Who Gives the Orders in the New Russian Military?

The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 2019

This article is the first in a series of three that examines the Russian Armed Forces' efforts to adjust their strategic command and control architecture in the post-Soviet period, taking into account wide-ranging shifts in force structure, missions, geography, resources, and leadership. From 1996 to 2000, changes reflected Russian military reform more broadly: much conceptualization, but little implementation. In the first four years of Putin's presidency, the military leadership advocated strategic command and control reforms, but remained focused on more fundamental issues of military readiness, service conditions, and downsizing. More wide-ranging changes began in earnest in the mid-2000s, only to be overtaken by an even more fundamental defense reform process initiated in 2007. The process of changing the strategic C2 system captured many political, cultural, and strategic facets of post-Soviet Russian military development.

2020

The Russia Strategic Initiative at US European Command tasked CNA with providing a primer on the Russian General Staff for a public audience. The General Staff is perhaps the most important warfighting institution in the Russian Armed Forces, acting both as the planning "brains" of the Russian military and also as its operational-strategic headquarters. This paper covers the formal structure of the Russian General Staff, its institutional relationships with other militarybureaucratic institutions in Russia, its role in civil-military relations, its historical evolution, and its special role during wartime. It also offers multiple interpretations of the General Staff's significance in military decision-making, considering the dynamics of political and policy influence in Russia and the role of the General Staff in developing military and political-military doctrine. This paper also raises the issue of the Russian General Staff chief's incumbency and leadership continuity in light of the 2024 cabinet reshuffle. CNA's Occasional Paper series is published by CNA, but the opinions expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of CNA. The views, opinions, and findings contained in this report should not be construed as representing the official position of the Department of the Navy.

2021

The Main Operations Directorate (GOU) of the General Staff is the keystone of the entire Russian military command structure, providing context for political decisions, expertise to policy drafting and guidance to operational commands. It plays a crucial role not simply in monitoring and analysing the contemporary military-political scene but also in shaping Russia’s foundational policy documents – and then operationalising them in terms of what they demand in terms of deployments, equipment and training needs, and future force development. While it continues to prepare for a potential full-scale conflicts, it is at the forefront of pivoting to what the Russians call New Generation Warfare, involving ‘political-diplomatic, economic, informational, cybernetic, psychological and other non-military forms and methods of confrontation’ as well as direct warfighting.

Polish Political science Yearbook, 2018

This paper investigates Russian Military Doctrines which establish the military construction and training of state armed forces and set out the forms and methods of conducting war. The main provisions of Military/Defense Doctrines have been formed and changed depending on current policy and the existent social system. This includes the level of productive forces and new scientific achievements and the nature of anticipated war. The 2014 Russian Military Doctrine defines the country as a strictly defensive entity and issues a list of provisions where Russia would be motivated to act militarily towards other countries. State policy and military doctrine are inextricably linked because the competent military policy meets all changes in international and domestic situations and successive military reforms are impossible without corresponding reflection in Military Doctrine.

Russia’s 2010 Military Doctrine highlighted NATO as a military danger to the Russian Federation. NATO was listed explicitly in first place among these dangers - specifically the “striving to ascribe global functions to the force capability of NATO, implemented in breach of international law, and bringing the military infrastructure of NATO member countries closer to the borders of the Russian Federation, including by means of enlarging the bloc”. Significantly for our interpretation of Russian statements, NATO is listed as a military danger not as a military threat. The distinction in Russian doctrinal lexicon is important – a “danger” is a situation with the potential “under certain conditions” to develop into an immediate military threat, rather than a threat per se. Clear definitions for both military threat and military danger are included in the Doctrine, as well as the distinction between military conflict and armed conflict. Previously to be found in other doctrinal statements, these definitions are essential for a precise understanding of the threat picture as expressed by official Russia. Other military dangers include deployment of foreign forces on territory adjacent to Russia and its allies, not only on land but also at sea; the creation of strategic missile defence forces; and the development of strategic non-nuclear precision weapons systems. Development of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) is a fundamental task in deterring and preventing armed conflict, alongside cooperation with other international organisations including, interestingly, NATO. Russia will also contribute forces to the CSTO’s rapid reaction group and for deployment as CSTO peacekeepers. Furthermore, the CSTO’s collective defence provision, similar to but more binding than NATO’s Article 5, is now explicitly included in Russian doctrine. Despite widespread reporting that the new Doctrine would display increased readiness for first use of nuclear weapons, this provision is if anything subtly rolled back from the 2000 version of the Military Doctrine – instead of first use “in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation”, the criterion is now “when the very existence of the State is under threat”. The related provision promising no use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states acting alone has been dropped. But Russia’s precise stance on nuclear use is detailed in a classified addendum to the Doctrine, so remains unclear. The provision for use of Russian forces overseas “to defend the interests of the Russian Federation and its citizens, and to protect international peace and security” is included. Operations overseas to remove threats or suppress aggression can also be undertaken at the instigation of the UN “or other bodies”. Preparation for mobilisation receives substantial attention, with several sections retained verbatim from the 2000 Doctrine and others new or re-drafted. These provisions concern both the economy and the military, with no regard to the substantial reorganisation of the military during 2009 towards permanent readiness and away from a mobilisation army. Information warfare (a concept which largely overlaps with what we might term cyber operations) is largely ignored in the Doctrine, except as a military danger and for the stipulation that the means to prosecute it must be developed. Meanwhile, the largely outdated Information Security Doctrine of 2000 remains in force.

2019

Russia-Georgia relations had been declining since Georgia first voiced its intention for NATO membership in 2005 which later escalated into a war in 2008. Despite being victorious in the 2008 Russo-Georgian Five-Day War, the shortcomings of the Russian Armed Forces that were exposed during the war had led the country towards its “New Look” military reform announced months after the war. Many International Relations scholar draw a connection between the reform and Russia’s increasing assertiveness marked by the Crimean annexation and Russia’s involvement in Syria. This piece will then try to understand how Russian military performance in the 2008 war led to Russia’s most rigorous military reform, and more importantly, how did Russia implement its “New Look” reform during 2008 until 2013. Russia had underwent far reaching efforts and goals to transform the armed forces into combat-ready forces but had also faced challenges in modernizing its weaponry system, in increasing the quality...

Defense & Security Analysis, 2013

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e-International Relations, 2010

The long-awaited publication of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, signed by President Dmitry Medvedev on 5 February 2010, was the result of years of debate within the Russian military and political establishment. The new Russian strategic perspective was expected with anxiety due to the great changes in the international arena since the last edition of the Military Doctrine of the country, in 2000, including: the resurgence of Russian power; the September 11 attacks and the international terrorism; the wars in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003); NATO’s expansion toward Russia’s borders (2004); and the August War against Georgia (2008).