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2007, Memory & Cognition
AI
The paper explores the mechanisms underlying change blindness, particularly focusing on the roles of encoding, retrieval, and awareness in memory processing. It posits that changes in visual scenes may go unnoticed due to encoding failures, particularly for improbable changes that are less represented in memory. Furthermore, it highlights that even when long-term memory tests indicate accurate recall of visual elements, a failure in retrieval may contribute significantly to change blindness. Statistical analysis is used to assess the differences in attention and fixation durations on probable versus improbable changes.
Communicative & Integrative Biology, 2009
A large body of literature has shown that observers often fail to notice significant changes in visual scenes, even when these changes happen right in front of their eyes. For instance, people often fail to notice if their conversation partner is switched to another person, or if large background objects suddenly disappear. 1,2 These 'change blindness' studies have led to the inference that the amount of information we remember about each item in a visual scene may be quite low. 1 However, in recent work we have demonstrated that long-term memory is capable of storing a massive number of visual objects with significant detail about each item. 3 In the present paper we attempt to reconcile these findings by demonstrating that observers do not experience 'change blindness' with the real world objects used in our previous experiment if they are given sufficient time to encode each item. The results reported here suggest that one of the major causes of change blindness for real-world objects is a lack of encoding time or attention to each object (see also refs. 4 and 5).
British Journal of Psychology, 2006
Change blindness is often taken as evidence that visual representations are impoverished, while successful recognition of specific objects is taken as evidence that they are richly detailed. In the current experiments, participants performed cover tasks that required each object in a display to be attended. Change detection trials were unexpectedly introduced and surprise recognition tests were given for nonchanging displays. For both change detection and recognition, participants had to distinguish objects from the same basic-level category, making it likely that specific visual information had to be used for successful performance. Although recognition was above chance, incidental change detection usually remained at floor. These results help reconcile demonstrations of poor change detection with demonstrations of good memory because they suggest that the capability to store visual information in memory is not reflected by the visual system's tendency to utilize these representations for purposes of detecting unexpected changes.
2003
2.. Attention and storage in working memory protects against change blindness AA crucial factor in change detection seems to be attention, a phenomenon discussed in BOX 1.. In the real world, changes almost always involve motion or luminance changes. This often evokess a visual transient that is unique, or very salient with respect to background noise, so that itt attracts attention (Phillips & Singer, 1974; Rensink, 2000b, 2002). Without a blank interval in thee change blindness paradigm, the unique transient makes the change easy to detect. With the
Cognitive psychology, 2016
Response-time (RT) and choice-probability data were obtained in a rapid visual sequential-presentation change-detection task in which memory set size, study-test lag, and objective change probabilities were manipulated. False "change" judgments increased dramatically with increasing lag, consistent with the idea that study items with long lags were ejected from a discrete-slots buffer. Error RTs were nearly invariant with set size and lag, consistent with the idea that the errors were produced by a stimulus-independent guessing process. The patterns of error and RT data could not be explained in terms of encoding limitations, but were consistent with the hypothesis that long retention lags produced a zero-stimulus-information state that required guessing. Formal modeling of the change-detection RT and error data pointed toward a hybrid model of visual working memory. The hybrid model assumed mixed states involving a combination of memory and guessing, but with higher memor...
Consciousness and Cognition, 2010
The goal of this study is to characterize observers' abilities to detect gradual changes and to explore putative dissociations between conscious experience of change and behavioral adaptation to a changing stimulus. We developed a new experimental paradigm in which, on each trial, participants were shown a dot pattern on the screen. Next, the pattern disappeared and participants had to reproduce it. In some conditions, the target pattern was incrementally rotated over successive trials and participants were either informed or not of this change. We analyzed both awareness of the changes and the dynamics of behavioral adaptation, in a way that makes it possible to assess both variability and accuracy as they change over time. Results indicate a dissociation between change awareness and behavioral adaptation to the changes, and support the notion that unconscious representations of visual stimuli are more precise and detailed than previously suggested. We discuss the implications of these results for theories of change detection. Crown steps of 1°of visual angle on each display, with each display separated from the next one by a brief blank screen (1500 ms). Participants were instructed to press a button if they had noticed the scene change. The results indicated that half of the participants remained unaware of the change up to a dramatic rotation of 48°. However, when a shift back to the original scene was produced after a cumulated rotation of 20°or 30°that had so far remained undetected, most subjects could then clearly see the change. Authors concluded that visual memory had been updated, albeit in the absence of awareness. Indeed, if visual memory had not been updated at all, participants would not have been able to detect the change when presented anew with the original display. These results clearly challenge the idea that change blindness arises from a failure to maintain relevant information in memory (see also, .
Current Directions in Psychological …, 2005
People often fail to notice large changes to visual scenes, a phenomenon now known as change blindness. The extent of change blindness in visual perception suggests limits on our capacity to encode, retain, and compare visual information from one glance to the next; our awareness of our visual surroundings is far more sparse than most people intuitively believe. These failures of awareness and the erroneous intuitions that often accompany them have both theoretical and practical ramifications. This article briefly summarizes the current state of research on change blindness and suggests future directions that promise to improve our understanding of scene perception and visual memory.
Psychologia, 2008
An overview is presented of the ways that change blindness has been applied to the study of various issues in perception and cognition. Topics include mechanisms of change perception, allocation of attention, nonconscious perception, and cognitive beliefs. Recent work using change blindness to investigate these topics is surveyed, along with a brief discussion of some of the ways that these approaches may further develop over the next few years.
Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science
This study examined the notion that visually fixating at a stimulus can help prevent change blindness from occurring and looks at change blindness blindness, a common metacognitive error shown by participants. 77 participants were randomly selected and assigned to different conditions. Experimental group had an extra task that they had to perform while attending to the video and the control group only had to watch the video. Participants in both conditions were required to fill out a questionnaire measuring their confidence levels to notice the change. Both conditions failed to detect changes with insignificant difference between the groups, even though the stimulus was visually fixated. Most participants overestimated their change detecting abilities, predicting in the questionnaire that they would notice the change, while in practice they did not. Thus an extra task in the experimental condition did not produce a cognitive overload leading to change blindness. Still participants failed to detect changes when the stimulus was fixated and failed to measure their change detecting abilities realistically.
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 2004
Neuropsychologia, 2011
Visual short-term memory (VSTM) capacity is often assessed using change detection tasks, and individual differences in performance have been shown to predict cognitive aptitudes across a range of domains in children and adults. We recently showed that intelligence correlates with an attentional component necessary for change detection rather than with memory capacity per se ). It remained unclear, however, whether different attentional strategies during change detection have most impact during the encoding or maintenance of information. Here we present recent findings from our laboratory supporting the hypothesis that attentional selection during encoding dominates individual differences in change detection measures of visual short-term memory.
Consciousness and Cognition, 2011
Wiley Interdisciplinary …, 2011
Change blindness is the failure to notice an obvious change. Inattentional blindness is the failure to notice the existence of an unexpected item. In each case, we fail to notice something that is clearly visible once we know to look for it. Despite similarities, each type of blindness has a unique background and distinct theoretical implications. Here, we discuss the central paradigms used to explore each phenomenon in a historical context. We also outline the central findings from each field and discuss their implications for visual perception and attention. In addition, we examine the impact of task and observer effects on both types of blindness as well as common pitfalls and confusions people make while studying these topics.
In a series of three experiments, we explored the nature of implicit representations in change blindness (CB). Using 3 x 3 letter arrays, we asked subjects (Ss) to locate changes in paired arrays separated by 80 ms ISIs, in which one, two or three letters of a row in the second array changed. In one testing version, a tone followed the second array, signaling a row for partial report (PR). In the other version, no PR was required. After Ss reported whether a change had been detected and the PR had been completed (if required), they were asked to identify a degraded letter trigram that was either novel, or from a previously shown row (repetition priming). Our findings indicate that when CB occurs, both the pre-change and post-change stimulus information primes despite its unavailability to consciousness. Surprisingly, findings also indicate that when change detection occurs only the post-change information primes.
Acta Psychologica, 2008
People often fail to detect a change between two visual scenes, a phenomenon referred to as change blindness. This study investigates how a post-change object's similarity to the pre-change object influences memory of the pre-change object and affects change detection. The results of Experiment 1 showed that similarity lowered detection sensitivity but did not affect the speed of identifying the pre-change object, suggesting that similarity between the pre-and post-change objects does not degrade the pre-change representation. Identification speed for the pre-change object was faster than naming the new object regardless of detection accuracy. Similarity also decreased detection sensitivity in Experiment 2 but improved the recognition of the pre-change object under both correct detection and detection failure. The similarity effect on recognition was greatly reduced when 20% of each pre-change stimulus was masked by random dots in Experiment 3. Together the results suggest that the level of pre-change representation under detection failure is equivalent to the level under correct detection and that the pre-change representation is almost complete. Similarity lowers detection sensitivity but improves explicit access in recognition. Dissociation arises between recognition and change detection as the two judgments rely on the match-to-mismatch signal and mismatch-to-match signal, respectively.
2006
The mismatch negativity is an event-related potential that represents a preattentive change detection process. The aim of this study was to determine whether the mismatch negativity was present during 'change blindness', a striking phenomenon in which surprisingly large changes in a complex scene are not seen when they occur during a blink or an eye movement. In this study, large orientation changes elicited a candidate mismatch negativity between 180 and 320 ms that appeared to be independent of participants' performance (uncued 76% correct, miscued 59% correct with chance performance at 50%). This negativity, however, disappeared in the miscued 'change blind' condition. In conclusion, the mismatch negativity does not appear to be present during change blindness suggesting that in complex scenes even large changes may not trigger preattentive change detection processes. NeuroReport17:1011^1015
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2005
Change blindness is the striking failure to see large changes that normally would be noticed easily. Over the past decade this phenomenon has greatly contributed to our understanding of attention, perception, and even consciousness. The surprising extent of change blindness explains its broad appeal, but its counterintuitive nature has also engendered confusions about the kinds of inferences that legitimately follow from it. Here we discuss the legitimate and the erroneous inferences that have been drawn, and offer a set of requirements to help separate them. In doing so, we clarify the genuine contributions of change blindness research to our understanding of visual perception and awareness, and provide a glimpse of some ways in which change blindness might shape future research.
Neuropsychologia, 2010
It is commonly accepted that right posterior parietal cortex (PPC) plays an important role in updating spatial representations, directing visuospatial attention, and planning actions. However, recent studies suggest that right PPC may also be involved in processes that are more closely associated with our visual awareness as its activation level positively correlates with successful conscious change detection (Beck, D.M., Rees, G., Frith, C.D., & Lavie, N. (2001). Neural correlates of change detection and change blindness. Nature Neuroscience, 4, 645-650.). Furthermore, disruption of its activity increases the occurrences of change blindness, thus suggesting a causal role for right PPC in change detection (Beck, D.M., Muggleton, N., Walsh, V., & Lavie, N. (2006). Right parietal cortex plays a critical role in change blindness. Cerebral Cortex, 16, 712-717.). In the context of a 1-shot change detection paradigm, we applied transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) during different time intervals to elucidate the temporally precise involvement of PPC in change detection. While subjects attempted to detect changes between two image sets separated by a brief time interval, TMS was applied either during the presentation of picture 1 when subjects were encoding and maintaining information into visual short-term memory, or picture 2 when subjects were retrieving information relating to picture 1 and comparing it to picture 2. Our results show that change blindness occurred more often when TMS was applied during the viewing of picture 1, which implies that right PPC plays a crucial role in the processes of encoding and maintaining information in visual short-term memory. In addition, since our stimuli did not involve changes in spatial locations, our findings also support previous studies suggesting that PPC may be involved in the processes of encoding non-spatial visual information (Todd, J.J. & Marois, R. (2004). Capacity limit of visual short-term memory in human posterior parietal cortex. Nature, 428, 751-754.).
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