The Russian-Ukrainian Political Divide

Research for this article was facilitated by the support of the British Academy (Grant number SG-38537) for research on relations between Ukraine and the European Union. The author would like to thank the reviewer, Oleh Protsyk, for useful comments on the first European Yearbook of Minority Issues Vol 5, 2005/6, isbn 978 9004 xxxxx x, 521-547.

Post-Soviet Affairs, 2018

Taking advantage of a panel survey in Ukraine before and after the Euromaidan, we analyze the relationship between ethnicity, language practice, and civic identities on the one hand and political attitudes on the other. We find that while ethnic identities and language practices change little on the aggregate level over the period, there has been a significant increase in the proportion of people thinking of Ukraine as their homeland. There has also been a large fall in support for a close political and economic relationship with Russia and some increase in support for joining the European Union. Nevertheless, we find that identities in general, and language practice in particular, remain powerful predictors of political attitudes and that people are more likely to shift attitudes to reflect their identities rather than modify their identities to match their politics. Ukraine won its independence from the USSR in 1992 on the back of a referendum in which 90% of voters supported independence. Moreover, support for independence was above 80% in all but two regions-Crimea and the Crimean city of Sevastopol-and even there more than 50% of voters (though less than 40% of the electorate) supported separation. This extraordinary moment of national unity did not last, however. Already by the 1994 presidential elections, Ukraine was sharply divided between an ethnically Ukrainian, and largely Ukrainian-speaking, west and center and a south and east that had large ethnic Russian minorities, was largely Russophone, and supported candidates promising closer relations with Russia. These deep differences have been a staple of Ukrainian politics in the democratic era, as the divide extended from support for particular candidates to views of domestic political upheaval (such as the Orange Revolution) and preferences over foreign policies such as European integration and relations with Moscow. Nevertheless, during the 2014 "Euromaidan Revolution" that overthrew then President Viktor Yanukovych, a key claim of the revolutionaries was that what they called the "Revolution of Dignity" was not about sectional interests but rather represented people from all across Ukraine. Moreover, the aftermath of the revolution, which involved war and the annexation of Crimea by Russia, led some scholars to argue that what we are seeing now is the emergence of a new and much stronger sense of identity in Ukraine and a greater sense of political unity (Alexseev 2015; Kulyk 2016). The extent to which this is indeed the case and the details of this new identity and its political implications are crucial questions for Ukraine in the post-Maidan era.

Donetsk and Luhansk are often labeled pro-Russian regions as a result of the founding of Peoples’ Republics there in spring 2014. This article investigates popular opinion in Donbas before armed conflict began, to determine whether the high concentration of ethnic Russians there drove support for separatism. Analysis of a KIIS opinion poll shows that, on the one hand, ethnic Russian respondents were divided on most separatist issues, with a minority backing separatist positions. On the other hand, they supported separatist issues in larger numbers than both ethnic Ukrainians and respondents with hybrid identities. Thus, while ethnic identity does not produce polarized preferences, it is relevant in shaping political attitudes. Also, analysis of an original database of statements made by Donbas residents indicate that they were motivated to support separatism by local concerns exacerbated by a sense of abandonment by Kyiv rather than by Russian language and pro-Russian foreign policy issues.

Post-Soviet Affairs, 2018

Donetsk and Luhansk are often labeled pro-Russian regions as a result of the founding of Peoples' Republics there in spring 2014. This article investigates popular opinion in Donbas before armed conflict began, to determine whether the high concentration of ethnic Russians there drove support for separatism. Analysis of a KIIS opinion poll shows that, on the one hand, ethnic Russian respondents were divided on most separatist issues, with a minority backing separatist positions. On the other hand, they supported separatist issues in larger numbers than both ethnic Ukrainians and respondents with hybrid identities. Thus, while ethnic identity does not produce polarized preferences, it is relevant in shaping political attitudes. Also, analysis of an original database of statements made by Donbas residents indicate that they were motivated to support separatism by local concerns exacerbated by a sense of abandonment by Kyiv rather than by Russian language and pro-Russian foreign policy issues. We are sick and tired of our country, of our government's policies, so we're voting for what we've been offered so far. We want order; stability; salaries; jobs …-A woman in Donetsk explaining why she is voting for independence in the sovereignty referendum in Donetsk, May 11, 2014. (RFE/RL 2014) Demands for separatism in the eastern Donbas region of Ukraine in spring 2014 emerged rapidly. Residents of Donetsk and Luhansk, who had been politically quiescent throughout the Maidan demonstrations that started the previous fall, began to participate in a series of escalating demonstrations after the ouster of Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovych in late February. As events in Crimea crescendoed in early March, local activists of formerly marginal pro-Russian organizations in Donbas gained in popularity. 1 Whereas only a year earlier these groups' events consisted primarily of distributing literature to passers-by from folding tables, they now took advantage of the opening provided by Russia's annexation of Crimea. Activists forcibly seized government buildings in April and declared themselves leaders of the self-styled Peoples' Republic of Donetsk (DNR) and Peoples' Republic of Luhansk (LNR). They quickly adopted declarations of sovereignty (e.g. Declaration 2014), and in May, held referenda on state sovereignty. Support for separatism was not the dominant political opinion among residents of Donbas. Only a minority of the population-slightly less than a third of people surveyed in Donetsk and Luhanskbacked separation from Ukraine (KIIS 2014). Nevertheless, the percentage of citizens with opinions that

This paper analyzes changes in regional electoral behavior and attitudes towards separatism and foreign policy orientation in Ukraine after the “Orange Revolution” and the “Euromaidan,” which turned into a violent internal conflict and one of the biggest international conflicts involving Western countries and Russia. The research question is whether the regional divisions concerning domestic politics, separatism and foreign orientation have changed significantly in Ukraine since the “Orange Revolution” in 2004 and the “Euromaidan” in 2014. This paper employs comparative and statistical analyses of voting results of the 2012, 2007, 2006, and 2002 parliamentary elections, and the 2014, 2010, and 2004 presidential elections, to examine effects of historical legacies, ethnicity, language, age, and economic factors on regional support for pro-nationalist/pro-Western and pro-Russian/pro-communist political parties and presidential candidates. The study also analyses support for separatism in Crimea and Donbas after the “Orange Revolution” and the “Euromaidan.” It uses a brief survey, conducted for this study by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in April and May 2014, to examine determinants of pro-separatist attitudes. The paper also employs Razumkov Center and KIIS surveys to analyze changes in 2002-2014 in regional preferences for joining the European Union (EU), NATO, and a union with Russia. The analysis shows that Ukraine after the “Orange Revolution” remained divided along regional lines in terms of support for political parties and presidential candidates and attitudes towards joining the EU, NATO, and a Russia-led union. After the “Euromaidan,” such divisions in foreign policy orientation and, to a lesser extent, support for presidential candidates and political parties remained. A significant rise in separatist sentiments helped to fuel separatist takeovers of power in Crimea and Donbas and Russian military intervention in these regions.

This study analyzes changes in regional electoral behavior and foreign policy attitudes in Ukraine after “Orange Revolution.” The research question is whether the public support for major groups of political parties and presidential candidates and attitudes towards principal foreign policy issues in regions of Ukraine have changed after the “Orange Revolution.” This article employs comparative and statistical analyses of voting results of the 2007, 2006, and 2002 parliamentary elections, the 2010 local elections, and the 2004 and 2010 presidential elections, and survey data to examine effects of regional political culture, compared to other factors, on support for pro-nationalist/pro-Western and pro-Russian/pro-communist political parties and presidential candidates. This study also uses survey data to analyze changes in attitudes towards NATO, the European Union, and a union with Russia in regions of Ukraine and a change in separatist preferences in Crimea. The analysis shows that Ukraine after the “Orange Revolution” remained divided along regional lines in terms of support for political parties and presidential candidates and attitudes towards foreign orientation.

Aspects of the Orange Revolution III: The Context and Dynamics of the 2004 Ukrainian Presidential Elections, Ingmar Bredies, Andreas Umland, and Valentin Yakushik, Eds. Ibidem-Verlag, Stuttgart, pp. 55-77., 2007

Statistical analyses of the voting results from all national parliamentary and presidential elections held between 1991 and 2006 and survey data concerning attitudes towards major historical issues confirm the existence of strong and persistent regional cleavages in post-Soviet Ukraine. Western Ukrainian regions, which differ significantly in terms of their historical legacies from regions in Eastern Ukraine, are much more supportive, compared to Eastern Ukraine, of pro-nationalist and pro-Western parties and politicians, and they are much less supportive of pro-Communist and pro-Russian parties and politicians. Similarly, Eastern Ukrainians, compared to Western Ukrainians, express much more favorable attitudes towards the incorporation of Eastern Ukraine by Russia in the seventeenth century, the Bolshevik Revolution, the whole period of Ukraine’s inclusion in the Soviet Union, the past Communist political system, Russian tsars, and Soviet political leaders. People from Western Ukraine are much more likely than the residents of other regions to regard the artificial famine of 1932/1933 as a result of deliberate Soviet policy directed against ethnic Ukrainians. Western Ukrainians demonstrate much more favorable views than their Eastern Ukrainian counterparts towards the UPA and historical Ukrainian nationalist and pro-independence leaders. Regression analysis shows that historical legacies, linked to different historical experiences before Soviet unification, have the largest effect, compared to other factors, on electoral behavior and on attitudes towards historical issues. Keeping other factors, such as ethnicity and the level of economic development constant, the history of Austro-Hungarian, Polish, Romanian, and Czechoslovak rule is the biggest determinant of the regional pro-nationalist/pro-Western vote index, the pro-Communist/pro-Russian vote index, and individual attitudes towards the past Soviet political system. Catholic religion and Ukrainian ethnicity also affect the regional electoral behavior indexes but to a lesser extent and less consistently than the historical legacy does. Age, education, Catholic religion, and gender are significant determinants of attitudes towards the Soviet political system. However, their effects are weaker compared to the effects of historical legacy variables. This study concludes that the regional political cleavages in post-Communist Ukraine reflect primarily cultural differences that emerged as a result of distinct historical experiences in Ukrainian regions in the periods before World War I and World War II. These findings imply that the regional differences in electoral behavior and attitudes towards major historical issues will not disappear in Ukraine in the near future.

Post-Soviet Affairs, 2008

Have there been changes in political institutions, parties, leaders, and regional political orientations in Ukraine after the "Orange Revolution"? If so, are the changes revolutionary or evolutionary? Most previous studies refer to the 2004 presidential elections and mass protest actions as a revolution. To test this claim, this article analyzes political changes in Ukraine. Survey data are used to compare changes in pro-Russian and pro-Western orientation, support for major parties in the 2002, 2006, and 2007 parliamentary elections, and support for leading presidential candidates since the 2004 presidential elections. The implications of these changes for development of democracy in Ukraine are also considered.

2012

The "normalization" of politics in new democracies is an important concern of political science research. Normalization could refer to democratic consolidation when democracy "becomes the only game in town" (Linz and Stepan 1996). Some of the factors contributing to normalization are stable institutions, the rule of law, and transparency in power transfer, among others. Yet, it can be argued that the democratic process is normalized when programmatic parties compete for political office by wooing a sophisticated and knowledgeable electorate (Kitschelt 1992, 1995, 2000). This inquiry is a story of such normalization in the case of a new post-communist democracy-Ukraine. In the literature the Ukrainian public is depicted as highly apolitical, unsophisticated, and divided along the ethno-cultural regional cleavage which contributes to the problems of normalization of electoral competition. Moreover, there is a general sense that voters are "the least likely segment of Ukrainian polity" to influence political processes (Copsey 2005). Yet, the events of the Orange Revolutions showed otherwise. It does not seem reasonable any longer to ignore the Ukrainian voter and her role in the development of a democratic Ukraine. Recently Timothy J. Colton (2011) lamented the lack of the individual level analysis of Ukrainian electorate. This study is a decisive attempt to remedy this oversight. Using the survey data from International Foundation for Electoral Studies (IFES) from 1994, 1997-2008 I develop and analyze a model of the sophisticated voter in the new democracy. I argue that over time, as voters have more experience with democratic processes, they learn how to properly link their

This paper examines determinants of persistent regional political cleavages in post-communist Ukraine. The question is as to how significant the role of culture is compared to ethnic, economic and religious factors in the regional divisions. This study employs regression analysis of regional support for the Communist/pro-Russian parties and presidential candidates and nationalist/pro-independence parties and candidates in all national elections held since 1991, the vote for the preservation of the Soviet Union in the March 1991 referendum and the vote for the independence of Ukraine in the December 1991 referendum. This study shows that the historical experience has major effect on regional electoral behavior in post-communist Ukraine. The legacy of Austro-Hungarian, Polish, Romanian and Czechoslovak rule is positively associated with the pro-nationalist and pro-independence vote, and this historical legacy has a negative effect on support of pro-Communist and pro-Russian parties and presidential candidates and preservation of the Soviet Union.