The moral universalism-relativism debate

Kpanie Addy MA Philosophy 'The very existence of other cultures with different moralities from ours is, in itself, enough to show that moral relativism is true.' Discuss. This essay discusses the view that the very existence of other cultures with different moralities from ours is, in itself, enough to show that moral relativism is true. To reformulate the issue as a question: does the existence of other cultures with moral views dissimilar to ours constitute a condition sufficient for establishing the truth of moral relativism? A careful treatment of this issue requires understanding moral relativism; I shall therefore begin by briefly sketching out this viewpoint. A focused discussion of the matter in hand will then follow. I shall deploy arguments in support of my opinion that the case for moral relativism actually seems to founder when premised on moral diversity. I shall conclude this essay by stating why in my view moral relativism lacks viability as an ethical position. Moral relativism, as Harman explains, is the view that "moral right and wrong (good and bad, justice and injustice, virtue and vice etc.) are always relative to a choice of moral framework. What is morally right in relation to one moral framework can be morally wrong in relation to a different moral framework. And no moral framework is objectively privileged as the one true morality" (Harman and Thomson 1996: 3). Meiland and Krausz express a similar view: "moral relativism tells us that an action is morally right only relative to a particular moral code or set of moral principles" (1982: 8). The term, moral relativism (MR) or ethical relativism, thus aptly reflects the general idea underlying this viewpoint that moral truth is relative to or contingent on a specific moral framework and equally relative is the justifiability of such truth. MR contrasts sharply with the view that there is an objective, universal, absolute moral truth which exists, as Mackie picturesquely puts it, as part of the fabric of the world. It thus diametrically opposes moral objectivism and universalism, both of which, in very simple terms, are claims supporting the position that objective standards bearing on truth or falsity obtain with regard to evaluating moral judgments and that such judgments have universal application. MR, although often likened to moral scepticism, differs significantly from the latter viewpoint. Outlining this difference helps to further clarify what MR consists in. Meiland and Krausz highlight the key similarity and difference as follows:

2012

Among naturalist philosophers, both defenders and opponents of moral relativism argue that prescriptive moral theories (or normative theories) should be constrained by empirical findings about human psychology. Empiricists have asked if people are or can be moral relativists, and what effect being a moral relativist can have on an individual's moral functioning. This research is underutilized in philosophers' normative theories of relativism; at the same time, the empirical work, while useful, is conceptually disjointed. Our goal is to integrate philosophical and empirical work on constraints on normative relativism. First, we present a working definition of moral relativism. Second, we outline naturalist versions of normative relativism, and third, we highlight the empirical constraints in this reasoning. Fourth, we discuss recent studies in moral psychology that are relevant for the philosophy of moral relativism. We assess here what conclusions for moral relativism can and cannot be drawn from experimental studies. Finally, we suggest how moral philosophers and moral psychologists can collaborate on the topic of moral relativism in the future.

Cambridge University Press eBooks, 1996

Principles of Health Care Ethics, 2006

I am not going to argue for moral relativism. The case for moral relativism is not an argument; it's a pair of observations. The first observation is that people live and have lived by mutually incompatible moral norms. The second observation is that no one has ever succeeded in showing any one set of norms to be universally valid. These observations do not prove that there is no universally valid morality, but they do lead us to wonder: If there weren't a universally valid morality, would there be any valid morality at all? Could there be multiple moralities, each of merely local validity? To explain how there could be would be to lay foundations for moral relativism. Formulating Relativism According to moral relativism, saying that an action is wrong is like saying that someone is tall, a claim that is elliptical unless indexed to a reference class, since someone who is tall for an Mbuti may not be tall for a Kikuyu, and it makes no sense to ask whether he is tall simpliciter. 1 Similarly, says relativism, it makes no sense to ask whether an action or practice is wrong simpliciter. Claims of wrongness must be about wrongness-for-members-of-x, 1 Yes, there may be a standard for human beings, tall for a human, which applies to all of us. But that standard is still relative to a reference class, namely, human beings. What's tall for a human is not tall for a giraffe. What's tall for a giraffe is not tall for a tree. The Milky Way is said to be 2,000 light years tall.

International Journal of Psychology, 2011

T he importance of including cultural perspectives in the study of human cognition has become apparent in recent decades, and the domain of moral reasoning is no exception. The present review focuses on moral cognition, beginning with Kohlberg's model of moral development which relies heavily on people's justifications for their judgments and then shifting to more recent theories that rely on rapid, intuitive judgments and see justifications as more or less irrelevant to moral cognition. Despite this dramatic shift, analyses of culture and moral decision-making have largely been framed as a quest for and test of universal principles of moral judgment. In this review, we discuss challenges that remain in trying to understand crosscultural variability in moral values and the processes that underlie moral cognition. We suggest that the universalist framework may lead to an underestimation of the role of culture in moral reasoning. Although the field has made great strides in incorporating more and more cultural perspectives in order to understand moral cognition, theories of moral reasoning still do not allow for substantial variation in how people might conceptualize the domain of the moral. The processes that underlie moral cognition may not be a human universal in any simple sense, because moral systems may play different roles in different cultures. We end our review with a discussion of work that remains to be done to understand cultural variation in the moral domain.

2000

Among naturalist philosophers, both defenders and opponents of moral relativism argue that prescriptive moral theories (or normative theories) should be constrained by empirical findings about human psychology. Empiricists have asked if people are or can be moral relativists, and what effect being a moral relativist can have on an individual’s moral functioning. This research is underutilized in philosophers’ normative theories of relativism; at the same time, the empirical work, while useful, is conceptually disjointed. Our goal is to integrate philosophical and empirical work on constraints on normative relativism. First, we present a working definition of moral relativism. Second, we outline naturalist versions of normative relativism, and third, we highlight the empirical constraints in this reasoning. Fourth, we discuss recent studies in moral psychology that are relevant for the philosophy of moral relativism. We assess here what conclusions for moral relativism can and cannot be drawn from experimental studies. Finally, we suggest how moral philosophers and moral psychologists can collaborate on the topic of moral relativism in the future.

Frontiers in Psychology, 2021

Many theories have shaped the concept of morality and its development by anchoring it in the realm of the social systems and values of each culture. This review discusses the current formulation of moral theories that attempt to explain cultural factors affecting moral judgment and reasoning. It aims to survey key criticisms that emerged in the past decades. In both cases, we highlight examples of cultural differences in morality, to show that there are cultural patterns of moral cognition in Westerners’ individualistic culture and Easterners’ collectivist culture. It suggests a paradigmatic change in this field by proposing pluralist “moralities” thought to be universal and rooted in the human evolutionary past. Notwithstanding, cultures vary substantially in their promotion and transmission of a multitude of moral reasonings and judgments. Depending on history, religious beliefs, social ecology, and institutional regulations (e.g., kinship structure and economic markets), each soc...

Synthese, 2009

Moral relativism is an attractive position, but also one that it is difficult to formulate. In this paper, we propose an alternative way of formulating moral relativism that locates the relativity of morality in the property that makes moral claims true. Such an approach, we believe, has significant advantages over other possible ways of formulating moral relativism. We conclude by