Hume's Theory of Mental Representation

An Enquiry Concerning Humean Understanding: A Criticism of Hume's Conception of Causal Events In An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume provides an empirical account of knowledge that hinges upon the Copy Principle. The Copy Principle states that for every idea there is a corresponding impression or set of impressions that gives rise to the idea itself or its component ideas. With this foundation, Hume criticizes the idea that we have access to causation as the necessary connection between cause and effect. Considering the collision of two billiard balls, Hume identifies no sensory impression from which we copy our notion of causation. Therefore, he concludes that we perceive nothing in the collision that necessitates the outcome,

The Review of Symbolic Logic, 2011

In this note we derive Robinson’s Arithmetic from Hume’s Principle in the context of very weak theories of classes and relations.

(Hume Studies, Volume 41, Number 2, 2015, pp. 171–200) Although Hume appeals to the representational features of perceptions in many arguments in the Treatise, his theory of representation has traditionally been regarded as a weak link in his epistemology. In particular, it has proven difficult to reconcile Hume’s use of representation as causal derivation and resemblance (the Copy Principle) with his use of representation in the context of impressions and abstract ideas. This paper offers a unified interpretation of representation in Hume that draws on the resources of Berkeley’s doctrine of signs. On this account, while the Copy Principle still occupies the core of Hume’s “content empiricism,” the manner in which any perception represents is understood as involving a relation of sign to thing signified. A sign/signified interpretation has the virtue of allowing Hume to remain within the strictures of his empiricism, while underwriting the various senses in which an impression or idea could possess content. Such an interpretation is not only adequate to account for the role that mental representations play in everyday behavior, but also for the purposes of elaborating the foundations of civil society that are Hume’s concern in Book 3 of the Treatise.

We can understand epistemic naturalism as the view that there are cases in which we are justified in holding a belief and cases in which we are not so justified, and that we can distinguish cases of one sort from cases of the other with reference to non-normative facts about the mechanisms that produce them. By my lights, Hume is an epistemic naturalist of this sort, and I propose in this paper a novel and detailed account of his epistemic naturalism. On my account, which I call the determinacy account, Hume characterizes epistemic justification in terms of the mind's feeling determined by the relation of cause and effect to move from one impression (or idea) to an(other) idea. I find a statement of this account, which Hume applies initially to what he calls the second system of realities, in Treatise 1.3.9. After rejecting other accounts of Hume's epistemic naturalism, I show how the determinacy account handles the cases Hume considers later in Treatise 1.3.  Epistemic naturalism, as I understand it here, is the view that there are cases in which we are justified in holding a belief and cases in which we are not so justified, and that we can distinguish cases of one sort from cases of the other with reference to non-normative facts about the mechanisms that produce our beliefs. 1 To those familiar with the literature on this subject, it might seem that the issue of Hume's epistemic naturalism has already been approached from every angle. 2 All the same, I think there is an as yet unnoticed and better angle from which to approach the issue, one that brings out the central role of feeling in Hume's account of epistemic justification. 3 On my account, Hume characterizes justification in terms of the mind's feeling determined to move by a relation that feels unchangeable.

International Journal of Arts and Humanities (IJAH), 2019

This work is a critical exposition of the core aspects of Hume's empiricist epistemological views. The epistemological problem of the origin, scope and certainty of knowledge was a subject of fierce debate between the Continental Rationalists and the British Empiricists. While the rationalists argued for the supremacy of reason, the empiricists stood for experience. As an empiricist Hume believed that certain knowledge is only gained through experience which consists of sensations, emotions and passions. Hume reduced the contents of the mind to perception which he divided into impressions and ideas. He also copiously addressed the idea of causality questioning the impressions that provide one with such an idea. This work employing the critical and expository methods surveyed the key points in Hume's discussion on perception and the association of ideas as well as Hume's analysis of the idea of causality. It gave a background of the empiricists project before presenting his epistemological theory of perception. The work further treated Hume's position with regard to the association of ideas and his analysis of causality. In the area of causality, the work critically looked at Hume's consideration of temporal succession, contiguity and necessary connection. In conclusion the work praised Hume's courageous, rigorous and consistent empiricist stance whose intensity led to a skeptic logical conclusion which is a necessary "antidote to dogmatism and fanaticism."

Synthese, 2006

Hume is a naturalist in many different respects and about many different topics; this paper argues that he is also a naturalist about intentionality and representation. It does so in the course of answering four questions about his theory of mental representation: (1) Which perceptions represent? (2) What can perceptions represent? (3) Why do perceptions represent at all? (4) How do perceptions represent what they do? It appears that, for Hume, all perceptions except passions can represent; and they can represent bodies, minds, and persons, with their various qualities. In addition, ideas can represent impressions and other ideas. However, he explicitly rejects the view that ideas are inherently representational, and he implicitly adopts a view according to which things (whether mental or non-mental) represent in virtue of playing, through the production of mental effects and dispositions, a significant part of the causal and/or functional role of what they represent. It is in virtue of their particular functional roles that qualitatively identical ideas are capable of representing particulars or general kinds; substances or modes; relations; past, present, or future; and individuals or compounds. Keywords Hume • Representation • Naturalism • Impressions • Ideas • Copy • External world • Resemblance • Bodies • Abstract ideas • Owen • Cohon There are many species of naturalism. Doxastic naturalism, we may say, is the doctrine that belief formation is an operation of nature. Epistemic naturalism is the doctrine that beliefs can have epistemic authority and be rightful objects of assent in virtue of the ways in which they result from operations of nature. Explanatory naturalism is the program of trying to explain phenomena without appeal to anything outside of

number of passages in his later work, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (e.g., Section XII, 15 [154-155]). For the empiricist Hume, who adheres to a nominalist gnoseology, there are no abstract, universal concepts or ideas (the abstract universal ideas or concepts of the moderate realists). Only names or words are universal, not ideas or concepts. "Hume maintains that we find a resemblance between objects and apply the same name to them; then, after a 'custom' of this kind has been established, the name revives the 'idea,' and the imagination conceives the object represented by the 'idea'" 1 Bittle points out Hume's sensist reductionism of ideas to images, writing that "according to Hume, the total content of the mind consists of perceptions. Perceptions are of two kinds: 'impressions' and 'ideas' or 'thoughts.' Impressions are those perceptions which are more lively and forceful, and they include sensations and emotions. The faint images of these impressions Hume terms ideas or thoughts. Impressions (sensations and emotions) are experienced; ideas or thoughts (faint images of sensations and emotions) are revived in imagination and memory…Hume's explanation of ideas as faint images of senseimpressions is totally inadequate. Since both are of a sensory character, they are concrete and individualized. Our ideas, however, are abstract and universal. There is a radical difference between 'sensations' and 'images' on the one hand and 'intellectual ideas' on the other. To ignore or deny these differences is a serious error." 2 Describing Hume's sensist nominalism concerning abstract, general ideas, James Daniel Collins writes: "In dealing with abstract, general ideas, Hume professes to be following Berkeley but, in fact, he comes closer to Hobbes's position. An abstract idea is one that is particular in its own nature, but general in its representation. 3 It acquires generality not from containing a universal meaning but from its connection with a general term. A term is called general in virtue of a twofold association that is built up in the mind by usage: first, between the term and the habit of the mind that evokes a particular idea; second, between the evoked idea and the other particular ideas with which customary bonds have been established. Upon presentation of the term, imagination not only calls forth the particular idea, associated with the term, but also places itself in a state of readiness to recall the remaining ideas in the associative group. The generality of abstract ideas resides in this readiness for associative recall of images." 4 In his A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume writes: "A great philosopher (Berkeley) has asserted that all general ideas are nothing but particular ones annexed to a certain term, which gives them a more extensive signification, and makes them recall upon occasion other individuals, which are similar to them. As I look upon this to be one of the greatest and most valuable discoveries which has been made of late in the republic of letters I shall here endeavour to confirm it by some arguments, which I hope will put it beyond all doubt and controversy." 5 Hume also writes in his later work, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding: "There is no such thing as abstract or general ideas, properly speaking; but all general ideas are, in reality, particular ones, that resemble in certain circumstances the idea present to the mind." 6 In his description of Hume's sensist, nominalist views on abstract, general ideas, Thonnard observes: "The existence of universal ideas in man is an undeniable fact. Hume, with his customary empiricism, reduces all the content of ideas to an incomplete, sensible image, designating but one individual in reality. How, then, does one explain the universal usage which we make of this concrete representation by giving it a common name enabling it to designate an indefinite number of similar individuals? "One must have recourse, for an explanation of this fact, to habit, the source of the law of association. Once we have seen by numerous experiences that a concrete image, properly prepared, as the one which stands for this particular man, can be used to designate another, similar individual, we designate the image by a word. We then habitually associate any sort of similar individual with the word. "This habit, once set within us, has a double property. a) It becomes an evocative tendency, so that the common name is applied to any individual whatsoever, and is ready to pass to all of those associated with the preceding experience; at the same time, it does not always 2

Organon F: International Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 2010

Hume's Principle (HP) states that for any two (sortal) concepts, F and G, the number of Fs is identical to the number of Gs iff the Fs are one-one correlated with the Gs. Backed by second-order logic HP is supposed to be the starting point for the neo-logicist program of the foundations of arithmetic. The principle brings a number of formal and philosophical controversies. In this paper I discuss some arguments against it brought out by Trobok, as well as by Potter and Smiley, designed to undermine a claim that HP and its instances (such as "the number of the forks on the table is identical to the number of the knives on the table iff the forks are one-one correlated with the knives") are true. Their criticism starts from distinguishing the objective truth from a weak or stipulative one, and focusing on fictional identities such as "Hamlet = Hamlet" or "Jekyll = Hyde." They argue that numerical identities (as occur in instances of HP) are much the same as fictional identities; that we can attribute them only a weak or stipulative truth; and, consequently, that neo-logicists are not entitled to ontological conclusions concerning numbers they derive from HP and its instances. As opposed to that, I argue that such a criticism is illconceived. The analogy between the numerical and fictional identities is far-fetched. So, relative to such a criticism, HP has more prospects than some authors are prepared to admit.

2014

Jesse Prinz has recently argued that if sensibility theory is true, then there is a sense in which what has been called ‘Hume’s Law’ – the position that one cannot derive an ought from an is – can be violated. In this short critical note, I argue that Prinz’s argument is problematic for at least three reasons. First, the ought that he derives from an is is not genuinely prescriptive. Second, Prinz’s argument violates the widely accepted principle of disquotation and an argument that he provides against that principle fails. Finally, there is an ambiguity in Prinz’s argument, which renders it either invalid or innocent, that is, it does not pose a threat to Hume’s Law.

Understanding the distinction between impressions and ideas that Hume draws in the opening paragraph of his " A Treatise on Human Nature " is essential for understanding much of Hume's philosophy. This however is a task that has been the cause of a good deal controversy that rocks the literature of Hume. There is an alternative reading to the distinction as being between original mental entities and copied mental entities. Hume takes himself to discover this distinction as that which underlies our pre-theoretical sorting of mental entities. Hume's reading on human nature make him a more philosophical robust one and avoids many of the difficulties of previous interpretations. The focus of this essay is to show how ideas which are abstract in nature come about. This work shows how we gained knowledge through impressions and ideas. Hume also pointed this out on his " A Treatise on Human Nature " when he said everything we are of can be classified under two headings which are impressions and ideas. It is the duty of this work to show how impressions and ideas constitute our knowledge of the world.

The concept of reflection plays an equivocal role in the Treatise. It is identified as both the key to the formation of more accurate beliefs and the means to the destruction of belief altogether. I attempt to resolve this apparent paradox by showing that there are two distinct kinds of reflection in Book 1: legitimate, or "proper," reflection and illegitimate reflection. Despite evidence to the contrary-including Hume's own claim that he cannot establish that excessive reflections (one variant of illegitimate reflection) should not affect our beliefs-I argue that Hume can justifiably draw a distinction between proper and illegitimate reflection based on epistemological grounds available to him that he does not recognize.

The European Legacy, 2013

This article shows that in 1.4.2.15-24 of the Treatise of Human Nature, Hume presents his own position on objects, which is to be distinguished from both the vulgar and philosophical conception of objects. Here, Hume argues that objects that are effectively imagined to have a “perfect identity” are imagined due to the constancy and coherence of our perceptions (what we may call ‘level 1 constancy and coherence’). In particular, we imagine that objects cause such perceptions, via what I call ‘indirect causation.’ In virtue of imagining ideas of objects that have a perfect identity, our perceptions seem to be even more constant and coherent (what we may call ‘level 2 constancy and coherence’). Thus, in addition to seeing that Hume is presenting his own position on objects in this section of the Treatise, we see that he is working with a previously unrecognized kind of causation, i.e., indirect causation, and that he has two kinds of constancy and coherence in mind: level 1 and level 2.