Meta-commentary to Glennon and Tarlow

Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 2014

In replying to the commentaries of Marks-Tarlow and Solow Glennon, I have provided some clarification and expansion on the epistemology of dynamic systems models. These models served as the basis for integrating neuroscientific research findings with the phenomena of self and identity. Some of the challenges offered by the commentators have been specifically addressed with reference to a clarification of a "linguistic system" and causality as it applies to nonlinear dynamics.

Dynamical Systems Theory (DST) claims to be an epistemological weapon particularly broad and rich in providing a fair explanatory account of the operations of our mind. However, the very features that DST espouses as reasons for having an edge over Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) and Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) are the ones that are causing trouble in the philosophy of science, especially regarding issues of Explanation. This paper aims to suggest some possible problems that could arise from the application of DST’s characteristically abstract mathematical framework to the study of the mind. As I have not found anything that suggests something like this, my aim is to at least show the reasonableness of a possibility.

1995

Recently, a new approach to modeling cognitive phenomena has been gaining recognition: the dynamical systems approach. Proponents of this theory claim to have identified a new paradigm for the study of cognition which is superior to both symbolicism and connectionism.

2011

Dynamical Systems Theory (DST) claims to be an epistemological weapon particularly broad and rich in providing a fair explanatory account of the operations of our mind. However, the very features that this DST espouses as reasons for having an edge over Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) and Artificial Neural Networks (ANN), are the ones that are causing trouble in the philosophy of science speculation, especially regarding issues of Explanation. This paper aims to suggest some possible problems that could arise from the application of DST’s characteristically abstract mathematical framework to the study of the mind. As I have not found anything that suggests something like this, my aim is to at least show the reasonability of a possibility.

1999

Sciences of chaos and complexity theory reveal new universalities in nature applicable to psychology. This article proposes that the psychic structure long known as the "self is best conceptualized as an open, complex, dynamical system. With chaos at the core of development, healthy selves self-organize and evolve to the edge of chaos, where they are capable of flexible reorganization in response to unpredictable social and environmental contingencies. The boundaries of the self are dynamically fluid and ever changing, mediated by complex, recursive, feedback loops existing simultaneously at physical, social, cultural, and historical levels. Because of multiplicity and multistability, wherein multiple descriptions and states are simultaneously possible, it is suggested that the self be considered dynamically as a processstructure that is fractally organized. "Who am I?" At some point, this question entices and perhaps haunts each person. It is a simple query with an endless answer. In the psychoanalytic literature, there have been a multiplicity of approaches to theories of self. They highlight various aspects of the self, including its structure, function and representation. A brief synopsis of major theoretical developments follows, in order to provide a context for the introduction of dynamical systems theory. In Freud's tripartate model of psyche (1923/1955), the self was conceptualized as a container of unconscious forces objectively discernable by others. This was a structural model by which the three components of

Frontiers in network physiology, 2024

Identity-differentiating self from external reality-and agency-being the author of one's acts-are generally considered intrinsic properties of awareness and looked at as mental constructs generated by consciousness. Here a different view is proposed. All physiological systems display complex time-dependent regulations to adapt or anticipate external changes. To interact with rapid changes, an animal needs a nervous system capable of modelling and predicting (not simply representing) it. Different algorithms must be employed to predict the momentary location of an object based on sensory information (received with a delay), or to design in advance and direct the trajectory of movement. Thus, the temporal dynamics of external events and action must be handled in differential ways, thereby generating the distinction between self and non-self ("identity") as an intrinsic computational construct in neuronal elaboration. Handling time is not what neurons are designed for. Neuronal circuits are based on parallel processing: each bit of information diverges on many neurons, each of which combines it with many other data. Spike firing reports the likelihood that the specific pattern the neuron is designed to respond to is present in the incoming data. This organization seems designed to process synchronous datasets. However, since neural networks can introduce delays in processing, time sequences can be transformed into simultaneous patterns and analysed as such. This way predictive algorithms can be implemented, and continually improved through neuronal plasticity. To successfully interact with the external reality, the nervous system must model and predict, but also differentially handle perceptual functions or motor activity, by putting in register information that becomes available at different time moments. Also, to learn through positive/negative reinforcement, modelling must establish a causal relation between motor control and its consequences: the contrast between phase lag in perception and phase lead (and control) in motor programming produces the emergence of identity (discerning self from surrounding) and agency (control on actions) as necessary computational constructs to model reality. This does not require any form of awareness. In a brain, capable of producing awareness, these constructs may evolve from mere computational requirements into mental (conscious) constructs.

In S. Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self (111-36)., 2011

2003

Citeseer

Neuroplasticity, Memory and Sense of Self. An Epistemological Approach, 2013

As the brain-changes are continuous, so do all these consciousnesses melt into each other like dissolving views.