are lead to act, according to Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā authors, by their desires, and, according to Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā authors, by Vedic injunctions which, in turn, identify them through their desires. Consequently, their precinct of free will seems exactly to lie in one's faculty to train their desires. Even from the point of view of Prābhākaras, who stress the role of Vedic commands, free will is presupposed by the claim that, although the Veda tells one what to do, it does not make one do it. Agency does not accrue to an underlying \emph{ātman}, but rather seems to constitute one of the subject's essential characters. Accordingly, the agent subject is said not to be immutable and does instead change through time. "
published in M. Dasti and E. Bryant (eds.), Free Will, Agency, and Selfhood in Indian Philosophy, OUP 2014, pp. 137--163. UNCORRECTED DRAFT
Journal of Indian Philosophy, 2020
The article concerns a mediaeval Indian debate over whether, and if so how, we can know that a self (ātman) exists, understood here as a subject of cognition (jñātṛ) that outlives individual cognitions, being their common substrate. A passage that has not yet been translated from Sanskrit into a European language, from Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s Nyāyamañjarī (c. 890 CE), ‘Blossoms of Reasoning’, is examined. This rich passage reveals something not yet noted in secondary literature, namely that Mīmāṃsakas advanced four different models of what happens when the self perceives itself. The article clarifies the differences between the four, and the historical and logical relationships between them. It also hypothesizes pressures that constituted the need for the creation of the newer views, i.e. perceived problems with the earlier views, which the proponents of the newer views saw themselves as overcoming.
Zenodo, 2024
This dissertation examines the concepts of free will and destiny through the lens of Vedic philosophy and quantum physics, revealing surprising parallels between ancient wisdom and modern science. Vedic philosophy contends that human life unfolds as a dynamic interplay between free will (purushartha) and destiny (karma), where individual choices impact the unfolding of a predetermined cosmic order. This concept is explored here in relation to quantum mechanics, where reality exists as probabilities until observation collapses them into specific outcomes. Vedic philosophy anticipated this insight, proposing that while free will allows conscious individuals to shape aspects of their lives, it operates within karmic boundaries shaped by past actions. In this framework, karma resembles a field of potential states—akin to quantum superposition—that manifests based on one’s present actions and awareness. In quantum terms, free will functions like the observer effect, where consciousness actively influences outcomes. This suggests that while life is shaped by deterministic patterns, intentional actions create pathways for change, challenging rigid determinism and supporting Vedic beliefs that agency is real yet bounded. Additionally, the concept of divine grace in Vedic thought aligns with quantum entanglement and non-locality, indicating that a transcendent, interconnected intelligence can alter destiny beyond personal control, allowing for spiritual intervention and transformation. This dissertation bridges free will and destiny through both Vedic and quantum perspectives, proposing that individual agency and universal law co-exist in a structured yet interconnected reality. By examining how conscious choices and karmic constraints interact within a larger cosmic framework, this work reveals a timeless understanding of human agency and predetermination, highlighting Vedic philosophy’s prescient grasp of ideas now explored in quantum mechanics.
Studia Orientalia, 2001
Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research, Springer India, 2018
The Buddha, unlike the Upaniṣadic or Brahmanical way, has avoided the concept of the self, and it seems to be left with limited conceptual possibilities for free will and moral responsibility. Now, the question is, if the self is crucial for free will, then how can free will be conceptualized in the Buddhist ‘no-self’ (anattā) doctrine. Nevertheless, the Buddha accepts a dynamic notion of cetanā (intention/volition), and it explicitly implies that he rejects the ultimate or absolute freedom of the will, but not the minimal power of free will. It seems that the Buddha’s view shifts from agent causation (independent ownership) to a causal sequence of impersonal processes (psychophysical factors). This paper claims to shed clarity on ‘whether free will is viable in the context of the anattāvāda in Buddhism.’ It mainly studies the secondary sources (even though it has also discussed the primary sources) and their interpretations of freedom of the will and how it further does argue for a compatibility approach of free will in Buddhist thought.
International Journal of Humanities, Social Sciences and Education, (IJHSSE), volume 10, Issue 6, pp. 25-29 , 2023
As we know, there is a difference between a simple wish and the will of an individual. Not only a concrete action is required in order to alleviate the impact of various factors that inhibit the former before it becomes ‘will’, but also a deep level of human consciousness. It implies conscientious motivation, clear goals, etc. My paper introduces some of the elements instrumental in the leap from the wish to the human will. As the issue of Free Will shall be central to the paper because when I say ‘human will’ I refer to ‘free will’, I have to mention that I adopt a pragmatic perspective on this notion. I. e. even though, as quantum physics tell us, any decision we make is conditioned by realities pertaining to it, we do not think of this state of affair when we carry out our activities – at least not always. Because of that we feel free – free enough to be able to function according to social norms.
Social Theory and Practice, 2009
at Austin. He is the author of seven books and over sixty articles on the philosophy of mind and action, ethics, the theory of value and philosophy of religion, including Free Will and Values (1985), Through the Moral Maze: Searching for Absolute Values in a Pluralistic World (1994), The Signifi cance of Free Will (1996), A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will (2005), and a lecture series on audio and video tape entitled The Quest for Meaning: Values, Ethics, and the Modern Experience. He is editor of The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (2002) and of Free Will (Blackwell, 2002). The recipient of fi fteen major teaching awards at the University of Texas, he was named an inaugural member of the University's Academy of Distinguished Teachers in 1995.
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