Discussion and conclusions

Journal of Neurolinguistics, 2019

We investigated the neurocognitive processes behind the asymmetry of affect observed in irony understanding, where ironic criticism is more easily understood than ironic praise. We recorded the ERPs of participants while they listened to positive (e.g., "These children are always smiling") or negative (e.g., "His son is very unfortunate") remarks pronounced with a sincere or ironic prosody. Participants had to decide whether or not the speaker was sincere. Behavioural results confirmed the asymmetry of affect phenomenon and ERP results revealed that the N400 and P600 were differentially sensitive to the negative or positive emotional connotations of the speaker's messages. These findings shed new light on the cognitive processes behind biphasic N400/P600 cycles, and how they are differentially affected by negativity. 1. Introduction Verbal irony is a form of nonliteral language in which speakers can convey implied meanings that intentionally contradict the literal meanings (e.g., saying "He is bright!" about somebody who says stupid thing). When they use verbal irony, speakers simultaneously communicate literal information and a dissociative attitude toward this literal information, and thus toward the referent (event, person or object). This attitude can be manifested by counterfactual aspects of the context, or by the speaker's facial cues, body posture, or tone of voice (Gibbs & Colston, 2007). For example, "That's a really good idea!" can be taken as either a compliment or a criticism, depending on the tone of voice, referred to as prosody in the literature. Although there is no consensus as to which vocal cues are most indicative of verbal irony, research has confirmed that prosody can inform listeners about a speaker's ironic attitude. For example, Bryant and Fox Tree (2002) found that participants could correctly distinguish between spontaneously produced ironic versus nonironic utterances based on prosody. Consistent with this, Rockwell (2000) showed that sarcastic irony can be detected when no context is provided, further emphasising the role of prosody in irony perception (see also Voyer & Techentin, 2010). Prosodic aspects of speech can therefore supplement or modify the meaning of the spoken sentence by providing valuable clues to the speaker's attitude. At least two kinds of prosody have been identified in the literature: emotional prosody and attitudinal prosody (Mitchell & Ross, 2013). While emotional prosody refers to the emotions conveyed by the tone of voice, attitudinal prosody refers to the expression of a person's attitude towards an event, person or object, be it scepticism, doubt, enthusiasm, or boredom (

2019

Theoretical accounts of irony comprehension assume that when an ironic utterance is unfamiliar and the context does not prime for ironic interpretation, processing should take longer than when reading the same utterance with a literal meaning. This slowdown reflects problems in integrating the utterance into the developing text representation, which results in a reanalysis of the utterance. Similar assumptions are made about other forms of figurative language, such as metaphors, although studies have shown that there are differences in the cognitive demands of different forms of figurative language. Until fairly recently, most of the studies have ignored possible individual differences in irony comprehension among healthy adults. Recent results have suggested that there might be individual differences in irony comprehension related to working memory capacity (WMC) and emotion processing. In the present thesis, I wanted to answer the following questions: 1) How do readers resolve the meaning of irony? 2) How do individual differences in WMC and the ability to process emotional information affect the processing of irony? and 3) Does the processing of irony differ from the processing of other forms of figurative language, namely metaphors? These questions were examined in four studies using eye-tracking to tap into the detailed time-course of resolving the meaning of irony. The results of these studies showed that readers need to reprocess the ironic utterance to achieve the intended meaning, as suggested by the theories on irony comprehension. WMC aids this process by helping readers to keep contextual information in their mind while they integrate the meaning of the utterance with the context and/or inhibit a more salient literal interpretation while making the inference. Emotion processing abilities help to recognize the emotional cues of irony; readers with a poorer ability to process emotional information need to rely more on textual context to resolve the ironic meaning. Finally, resolving the ironic meaning differs from resolving other forms of figurative language, namely metaphors. Metaphors are easier to comprehend, and the processing of the intended meaning of metaphors starts at an earlier stage of reading. Moreover, emotion processing abilities are related to the processing of irony, but not metaphors. Based on the findings of this thesis, I present a new theoretical framework, the Cumulative Evidence Model.

Journal of Memory and Language

While incongruence with the background context is a powerful cue for irony, in spoken conversation ironic utterances often bear non-contextual cues, such as marked tone of voice and/or facial expression. In Experiment 1, we show that ironic prosody and facial expression can be correctly discriminated as such in a categorization task, even though the boundaries between ironic and non-ironic cues are somewhat fuzzy. However, an act-out task (Experiments 2 & 3) reveals that prosody and facial expression are considerably less reliable cues for irony comprehension than contextual incongruence. Reaction time and eye-tracking data indicate that these non-contextual cues

Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 2002

Three experiments assessed four variables that may affect verbal irony processing: people's expectations of events, event outcome, evaluations of outcome, and shared common ground. Reading times and rating tasks were used to quantify the interaction of these factors. The failed expectation hypothesis predicts an interaction of expectation, outcome, and evaluation. In contrast, the expectation irrelevance hypothesis states that expectation does not matter-only interactions between outcome and evaluation should result. The results provide support for the expectation irrelevance hypothesis. There were also consistent common ground effects: Statements directed at high common ground targets were read more quickly and rated as more ironic than statements directed at low common ground targets. These studies also provide online evidence of the asymmetry of affect (positive evaluations of negative outcomes are more ironic than negative evaluations of positive outcomes). Together, these experiments further elucidate the complex pragmatic factors that govern verbal irony comprehension.

Brain Research, 2010

extra-linguistic and linguistic information to compute the speaker's intended meaning. To assess whether knowledge about the speaker's communicative style impacts the brain response to irony, ERPs were recorded as participants read short passages that ended either with literal or ironic statements made by one of two speakers. The experiment was carried out in two sessions in which each speaker's use of irony was manipulated. In Session 1, 70% of ironic statements were made by the ironic speaker, while the non-ironic speaker expressed 30% of them. For irony by the non-ironic speaker, an increased P600 was observed relative to literal utterances. By contrast, both ironic and literal statements made by the ironic speaker elicited similar P600 amplitudes. In Session 2, conducted 1 day later, both speakers' use of irony was balanced (i.e. 50% ironic, 50% literal). ERPs for Session 2 showed an irony-related P600 for the ironic speaker but not for the non-ironic speaker. Moreover, P200 amplitude was larger for sentences congruent with each speaker's communicative style (i.e. for irony made by the ironic speaker, and for literal statements made by the nonironic speaker). These findings indicate that pragmatic knowledge about speakers can affect language comprehension 200 ms after the onset of a critical word, as well as neurocognitive processes underlying the later stages of comprehension (500-900 ms post-onset). Thus perceived speakers' characteristics dynamically impact the construction of appropriate interpretations of ironic utterances.

It is well known that speakers rely on prosodic and gestural features at the time of producing and understanding verbal irony. Yet little research has examined (a) how gestures manifest themselves in spontaneous speech, both during and after ironic utterances; and (b) how the presence of the so-called ‘gestural codas’ (audiovisual cues produced after the ironic utterance) influences irony detection. In Experiment 1, spontaneously produced verbal irony utterances generated between pairs of friends in conversational dyads were analyzed for semantic, prosodic and visual contrasts. Results show that ironic utterances contrast with immediately preceding non-ironic utterances, both in terms of prosody and gesture. Experiment 2 tested the contribution of the presence vs. absence of such ‘gestural codas’ to the perception of verbal irony. An irony rating task was conducted in which participants were audiovisually presented with a set of ambiguous discourse contexts followed by a set of matching ironic and non-ironic utterances presented in two conditions, namely without coda and with coda. Results show that subjects detected the speaker’s ironic intent significantly better when post-utterance codas were present (88%) than when they were not (56%), thus confirming the hypothesis that visual information produced after ironic sentences is a key factor in the identification of the speaker’s ironic intent.

Metaphor and Symbol, 2007

Results from 4 experiments support the view that, regardless of contextual information, when an end-product interpretation of an utterance does not rely on the salient (lexicalized and prominent) meanings of its components, it will not be faster than nor as fast to derive as when it does. To test this view, we looked into interpretations of salience-based (here, literal) interpretations and expectation-based (here, ironic) interpretations in contexts inducing an expectation for irony. In Experiment 1, expectancy was manipulated by introducing an ironic speaker in vivo who also uttered the target utterance. Findings show that ironic targets were slower to read than literal counterparts. Experiment 2 shows that ironies took longer to read than literals and that response times to ironically related probes were longer than to literally related probes, regardless of context. Experiments 3 and 4 show that, even when participants were given extra processing time and were exclusively presented ironically biasing contexts, the expectancy for irony acquired throughout such exposure did not facilitate expectancy-based compared to salience-based interpretations.

Frontiers in Psychology

An ironic statement transmits the opposite meaning to its literal counterpart and is one of the most complex communicative acts. Thus, it has been proposed to be a good indicator of social communication ability. Prosody and facial expression are two crucial paralinguistic cues that can facilitate the understanding of ironic statements. The primary aim of this study was to create and evaluate a task of irony identification that could be used in neuroimaging studies. We independently evaluated three cues, contextual discrepancy, prosody and facial expression, and selected the best cue that would lead participants in fMRI studies to identify a stimulus as ironic in a reliable way. This process included the design, selection, and comparison of the three cues, all of which have been previously associated with irony detection. The secondary aim was to correlate irony comprehension with specific cognitive functions. Results showed that psycholinguistic properties could differentiate irony ...

Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology, 2021

Ironic language is typically more difficult to process and interpret than a literal equivalent, hence is assumed to serve several social and emotional functions not achieved by literal communication (such as politeness or introducing humor). Several factors may influence emotional responses to irony, such as the perspective from which the utterance is encountered (e.g., speaker vs. target) and the tone of voice (prosody) used. To examine these issues, we conducted two event-related brain potential (ERP) studies in which participants listened to scenarios describing emotional responses to either literal criticism or ironic criticism. Ironic criticism was delivered with either natural or ironic prosody. Scenarios either described an emotional response the speaker expected to elicit from the target (speaker perspective), or the target’s actual emotional response (target perspective). Expected or actual emotional responses were described as either “amused” (Experiment 1) or “hurt” (Experiment 2). ERPs were calculated time-locked to the end of the ironic or literal statements, and to the audio presentation of the critical emotion words. Results showed a significant effect of perspective for amused conditions, reflected by a larger late posterior positivity for the target than speaker conditions, indicating amused responses are more expected from speaker than target perspective. This effect was not seen for hurt conditions, suggesting these are equally expected from target and speaker perspectives. The data also revealed a more negative-going ERP waveform specifically for ironic criticism delivered with ironic prosody, reflecting prosodic processing. This suggests prosody may be able to speed the identification of irony.

2000

Irony, as "quotation" and "fencing game," consists of an interactive script, grounded on a focal event "trigger," in which the dialogic comment shows the ironist's intention through an antiphrastic process and syncoding to "hit" the victim of the irony (blame by praise or praise by blame).